Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The issues before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the services provided by plaintiff's wife constituted services "for an injured person's care," whether the Court of Appeals properly remanded this case to the circuit court for findings of fact regarding the extent to which expenses for services for plaintiff's care were actually incurred, and whether the circuit court erred by awarding an hourly rate that corporate agencies charge for rendering services, rather than an hourly rate that individual caregivers receive for those services. Upon review, the Court held that "allowable expenses" must be "for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation." Because the Michigan no-fault act does not create different standards depending on who provides the services, this requirement applies equally to services that a family member provides and services that an unrelated caregiver provides. For this case, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that plaintiff may recover "allowable expenses" to the extent that they encompass services that are reasonably necessary for plaintiff's care when the care is "related to [plaintiff's] injuries." However, because the circuit court erred by awarding damages for allowable expenses without requiring proof that the underlying charges were actually incurred, the Court agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the circuit court for a determination whether charges for allowable expenses were actually incurred. In determining the hourly rate for attendant care services, the circuit court "clearly erred" by ruling that plaintiff was entitled to an hourly rate of $40 for attendant care services because that rate was entirely inconsistent with the evidence of an individual's rate of compensation, including the compensation that plaintiff's wife, actually received as an employee hired to care for plaintiff. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Douglas v. Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Bowers Oil and Gas, Inc. (BOG) entered into a Gas Purchase Contract with Kinder Morgan Operating, L.P. (Kinder Morgan), pursuant to which Kinder Morgan agreed to purchase coal bed methane gas from certain of BOG's wells. Kinder Morgan transferred its interest in the Contract, and Kinder Morgan's successor eventually terminated the Contract pursuant to a provision that allowed either party to terminate if in the terminating party's sole opinion, the sale or purchase of the gas became unprofitable or uneconomical. BOG thereafter filed suit asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Following a bench trial, the district court found no contract breach or covenant breach and ruled in favor of Kinder Morgan and its successor. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court found no breach of contract in the successor's removal of the pipelines connecting BOG to the gas gathering system and that the Gas Purchase Contract was properly terminated for economic cause. Furthermore, the Court found no clear error in the district court's rejection of BOG's claim for breach of the implied covenant and fair dealing. View "Bowers Oil & Gas, Inc. v. DCP Douglas, LLC" on Justia Law

Ruth Mendenhall appealed a summary judgment in favor of Property and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford on her equitable garnishment claim seeking insurance coverage for the death of her husband, Len Mendenhall. The trial court's judgment was premised on the conclusion that Len was an "employee" under the terms of the Hartford policy and, therefore, was excluded from coverage. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that, given the facts of this case and the policy language, Len was not an "employee" but was instead a "temporary worker" subject to coverage under the terms of the Hartford policy. View "Mendenhall v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Hartford" on Justia Law

When Sean and Dee Anna Ryan divorced, they agreed to sell two properties they owned and divide the proceeds, subject to a proviso that neither party was required to accept a sale yielding net proceeds below specified minimums. When the properties could not be sold at or above the specified minimums, Dee Anna refused to waive the proviso. Sean filed a motion for relief from judgment, seeking a court order that the properties be sold at prevailing fair market value and the private agreement be declared of no further force and effect. The trial court denied Sean's request. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) general rules applicable to contract construction dictated that Dee Anna was not required to agree to sell the properties for net proceeds less than the amounts set forth in the parties' agreement; and (2) Sean was not entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B), under which a court may relieve a party from a judgment. View "Ryan v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Appellant and Respondents entered into a lease agreement for a residence to be used by one of Respondents. Appellant later filed a petition for breach of contract and property damage against Respondents, claiming they had breached the terms of the lease and had committed waste on the property. Respondents filed a counterclaim against Appellant. The trial court ruled in favor of Respondents on Appellant's petition and in favor of Appellant on Respondents' counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, among other things, that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's determination that Respondents did not breach the lease agreement. View "Kieffer v. Icaza" on Justia Law

