Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an African-American male of Nigerian origin, was hired by Atlantek, Inc. Zebra Technologies later acquired Atlantek. Three years later, Plaintiff was laid off. Plaintiff signed a release document and submitted it to Zebra Atlantek without consulting with his attorney. According to another document received by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's receipt of separation benefits was contingent on the receipt by Zebra Atlantek of a signed copy of the release document wherein Plaintiff released any claims under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) or any state law prohibiting employment discrimination or harassment. Plaintiff later commenced an action against Defendants, Zebra Atlantek and several individuals, alleging that he had been discriminated against in violation of the FEPA and State Civil Rights Act. Defendants counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit constituted a material breach of the release document. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that FEPA did not render the release document void as it applied to Plaintiff's pending FEPA claims.

In this case the Supreme Court addressed several issues arising from a dispute over a series of property transactions. Plaintiffs sued Defendants under various theories of liability, including breach of contract and fraud. Defendants countersued for, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation and fraud by concealment. Defendants also brought a claim against Plaintiffs under Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.257, which provides a statutory cause of action for the victim of a real estate licensee's breach of the various duties imposed by Nev. Rev. Stat 645.252-.254. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court, holding (1) compromise offers are not admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a failure to mitigate damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.105; (2) although Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.251 does not, in all instances, shield real estate licensees from common law forms of liability, it precludes such liability when the type of conduct complained of is covered by sections 645.252-.254; and (3) punitive damages may not be recovered under section 645.257, but compensatory damages are recoverable under the statute in accordance with the measure of damages that appropriately compensates the injured party for the losses sustained as a result of the real estate licensee's violations. Remanded.

The parcel of land that was the subject of this appeal was once owned by a school. An adjacent property, now owned by Defendants, Eric and Wendy Federer, was previously owned by Wendy's father. In 1990, the school sold its property to a limited liability corporation subject to a set of restrictive covenants that did not expressly reference any third parties. The present action arose when Plaintiff, the current owner of the property, sought permits to develop the school property in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the restrictive covenants. Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish the unenforceability of the restrictive covenants as to Defendants. Defendants counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to Plaintiff's property and to enforce the restrictive covenants. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the covenants at issue in this case were not void as a matter of law; and (2) questions of material fact existed as to whether Defendants were entitled to enforce them. Remanded.

Appellants, a clinic study center and three medical doctors, filed an action against Appellees, Dr. Samuel and Marilyn Boellner, alleging breaches of contract for a covenant not to compete, tortious inteference with a business expectancy, defamation, and injunctive relief. Appellees counterclaimed for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and declaratory judgment on the noncompete agreement. The trial court returned verdicts in favor of both Appellants and Appellees. Appellants later caused a writ of garnishment to be issued to reach assets of Marilyn Boellner held in an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). Appellants moved to declare the IRA statute unconstitutional. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion and quashed the writ of garnishment. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute was constitutional, as the IRA exemption provided in Ark. Code Ann. 16-66-220(a)(1) is not an absolute exemption of all personal property, and, as such, does not offend Ark. Const. art. IV, section 2.

After a landslide damaged their home, homeowners Timothy Jackowski and Eri Takase (the Jackowskis) sued the sellers of the home, seeking rescission or, in the alternative, damages for fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The homeowners also sued the sellers' broker and agent, alleging fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of common law fiduciary duties. They leveled similar claims against their own broker and agent together with a claim for breach of statutory fiduciary duties. The trial court entered summary judgment dismissing all of the Jackowskis' claims, except the fraudulent concealment claims against the sellers and the sellers’ broker and agent regarding cracks in the concrete basement floor. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in part and reversed it in part. The sellers and the homeowners’ broker and agent then sought review by the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals and to address four issues stemming from a lawsuit by LensCrafters to enforce a noncompete provision against optometrist Dennis Kehoe after a sublease contract between the two parties ended. After review of the "complex, convoluted, and contentious eleven-year dispute," the Supreme Court held that (1) the district court properly dismissed LensCrafters' breach of contract claim on summary judgment because LensCrafters terminated the parties' contract as a matter of law and, with it, the contract's noncompete provision; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Kehoe's request to supplement his pleadings shortly before trial; and (3) summary judgment dismissing Kehoe's malicious abuse of process and tortious interference with contract counterclaims was proper because Kehoe did not demonstrate genuine issues of material fact. Because we hold that the noncompete provision was not in effect during any relevant time, the Court did not address Kehoe's fourth issue, whether the provision would have been contrary to public policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part.

