Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. appealed a Chancery Court judgment granting Defendant Vulcan Materials Company relief on its counterclaims, and an accompanying injunction. The Chancery Court enjoined Martin for a four month period from continuing to prosecute its pending Exchange Offer and Proxy Contest to acquire control of Vulcan. That injunctive relief was granted to remedy Martin's adjudicated violations of two contracts between Martin and Vulcan: a Non-Disclosure Letter Agreement (the "NDA") and a Common Interest, Joint Defense and Confidentiality Agreement (the "JDA"). Finding that the Chancery Court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the equities favored Vulcan, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's decision.

At issue before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case was whether an adverse claim to a stake may be so lacking in substance that a neutral stakeholder cannot interplead in good faith. Interpleader is proper when a stakeholder has at least a good faith belief that there are conflicting colorable claims. Appellee in this case was an insurance company that sought to interplead disputed insurance proceeds. Seeking to interplead the insurance funds, Appellee filed a counterclaim against Appellant and a third party complaint against Appellant's former husband. The district court found that interpleader was appropriate. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellee interpleaded in good faith, and consequently, the district court's judgment in interpleader was proper.

After Lender failed to respond to Plaintiff's correspondence regarding ownership of his loan, Lender foreclosed on Borrower's property. Plaintiff filed suit against all the actors involved (Defendants), alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) , seeking injunctive relief against foreclosure, and claiming breach of contract, failure to act in good faith, and wrongful foreclosure under Nevada law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's Nevada law claims with prejudice. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint claiming a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court dismissed the amended complaint without leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's TILA and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, as Lender was not legally required to respond to Plaintiff's correspondence in its capacity as loan servicer; and (2) vacated the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims regarding the foreclosure of Plaintiff's property and remanded those remaining claims to the district court.

This case concerned a circuit court's order to transfer to a tribal court a civil suit that was brought against a tribally owned entity by a nonmember of the tribe. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it transferred the action to tribal court. At issue was the interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. 801.54, which authorizes the circuit court, in its discretion, to transfer an action to the tribal court and sets forth the conditions for doing so. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts and the applicable law were not fully stated and considered together in making the determinations that the statute requires, the order to transfer was an erroneous exercise of the circuit court's discretion. Remanded.

RTI owns patents relating to the automatic routing of telephone calls based upon cost. Aware of infringement by Speakeasy, a telecommunications company, RTI offered to release Speakeasy from liability in exchange for a one-time payment under RTI’s tiered pricing structure. In 2007, the companies entered a “Covenant Not to Sue” with a payment of $475,000 to RTI, and a provision barring Speakeasy from challenging, or assisting others in challenging, the validity of the patents. The agreement defined “Speakeasy” to include both Speakeasy and Best Buy, which had previously announced plans to acquire Speakeasy. Three years later, Best Buy announced a plan to sell Speakeasy and merge it into Covad. RTI again learned of an infringement and notified Covad. Covad sought a declaratory judgment that the patents were invalid. The action was later dismissed voluntarily. RTI initiated the present lawsuit. The district court dismissed, holding that the doctrine of licensee estoppel, under which a licensee of intellectual property “effectively recognizes the validity of that property and is estopped from contesting its validity,” is unenforceable in the context of challenges to patents, and that the no-challenge clause was contrary to the public interest in litigating the validity of patents. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiffs purchased furniture from the Fortunoff store and purchased a furniture protection plan. Defendant sold the plans to Fortunoff, which in turn sold them to plaintiffs. After the Fortunoff store closed and the company went into bankruptcy, defendant rejected plaintiffs’ claims under the plan. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging breach of contract, that the store closing termination clause in the plan violated New York General Business Law 395-a, and deceptive business practices in violation of General Business Law 36 349. The district court dismissed, holding that there was no implied cause of action under 395-a. The Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals: May parties seek to have contractual provisions that run contrary to General Business Law 395-a declared void as against public policy? May plaintiffs bring suit pursuant to 349 on the theory that defendants deceived them by including a contractual provision that violates 395-a and later enforcing this agreement?

Petitioner Leandre Layton, on behalf of himself and the similarly-situated members of his conditionally-certified class (collectively, "Drivers"), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DHL Express, Inc. ("DHL") on his claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). DHL contracted with Sky Land Express, Inc. to manage local parcel deliveries. Petitioner worked on DHL routes for Sky Land. Petitioner filed his collective action for unpaid overtime, naming DHL, Sky Land and Gary Littlefield (owner and president of Sky Land) as his joint employers and defendants to the suit. DHL moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was not the drivers' employer. The district court granted DHL's motion: "DHL did everything it could possibly do to relate to Sky Land only as an "independent contractor[."] The contract with Sky Land allowed DHL to exercise only the minimal supervision necessary to monitor compliance with the contract. The undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that if plaintiffs were employed by anybody, they were employed by Sky Land, the entity that they ostentatiously dismissed as a defendant, for reasons this court can only guess at. DHL was not an employer, much less a joint employer." After a thorough examination of the realities of the economic relationship between Drivers and DHL, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the grounds that DHL was not a joint employer of the Drivers.

Plaintiff brought a Deceptive Trade Practices Act suit against Company and its co-operators for violating the terms of a contract. Through a process server, Plaintiff served all three Defendants with citations, but one citation contained an error in a co-operator's name. Defendants failed to file a timely answer, and Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendants filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that service on the co-operator was improper and that Defendants established the necessary Craddock elements to set aside the default judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants asserted facts that, if true, established the first Craddock element, i.e., that the failure to appear was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was the result of a mistake or an accident. Remanded for consideration of the second and third elements of the Craddock test.

This suit was filed by a daughter against an organ donation charity when she discovered that the charity - contrary to an earlier representation to her - would allegedly profit from harvesting her deceased mother's tissues. The charity requested a defense from its insurer, and the insurer denied a defense. The insurer's subsequent suit against the charity resulted in two certified questions from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held (1) the insurance policy provision for coverage of "personal injury" does not include coverage for mental anguish, unrelated to physical damage to or disease of the daughter's body; and (2) the insurance policy provision for coverage of "property damages," does not include coverage for the underlying plaintiff's loss of use of her deceased mother's tissues, organs, bones, and body parts.

Plaintiffs commenced an arbitration proceeding against Defendant pursuant to terms of a written agreement between the parties. Eber subsequently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, and the arbitration was automatically stayed. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint for determination that debts are nondischargeable and for damages. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from automatic stay in the bankruptcy court proceeding and a motion to compel arbitration in the adversary proceeding. Both motions were denied. The bankruptcy court found that Plaintiffs' claims were discharged. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration because granting the motion would have conflicted with the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code; and (2) the Court did not need address the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for relief from the automatic stay because the stay had already dissolved before the bankruptcy judge ruled on the motion.