In 2008, St. Louis County (County) assumed control of solid waste collection in County's unincorporated areas. Prior to that, waste collection services had been provided by private entities, including respondent Haulers. Following a 2007 amendment to Mo. Rev. Stat. to 260.247, which extended hauler-protective business regulations to counties that wish to provide trash collection, Haulers sued County for a declaratory judgment that County must comply with section 260.247. Haulers also claimed they suffered money damages as a result of County's failure to comply with the statute. The circuit court found County liable to Haulers on the theory of implied in law contract and awarded Haulers $1.2 million in damages. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's calculation of damages, holding that the circuit court was incorrect to exclude discovery or evidence of Haulers' expenses or net profit; and (2) affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Remanded. View "Am. Eagle Waste Indus. v. St. Louis County" on Justia Law

This case arose from an underlying dispute involving three parties related to an alleged breach of an assignment agreement. The three parties disagreed over the appointment of arbitrators to hear their dispute. The agreement to arbitrate seemed designated for a two-party dispute. Notwithstanding that the parties agreed to arbitrate before three arbitrators, the district court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration before five arbitrators: three party-appointed arbitrators, who would then choose two neutral arbitrators. If the party-appointed arbitrators could not agree, the district court ordered the parties to petition for appointment of the two neutral arbitrators. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's judgment, holding (1) there was a lapse in the naming of the arbitrators in the parties' agreement; (2) the district court was authorized to exercise appointment power under 9 U.S.C. 5; and (3) the district court erred in deviating from the parties' express agreement to arbitrate before a three-member panel. Remanded. View "BP Exploration Libya Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Libya Ltd." on Justia Law

Attorneys Post and Reid were retained to defend a medical malpractice action. At trial, plaintiffs introduced evidence suggesting that Post and Reid had engaged in discovery misconduct. Fearing that the jury believed that there had been a “cover-up” involving its lawyers, and concerned with the “substantial potential of uninsured punitive exposure,” the hospital, represented by new counsel, settled the case for $11 million, which represented the full extent of its medical malpractice policy limits. The settlement did not release Post, Reid, the law firm where they began representation of the hospital, or their new firm from liability. The hospital threatened Post with a malpractice suit and sought sanctions. Post eventually brought claims of bad faith and breach of contract against his legal malpractice insurer. The district court awarded $921,862.38 for breach of contract. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurer on the bad faith claim and remanded for recalculation of the award, holding that, under the policy, the insurer is responsible for all costs incurred by Post in connection with the hospital’s malpractice claim from October 12, 2005 forward and for all costs incurred by Post to defend the sanctions proceedings from February 8, 2006 forward. View "Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals withdrew its previous opinion in this case filed on April 20, 2012. Because the case involved important and determinative questions of Texas law as to which there was no controlling Texas Supreme Court precedent, the Court substituted its previous opinion with the following questions to the Supreme Court of Texas: (1) whether, under Texas law, at-will employees may bring fraud claims against their employers for loss of their employment; and (2) if question number one is answered in the negative, whether employees covered under a sixty-day cancellation-upon-notice collective bargaining agreement that limits the employer's ability to discharge its employees only for just cause may bring Texas fraud claims against their employer based on allegations that the employer fraudulently induced them to terminate their employment. View "Sawyer v. E I DuPont de Nemours & Co." on Justia Law

Contractor contracted to build a restaurant in Minnesota, promising to pay each subcontractor, upon receipt of payment from the owner, the amount to which the subcontractor was entitled. Appellant became the subcontractor for carpentry and drywall work. Upon completing its work, Appellant was not paid the full amount owed. After Contractor settled a dispute with the restaurant, it offered Appellant a smaller sum, claiming it was Appellant's pro rata share of the settlement proceeds. Appellant rejected the offer and sued Contractor and its Owner in state court. Owner and his wife subsequently filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief, with the debt to Appellant unsatisfied. Appellant commenced this adversary proceeding to have the debt declared nondischargeable. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) determined that neither 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) nor 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6) barred discharge of the debt. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Owner was not a section 523(a)(4) fiduciary by reason of a Minnesota statute or Owner's Minnesota common law duties, nor did Contractor's use of its own property amount to embezzlement; and (2) the BAP did not err in finding no malicious injury, which resolved the section 523(a)(6) issue. View "Reshetar Sys., Inc. v. Thompson" on Justia Law