Plaintiff, both individually and as the trustee of several trusts that she directed, asserted claims against defendants arising out of her decision to invest in Lord Baltimore. Defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims asserted against them. The court held that defendants' motion to dismiss was granted, except to plaintiff's claim that there was an implied covenant in the Shareholders' Agreement requiring that repurchase proposals be presented to and considered by the Board, which was not dismissed.

This case was a consolidation of three separate wrongful death lawsuits. Each lawsuit arose from a nursing home's attempt to compel a plaintiff to participate in arbitration pursuant to a clause in a nursing home admission contract. The Supreme Court (1) ruled that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable and unenforceable in two of the cases, and (2) held that the Nursing Home Act could not be relied upon to bar enforcement of the arbitration clause in the third case. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded to consider whether the arbitration clauses were enforceable under state common law principles that were not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA. On remand, the Supreme Court (1) held that the doctrine of unconscionability that the Court explicated in Brown I was a general, state, common-law, contract principle that was not specific to arbitration and did not implicate the FAA; (2) reversed the trial courts' prior orders compelling arbitration in two of the cases and permitted the parties to raise arguments regarding unconscionability anew before the trial court; and (3) found the issue of unconscionability in the third case was not considered by the trial court but may be raised on remand.

At issue in this case was the scope of an appraisal clause in a fire and wind insurance policy, which provided that either party could demand an appraisal if the parties failed to agree on "the amount of loss." Insureds initiated a breach of contract action, arguing that the appraisal clause did not apply to their claim for damages because the parties disputed whether the damage was covered by the policy, not the cost of repairing the damage. The district court ordered the parties to participate in an appraisal process after determining that the amount of loss under the appraisal clause included a "causation element." The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the phrase "amount of loss," as it related to the authority of the appraiser under the policy, unambiguously permitted the appraiser to determine the cause of the loss; and (2) the appraiser must necessarily determine the cause of the loss as well as the amount necessary to repair the loss as an incidental step in the appraisal process in this case.

Respondents Kelly Rhoden and her daughters, Ashley Arrieta and Emerlynn Dickey, were involved in a motor vehicle accident while riding in a vehicle owned and operated by Arrieta. The parties stipulated that the Respondents are relatives residing in the same household, and that Arrieta's insurance policy with Nationwide did not provide UIM coverage. Rhoden owned two vehicles that she also insured through Nationwide under a policy that did provide UIM coverage. Rhoden's policy contained a term specifying that the insurance it provided was primary when the covered vehicle was involved in the accident but excess when the involved vehicle was not the covered vehicle but was owned by the policyholder or a resident relative. Nationwide brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that UIM coverage was not available to any of the Respondents under Rhoden's policy. Nationwide contended that because Arrieta's policy had no UIM coverage, clause 3(b), a portability limitation clause, operated to prevent any Respondent from recovering under Rhoden's policy. The trial court held that UIM coverage under Rhoden's policy was available to all three Respondents because such coverage is personal and portable, and Respondents were either named insureds or resident relatives under Rhoden's policy. Nationwide appealed the decision to the court of appeals, which reversed the trial court with regard to Arrieta, and affirmed the trial court's ruling that UIM coverage was available to Rhoden and Dickey under Rhoden's policy. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether public policy was offended by the portability limitation clause preventing non-owner resident relatives from importing UIM coverage from an at-home vehicle's policy when the involved vehicle lacked UIM coverage. The Supreme Court held that South Carolina's public policy that UIM coverage is personal and portable requires UIM coverage to be provided to Rhoden and Dickey, who did not own the vehicle involved in the accident, while denied to Arrieta, who owned the vehicle involved in the accident but chose not to purchase UIM coverage. The Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision.