Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Fernandes injured his back when he stepped into a hole in the floor of a tire "shed," an old shipping container, which was on property leased by AGAR to Fernandes's employer, Penske Truck Leasing. He sued AGAR on the theory that it owed him a duty of care to maintain and repair the tire shed under the lease. The district court granted summary judgment to AGAR under Massachusetts law. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that, under the lease, Agar had no duty to repair or maintain the shed. View "Fernandes v. Agar Supply Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs leased state trust land and owned all structures and improvements on the land. Under the terms of the lease, the improvements that existed on the land would become the state's property upon lease termination. After the leases were entered into, the legislature created a property tax classification ("Class Nine") in which property was taxed at a lower rate than that applicable to commercial property. For certain years, Maricopa County classified the improvements under the classification applicable to general commercial property and taxed Plaintiffs accordingly. The State Board of Equalization denied Plaintiffs' request for Class Nine classification. Plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgment action in the tax court. The tax court granted summary judgment for the County based on Plaintiffs' failure to meet the requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-12009(A)(1)(a), which provides that improvements on land leased from the state qualify for a reduced ad valorem tax rate if they become the property of the state on termination of the leasehold interest in the property. The Supreme Court remanded, holding that section 42-12009(A)(1)(a) applies when, at the time of taxation, improvements exist on the land that, under the terms of the lease, would become the state's property upon lease termination. View "CNL Hotels & Resorts, Inc. v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

In 2000 Go-Best wired $5 million to an account entitled "Morris M. Goldings client account" at Citizens Bank, based on representations made by Morris M. Goldings, who was then a Massachusetts attorney. Goldings later admitted that the representations were false and that he had used the money to pay other debts. Go-Best filed suit against Citizens Bank, bringing claims of misrepresentation, conversion, aiding and abetting a fraud, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a conversion, and negligence. Citizens Bank had no knowledge of Goldings's scheme to defraud Go-Best but failed to notify the Board of Bar Overseers of dishonored checks issued on the client account more than six months before Go-Best wired funds into that account. The trial court dismissed, but a divided Appeals Court reversed in part, vacating dismissal of claims of negligence and of aiding and abetting. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reinstated dismissal. Without actual knowledge, the bank's duty to notify the board of dishonored checks from trust accounts arose only from its contractual duty, not from any duty in tort, so the bank could not be liable to Go-Best for any negligence in fulfilling that duty. View "Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of MA" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases involved two properties purchased by John Hogan. Each parcel became subject to a deed of trust when Hogan took out loans from Long Beach Mortgage Company. Hogan was delinquent on both loans, which triggered foreclosure proceedings. A notice of trustee's sale recorded for the first parcel identified Washington Mutual Bank as the beneficiary and Deutsche Bank as the beneficiary for the second parcel. Hogan filed lawsuits seeking to enjoin the trustees' sales unless the beneficiaries proved they were entitled to collect on the respective notes. The superior court dismissed the cases. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Arizona's non-judicial foreclosure statute (Statute) does not require presentation of the original note before commencing foreclosure proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's orders dismissing Hogan's complaints and vacated the court of appeals, holding that the Statute does not require the beneficiary to prove its authority or show the note before the trustee may commence a non-judicial foreclosure. View "Hogan v. Washington Mut. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Winforge claimed that defendants breached a hotel development agreement between the parties, causing delay and costs that caused Winforge to default on the separate construction loan agreement between the parties. Defendants cross-claimed that Winforge breached the development agreement. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants and found that the parties had never entered into a final, enforceable contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even a signed writing is not a contract if there is no mutual assent or “distinct intention common to both;” the parties continued to exchange new drafts of the Scope of Work even after they had signed the Agreement. To the extent that defendants incurred any obligations, their failure to perform was not a breach because that failure was due to Winforge’s deficient performance of Winforge’s duties.

Plaintiffs purchased a house from Defendant, who built the house. Plaintiffs later discovered mold in some of the windows and walls and sued Defendant. The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs on their negligence claim but found in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim. The jury also found that Plaintiffs failed to perform all, or substantially all, of the things the contract required them to do and therefore the jury did not reach the question of whether Defendant breached the contract. The Supreme Court held (1) the economic loss rule prevented recovery of economic damages within the scope of the parties' contract but allowed for recovery of damages to other property or for bodily injury; (2) the trial court did not err when it permitted Dr. Eugene Cole to testify as an expert witness; (3) because Defendant prevailed in his claims under the contract, which provided the only basis for awarding attorney fees, he was entitled to recover attorney fees for the breach of contract suit; and (4) the trial court did not err when it denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Remanded.

Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. sued the City of Valdez for damages after Valdez applied for a grant from the State of Alaska for funding to convert Sea Hawk's seafood processing facility into a fish meal plant but then declined to accept the $600,000 grant that the State conditionally awarded to Valdez. On pre-trial motions, the superior court dismissed Sea Hawk's claims for breach of contract, breach of an agreement to negotiate, and breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith. Valdez and Sea Hawk filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Sea Hawk's remaining claim for promissory estoppel, which the court denied. Shortly before trial, the court dismissed Sea Hawk's promissory estoppel claim as a discovery sanction. Sea Hawk and Valdez both appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: Sea Hawk's claims were based on statements made and a letter sent by the Valdez City Manager to the owner of Sea Hawk. Because these communications, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Sea Hawk, were insufficient as a matter of law to support Sea Hawk's claims. The Court reversed the lower court's ruling denying Valdez summary judgment on Sea Hawk's promissory estoppel claim.

AECOM, Inc. hired Centennial Archaeology, Inc. to perform cultural resources survey work in connection with a wind-energy project. When AECOM refused to pay Centennial for some of its work, Centennial brought suit against AECOM in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. Centennial prevailed on several claims and the parties ultimately settled on appeal the issues raised with respect to the merits of the litigation. This appeal concerned the parties' dispute about the district court's postjudgment order requiring AECOM to pay Centennial $58,361.51 in attorney fees for misconduct in the course of discovery. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: the magistrate judge and district court reasonably found that AECOM had frustrated the discovery process and stalled the resolution of this case. And the amount of the fee award was proper. In particular, Centennial was entitled to an award under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 even though its attorneys were working for a fixed fee.

Art Etc., LLC sought a declaratory judgment that the sale of inventory purchased from Angel Gifts, Inc. and Donald Schmit would amount to copyright infringement in violation of the United States Copyright Act. Angel Gifts and Donald Schmit moved to stay the proceedings pending arbitration, invoking an arbitration provision in an agreement between the parties. The district court denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the parties intended for the arbitration provision to apply only under certain circumstances; and (2) Art. Etc.'s claims did not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision. Thus, arbitration in this case was not required.

This appeal arose from a dispute between two competing creditors, DAFCO, LLC, and New Phase Investments, LLC. DAFCO appealed the district court's determination on summary judgment that DAFCO's deed of trust, although first recorded, was void under I.C. 32-912 because it encumbered community real property but was not signed by both spouses. Because I.C. 32-912 was enacted for the protection of the community rather than third-party creditors, the Supreme Court found that New Phase could not invoke that statute to void DAFCO's competing encumbrance. Accordingly, the Court reversed: the district court erred in declaring DAFCO's trust deed void under that statute at New Phase's request.