Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Thomas DePetrillo filed suit against Belo Holdings, Inc. and Citadel Broadcasting Company, challenging the validity of Citadel's right of first refusal to purchase a broadcasting tower and surrounding real estate owned by Belo. The superior court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff, as a stranger to the original lease agreement between Belo and Citadel, had no standing to challenge Citadel's right of first refusal or the effectiveness of its exercise. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff lacked authority to challenge the validity of the right of first refusal; and (2) Citadel's right of first refusal was enforceable as a matter of law.

This case arose when the University told Daniel A. Moore, an artist who painted famous football scenes involving the University since 1979, that he would need permission to depict the University's uniforms because they were trademarks. Moore contended that he did not need permission because the uniforms were being used realistically to portray historic events. The parties could not reach a resolution and the University subsequently sued Moore for breach of contract, trademark infringement, and unfair competition. The court held that, as evidenced by the parties' course of conduct, Moore's depiction of the University's uniforms in his unlicensed paintings, prints, and calendars was not prohibited by the prior licensing agreements. Additionally, the paintings, prints, and calendars did not violate the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), because these artistically expressive objects were protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment by the district court with respect to the paintings and prints, and reversed with respect to the prints as replicated on calendars. With respect to the licensing agreements' coverage of the mugs and other "mundane products," the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment because disputed issues of fact remained. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Plaintiff brought suit against Deerbrook for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by Deerbrook's insured and after plaintiff received a judgment against the insured, the insured assigned his bad faith claim to plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Deerbrook breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to its insured when Deerbrook did not attempt to reach a settlement of plaintiff's claims after the insured's liability in excess of the policy limit became reasonably clear. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's rejection of his request to instruct the jury that it could consider Deerbrook's failure to effectuate a settlement in determining whether Deerbrook breached the implied covenant. The court concluded that plaintiff's proposed jury instruction was consistent with the law but that there was no evidentiary basis for the instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

MT Technology Enterprises, LLC filed an amended complaint against Cristol, LLC, several members of Cristol's board of managers, and an employee of Cristol, Cristol's attorney, and the attorney's firm, alleging, inter alia, statutory conspiracy, tortious interference with economic expectancy in MT technologies, and breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court imposed sanctions against Cristol, its board, and its employee (Defendants) for discovery violations. The case proceeded to a jury against Defendants, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of MT. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in its interpretation of Va. Code Ann. 13.1-1057(A) and in concluding that MT satisfied the registration requirements of the statute; (2) the trial court did not err in imposing a sanction for discovery abuses; but (3) the trial court abused its discretion by forbidding cross-examination of witnesses regarding damages. Remanded for further proceedings on damages only.

The Jared and Donna Murayama 1997 Trust sought damages arising from a settlement agreement between the Trust, its trustee Jared Murayama, and two of the defendants, NISC Holdings, LLC and Omen LLC, which transaction included NISC's repurchase of the Trust's voting stock in NISC (the "settlement agreement"). The Trust claimed it was damaged from selling the stock to NISC for substantially less than its fair market value as a result of the Trust's reliance on fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations of Defendants. The circuit court found that the Trust's allegations established that, as a matter of law, the Trust did not reasonably rely upon Defendants' alleged fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations regarding the value of the NISC stock at the time of the settlement. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment sustaining Defendants' demurrer, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment based upon both the language of the settlement agreement and the allegations regarding the adversarial relationship between Murayama and the defendants that precipitated the settlement.

Perot Systems Government Services filed an amended complaint against Defendants, 21st Century Systems, Inc, and several individuals, alleging that Defendants, all of whom were former Perot employees, conspired for the purpose of willfully and maliciously attempting to destroy Perot and steal away Perot business by unfairly and improperly using Perot's confidential and proprietary information. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Perot on all claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defense motions to strike testimony regarding lost goodwill damages, and accordingly, the court erred when it refused to set aside the jury's award of lost goodwill damages based upon that testimony; (2) the court did not err when it refused to set aside the jury's award of both punitive and treble damages in favor of Perot; and (3) the court did not err when it refused to set aside the jury's award of computer forensics damages.

This action arose from an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit wherein plaintiff appealed the dismissal of insurance coverage claims under section 627.701(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and the denial of a motion to enforce execution of the judgment, and defendant cross-appealed the denial of motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. In answering five certified questions, the court concluded that, under Florida law: (1) first-party claims were actually statutory bad-faith claims that must be brought under section 624.155; (2) an insured could not bring a claim against an insurer for failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established by section 627.701(4)(a); (3) an insurer's failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established in section 627.701(4)(a) did not render a noncompliant hurricane deductible provision in an insurance policy void and unenforceable as the Legislature had not provided for this penalty; and (4) a contractual provision mandating payment of benefits upon "entry of a final judgment" did not waive the insurer's procedural right to post a bond and stay the execution of a money judgment pending resolution of appeal.

KM Upstream, LLC and Newpoint, Inc. entered into a contract whereby Newport would construct for KM's amine plant. Newpoint subcontracted with Elkorn Construction, Inc. to build the foundation and perform other work. Elkhorn subsequently filed a lien statement with the county clerk. Elkhorn later filed a complaint against KM for, inter alia, foreclosure of the lien as a mechanic's lien. Newpoint was later added as a defendant. The district court granted summary judgment to Elkhorn to allow foreclosure on the mechanic's lien. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment; but (2) reversed and remanded the district court's determination that $181,369 of Elkhorn's lien claim was disputed and its subsequent order subtracting that amount from Elkhorn's judgment.

In this action the Cincinnati City School District Board of Education asked the Supreme Court to rule on the validity of a deed restriction it placed on school property that it offered for sale at a public auction. At issue was whether the deed restriction contravened public policy by preventing an unused school building from being used by a public charter school. The trial court concluded that the deed restriction was void as against public policy, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because this case involved a contract between a private party and a political subdivision, there was a compelling reason to apply the principle of the public policy exception to parties' rights to make contracts; and (2) therefore, the inclusion of a deed restriction preventing the use of property for school purposes in the contract for sale of an unused school building was unenforceable as against public policy.

Defendant entered into a contract for deed for the sale and purchase of Plaintiffs' building. After Defendant discontinued making payments and failed to pay property taxes as required by the contract, Plaintiffs obtained Defendant' quit claim deed from escrow, recorded it, retook possession of the building, and resold the contract. Plaintiffs then filed suit against Defendant for breach of contract. Defendant moved to summary judgment, arguing that because Plaintiffs chose to terminate the contract, take possession, and retain contract payments as liquidated damages rather than sue for the accelerated balance and additional damages under the contract, their breach of contract action was precluded under the election of remedies doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs elected to invoke the remedy of terminating the contract and retaking possession of the property, and that election, under the contract provisions at issue, precluded the additional relief sought here.