Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Ronald Bole appealed a superior court's order that affirmed an arbitration award that denied him recovery of underinsured motorist benefits. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal to determine whether the rescue doctrine allowed a volunteer firefighter responding to a crash to recover despite finding his injuries were the result of a superseding cause. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Bole could not, and did not disturb the arbitrator's determination. View "Bole v. Erie Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

Strata Corporation and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing Liberty Mutual's subrogation claim against United Crane & Excavation, Inc., after the district court certified the partial summary judgment as final under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Because this case did not represent the "infrequent harsh case for immediate appeal and subsequent proceedings in the district court may moot the issue raised on appeal," the district court improvidently certified the partial summary judgment as final and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "City of Mandan v. Strata Corp." on Justia Law

Limestone Creek Developers, LLC ("LCD"), sued Stuart Trapp and two companies in which Trapp had a controlling interest (Kyvest, Ltd., and Redesign, Inc.) after Trapp was unable or unwilling to close on a contract he had personally entered into agreeing to purchase all the lots in a new subdivision owned by LCD. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Trapp defendants, and LCD appealed. While expressing no opinion with regard to whether that contract violated state law, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that the contract in question was void because it violated section 1.2.3 of the MCSR. Accordingly, the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment in favor of the Trapp defendants on LCD's breach-of-contract claim, as well as LCD's other claims, which were dependent on that contract. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Limestone Creek Developers, LLC v. Stuart Trapp et al. " on Justia Law

Lexington Insurance Company and Chartis, Inc. appealed a circuit court order that appointed a third arbitrator to the arbitration panel established to settle a dispute between Lexington and Southern Energy Homes, Inc. ("SEH"). From January 1, 2002, through October 31, 2004, SEH purchased from Lexington three commercial general-liability ("CGL") policies. An endorsement to a CGL policy insuring SEH from January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2002, provided that SEH is responsible for a $100,000 self-insurance retention ("SIR") "per occurrence." Endorsements to two successive CGL policies that together provided coverage to SEH through October 31, 2004, provide that SEH is responsible for a $250,000 SIR per occurrence. The SIR applied both to costs of defense incurred by SEH and to amounts SEH pays in settlement or pursuant to a judgment. From January 1, 2002, through October 31, 2004, SEH was named as a defendant in 46 lawsuits alleging property damage and personal injury resulting from SEH's using a vinyl-on-gypsum product in the homes it manufactured. SEH gave notice of these lawsuits to Lexington, and that it had exhausted its SIR amounts in the litigation and was entitled to reimbursement from Lexington. More than 120 days passed without SEH receiving a decision from Lexington as to whether it agreed with SEH's claim for this amount. SEH made an arbitration demand pursuant to the arbitration clauses of the CGL policies, including the SIR endorsement to the 2002 policy. Upon review of the policies in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in appointing the third arbitrator. The order was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lexington Insurance Co. v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc. " on Justia Law

Andrew Thomas appealed the district court's judgment entered after a jury awarded Randall and Shannon Bakke $25,000 plus interest for breach of contract, negligence and fraud. Thomas argued insufficient evidence existed to pierce the corporate veil of D&A Landscaping Company, LLC and hold him personally liable for breach of contract and fraud. Thomas also claimed that the district court committed plain error by failing to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proving fraud and that insufficient evidence existed to support the fraud verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the corporate veil was not pierced and the jury instruction on the burden of proof for fraud was law of the case. View "Bakke v. D & A Landscaping Co." on Justia Law

Steven and Connie Falkenstein appealed a district court judgment dismissing their claims against Jon W. Dill and Credico, Inc. for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). The Falkensteins received medical services from Medcenter One but failed to pay the total balance due. The debt was assigned to Credico, Inc. for collection. Dill, an in-house attorney and employee of Credico, Inc., communicated with the Falkensteins regarding the debt. In March 2009, judgment was entered in favor of Credico, Inc. for the amount of the Falkensteins' debt, including interest. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no error with the district court's dismissal and affirmed. View "Falkenstein v. Dill" on Justia Law

Bruce G. Harris appealed a district court judgment awarding Linda A. Smestad $30,025 plus interest on the theory of unjust enrichment. Harris argued the district court erred by: (1) deciding the issue remanded without notifying him or holding a hearing, (2) considering unjust enrichment because Smestad's complaint did not include an unjust enrichment claim and (3) finding Smestad proved unjust enrichment. Upon review,the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "Smestad v. Harris" on Justia Law

Watkins, an African-American, worked for the school district, overseeing security systems. Fultz supervised Watkins and, relying on Watkins’s advice, Fultz awarded Vision a $182,000 annual contract for service of security cameras. Vision’s president, Newsome, testified that Watkins called her and talked about a “finder’s fee.. Newsome went to Cleveland for a customer visit. She e-mailed Watkins and he replied: “Absolutely$.” Newsome believed that Watkins expected her to pay him at their meeting. Newsome notified Fultz. At the meeting, Watkins requested “an envelope.” After Fultz contacted police, the FBI recorded meetings at which Newsome gave Watkins $5,000 and $2,000. A white jury convicted on two counts of attempted extortion “under color of official right” (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951), and one count of bribery in a federally funded program, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The court determined a total offense level of 22, applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, another two-level enhancement for bribes exceeding $5,000, and a four-level enhancement for high level of authority, plus an upward variance of 21 months under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and sentenced Watkins to six years’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, the jury’s racial composition, and the reasonableness of the sentence.View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from a decision of the United States tax court concluding that he owed $128,292 in income tax for the 2004 taxable year. Petitioner entered into an agreement with Optech Limited pursuant to which he transferred floating rate notes (FRNs) worth approximately $1 million to Optech in return for a nonrecourse loan of ninety percent of the FRNs' value. The agreement gave Optech the right to receive all dividends and interest on the FRNs and the right to sell the FRNs during the loan term without Petitioner's consent. Instead of holding the FRNs as collateral for the loan, Optech sold the FRNs and transferred ninety percent of the proceeds to Petitioner. Petitioner did not report that he had sold the FRNs in his 2004 federal income tax return. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the tax court, holding that Petitioner's transaction with Optech constituted a sale for tax purposes despite its taking the form of a loan because the burdens and benefits of owning the FRNs were transferred to Optech. View "Sollberger v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

David Fesler, a former sales representative with Whelen Engineering Company, sued Whelen for breach of contract. Fesler alleging that he was an employee of Whelen, that policy documents issued by Whelen applicable to sales representatives created a unilateral contract of employment, and that Whelen breached that unilateral contract of employment by terminating him without just cause and by failing to provide him with notice of substandard performance and an opportunity to cure. The district court granted summary judgment for Whelen. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Fesler was an independent contractor and not an employee, the policy documents could not have created a unilateral contract. Thus, the district court properly dismissed Fesler's claim for breach of contract. View "Fesler v. Whelen Eng'g Co." on Justia Law