Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought a declaratory action seeking a ruling that their insurance policies issued to defendants did not cover class claims brought in state court by Percic Enterprises. The state court complaint alleged that defendants violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), by sending unsolicited fax advertisements. After a settlement was reached in the state action, the federal district court concluded that damages sustained by sending unsolicited fax advertisements in violation of the TCPA were covered under the advertising provision of the policies. The court affirmed, applying standard Minnesota principles of insurance contract interpretation where unambiguous words were given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, and ambiguous language was construed in favor of the insured. View "Owners Ins. Co., et al v. European Auto Works, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement governs the relationship between Acument and its retired employees. Prior to 2008, the company paid healthcare and life-insurance benefits to qualified retirees. When Acument ended these benefits in 2008, a class of 64 retirees claimed that the company had violated the CBA in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Labor Management Relations Act. The district court granted Acument summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing the issue as “a matter of contract.” The relevant language states that the company “reserves the right to amend, modify, suspend, or terminate the Plan,” consisting of: retiree medical coverage; retirement income; disability income; and life insurance. View "Witmer v. Acument Global Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (VPI) and Prosper Financial (Prosper) entered into a research contract. The contract provided two addresses in Florida for Prosper. VPI subsequently filed a complaint in Virginia for breach of contract. VPI attempted to secure service of process on Prosper through the Secretary of the Commonwealth. In its affidavit for service of process on the Secretary, VPI listed the address contained in the contract's notice provision as Prosper's last known address. After Prosper failed to file responsive pleadings, the trial court entered a default judgment against Prosper. Upon Prosper's motion, the trial court determined the order of default judgment should be set aside because service of process should have been attempted at both Florida addresses. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the final judgment against Prosper, holding (1) the use of one of the two Prosper addresses known to VPI was constitutional and satisfied the requirements of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-329(B), and therefore, the trial court's determination that both addresses were required was error; and (2) the trial court erred in setting aside the order of default judgment brought pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-428(D) without identifying its findings on the necessary elements of the action. View "Va. Polytechnic Inst. v. Prosper Fin., Inc." on Justia Law

These companion appeals arose out of a dispute between a government contractor, Preferred Systems Solutions, Inc. (PSS) and one of its subcontractors, GP Consulting, LLC (GP). PSS sued GP following GP's termination of its contract with PSS and its commencement of a subsequent contract with a PSS competitor. PSS alleged breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference with contract, seeking injunctive as well as monetary relief. PSS was ultimately awarded $172,396 in compensatory damages based on the circuit court's finding that GP breached the noncompete clause in the parties' contract. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) awarding damages to PSS for lost profits as a result of GP's breach of the noncompete clause; and (2) refusing to grant PSS injunctive relief, in concluding that PSS failed to prove tortious interference, and in dismissing PSS' trade secret claim. View "Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of garaged lots in a subdivision, filed a complaint against the homeowners' association (HOA) alleging that the unequal treatment resulting from the HOA's assignment of parking spaces only to ungaraged lots in an amendment violated the subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (the Declaration). The circuit court determined that the amendment was invalid and ruled that the reservation of parking spaces in the common area for use solely by owners of ungaraged lots violated the Declaration. The court also found Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling the Declaration requires that parking spaces in the common area be assigned equally among all lot owners; (2) did not err in ruling that the amendment was invalid; (3) erred in its award of certain compensatory damages but did not err in awarding other compensatory damages; and (4) did not err in ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees and in determining the amount of that award. Remanded for a determination of attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiffs subsequent to the court's entry of the judgment appealed from. View "Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v. Batt" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the circuit court erred in allowing Plaintiff to take a nonsuit as a matter of right pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-380(B) based on its determination that Plaintiff's prior voluntary dismissal in federal court was not a nonsuit under section 8.01-380. In Virginia, a plaintiff may take only one nonsuit as a matter of right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that Plaintiff was permitted to take a nonsuit as a matter of right pursuant to section 8.01-380(B), holding (1) Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(3) does not confirm or suggest that a voluntary dismissal taken pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) is a nonsuit for purposes of section 8.01-380; and (2) Plaintiff's prior voluntary dismissal in federal court was not substantially equivalent to Virginia's nonsuit in this regard. View "Inova Health Care Servs. v. Kebaish" on Justia Law

In this case the circuit court determined that Plaintiff, the prevailing party on both its claim for compensation under the contract and Defendant's counterclaim for Plaintiff's alleged breach of the contract, was entitled to only a nominal award of one dollar in attorneys' fees for its defense of the counterclaim because Defendant had a "good faith" basis for alleging the breach. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment awarding one dollar in attorneys' fees and expenses to Plaintiff for its successful defense of Defendant's counterclaim and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine a proper award of attorneys' fees. Additionally, upon remand, the Court concluded Plaintiff may submit to the circuit court a claim for additional attorneys' fees, and the court shall award such fees and expenses it determines to be reasonable and necessary for the successful prosecution of this appeal and defense of Defendant's assignment of cross-error thereto. View "Dewberry & Davis, Inc. v. C3NS, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, Allen Grazer obtained a judgment against Gordon Jones and Richard Barney for breach of contract. To satisfy the judgment, property held by Jones and Barney was sold at a sheriff's sale and purchased by Grazer's attorney on his client's behalf. Jones and Barney assigned their redemption interests to the Olsen Trust, which attempted to redeem the property under Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(c). Grazer challenged that attempt as invalid because it was not in full compliance with Rule 69C(c). The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Olsen Trust, concluding the Trust had substantially complied with the rule. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on somewhat different grounds, holding (1) Rule 69C(c) cannot reasonably be read to require superfluous service of documents on the party who was ultimately their source; and (2) the Olsen Trust's redemption was valid and enforceable despite alleged deficiencies under Rule 69C(c) because the Trust fulfilled all non-superfluous requirements of the rule. View "Grazer v. Jones" on Justia Law

In two separate actions, seven Massachusetts hospitals and one managed health care organization that disproportionately provided medical care to the poor alleged that the Secretary of the Executive Office of Health and Human Services violated her obligation to reimburse them for the reasonable costs incurred in providing medical services to MassHealth enrollees. A superior court judge granted the Secretary's motion for judgment on the pleadings in one case and the Secretary's motion to dismiss in the other, concluding as a matter of law that the plaintiffs could not prevail even if their allegations were true. The plaintiffs appealed, and the cases were consolidated. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions denying the plaintiffs' claims, holding that the plaintiffs' redress for their claims rested in the political arena, not in the courts. View "Boston Med. Ctr. v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a judgment which held that a mechanic’s lien had priority over a mortgage. The judgment was predicated upon the district court's refusal to permit the mortgagee to withdraw an admission made in open court by its counsel that the mechanic's lien was valid. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that the mechanic's lien was invalid because the lien did not show that it was verified before a person entitled to administer oaths. View "First Federal Savings Bank of Twin Falls v. Riedesel Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law