Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Milford-Bennington Railroad Company, Inc. (MBR) appealed an award of summary judgment to Pan Am Railways, Inc., Boston and Maine Corporation, and Springfield Terminal Railway Company (collectively, "Pan Am") in a dispute arising from Pan Am's actions under a contract to provide MBR with access to Pan Am's railroad tracks. The district court held that Pan Am did not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing when it exercised its contractual right to exclude an MBR employee from its trackage for violating a safety rule. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that even if Pan Am was bound by a duty of good faith and fair dealing when exercising its right to exclude the employee from its trackage, Pan Am did not breach that duty. View "Milford-Bennington R.R. Co. v. Pan Am Rys., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Jessica Burkhardt appealed a district court judgment that awarded damages to Plaintiff Jon Kohanowski for the unpaid balance of a loan and ordered Defendant to pay costs and attorney fees. Defendant was engaged to marry Shaun Kohanowski, Plaintiff's brother. In 2006, Shaun and Defendant were planning to purchase a home. Shaun Kohanowski contacted Jon Kohanowski, who agreed to lend the couple money to help buy the home. Jon Kohanowski alleged that Defendant was in the room and overheard Shaun's side of the telephone conversation during which the brothers discussed the loan. Plaintiff contended the terms of the loan required Defendant and Shaun to repay the loan. Plaintiff wired $675 to Shaun and Defendant's bank to start the appraisal process and sent a check for $9,325 payable to Shaun and Defendant. Only Shaun endorsed the check, and he deposited the proceeds into a joint checking account he shared with Defendant. In early 2007, Defendant signed two checks for $215 each drawn on the joint account and payable to Plaintiff. Defendant and Shaun subsequently called off their engagement, and no further payments were made on the loan. In September 2010, Shaun e-mailed a "Letter of Intent" to Plaintiff acknowledging the debt, promising to pay one-half of the remaining debt with interest, and promising to assist Plaintiff in collecting the remaining one-half of the debt from Defendant. In October 2010, Plaintiff sued Defendant in small claims court for one-half of the remaining debt and a portion of the travel costs he had allegedly incurred attempting to collect the debt. Defendant removed the action to district court and demanded a jury trial. After a trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff $6,641.29, one-half of the remaining debt plus interest. Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or relief from the judgment. The district court impliedly denied Defendant's motions, instead entering an order awarding Plaintiff costs and attorney fees. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding the alleged oral loan agreement was barred by the statute of frauds. View "Kohanowski v. Burkhardt" on Justia Law

For some years, the Board of Education of Baltimore County belonged to a governmental group purchasing consortium, which competitively bid a roofing services contract on behalf of its members. The Board relied on that contact to fulfill its needs for roofing repair services. Appellant Building Materials Corporation of America, a nationwide manufacturer of roofing materials, questioned the Board's authority for that practice under the pertinent statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when viewed in the context of the entire education law and regulations promulgated under that law, the competitive bidding statute did not bar the Board from using its membership in an intergovernmental purchasing consortium for the procurement of roofing repair services. View "Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Lego admitted his wife to Porter Hospital's emergency room. She stayed there for approximately two months. The Legos' insurance provider notified Respondent in writing that it would stop covering Mrs. Lego's hospital care after six weeks. Respondent disputed the insurer's position and refused to discharge his wife from the hospital after six weeks. The hospital followed the insurer in notifying Respondent the insurance coverage for Mrs. Lego would end, and that the Legos would be responsible for any uncovered charges. In an effort to recoup those charges Respondent refused to pay, the hospital sued on the grounds of unjust enrichment with recovery in quantum meruit. Respondent moved to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred by a general statute of limitations codified in section 13-80-103.5(1)(a) C.R.S. (2011). The trial court denied the motion; the appellate court reversed, finding the trial court erred in determining the amount the insurance company did not pay was liquidated or determinable damages within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, interpreting section 13-80-103.5(1)(a) C.R.S. (2011) to mean its six-year limitations period applied in this case, particularly when the amount owed was ascertainable either by reference to the agreement, or by simple computation using extrinsic evidence. View "Portercare Adventist Health System v. Lego" on Justia Law

In December 2005, Charles Baggett and Diana Morris were involved in an automobile accident, as a result of which Baggett was injured. Baggett sued Morris, who was insured by Sagamore Insurance Company. Baggett added his underinsured-motorist ("UIM") carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as a party to the action. The limit of State Farm's UIM policy was $60,000. Before Baggett commenced the action against Morris, State Farm paid Baggett $25,000, the limit of the liability policy issued by Sagamore to Morris, to protect its potential subrogation interest against Morris. At the time State Farm advanced the $25,000 to Baggett, Baggett executed an agreement entitled an "Advancement of Funds to Protect Future Subrogation Rights." State Farm opted out of the action. Following a jury trial, Baggett obtained a judgment against Morris for $181,046. Therefore, Baggett was entitled to $85,000--the total of the limits of both the Sagamore policy ($25,000) and the State Farm policy ($60,000). Sagamore paid $25,000; State Farm, rather than paying Baggett $35,000 and receiving credit pursuant to the "Advancement of Funds" agreement for the $25,000 it had advanced, mistakenly paid $60,000, resulting in an overpayment to Baggett of $25,000. As a result of the overpayment, the trial court ordered Baggett to reimburse State Farm $25,000, less a one-third attorney fee under the common-fund doctrine. State Farm appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an opinion. State Farm petitioned the Supreme Court seeking review of the application of the common-fund doctrine. Upon review, the Court found that State Farm was entitled to a refund of the overpayment, and that if an attorney fee was due Baggett's attorney with respect to all or part of the $85,000 actually owed in the aggregate by Sagamore and State Farm, then the fee should be taken from the $85,000, not from the $25,000 State Farm overpaid and as to which it was entitled to be reimbursed. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Baggett" on Justia Law

Following an automobile accident in which Tracy Mitchell was injured when the vehicle in which she was a passenger, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Mitchell's insurer, paid Mitchell's medical expenses, among other coverage payments, and then sought, through subrogation, reimbursement from the driver Amy Kirk's insurer, Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company. Mitchell filed a personal-injury action against Kirk, State Farm, and fictitiously named defendants, alleging as to State Farm, among other things, that State Farm's right to recover from any damages awarded its payment of Mitchell's medical expenses was subject to a reduction, pursuant to the common-fund doctrine, for attorney fees incurred by Mitchell in pursuing the personal-injury action. The circuit court granted State Farm's summary-judgment motion, holding that the common-fund doctrine did not obligate State Farm to pay a pro rata share of Mitchell's attorney fees. Mitchell appealed the circuit court's decision to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit court's summary judgment, concluding that a common fund was created requiring State Farm to contribute to Mitchell's attorney fees; that the common-fund doctrine had not been contractually abrogated; and that the common-fund doctrine was not negated by State Farm's "active participation" in pursuing subrogation recovery. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine, as a matter of first impression, the narrow question whether, under the common-fund doctrine, the subrogated insurance carrier was responsible for a pro rata share of the injured insured's attorney fees incurred in the process of obtaining an award against which the carrier has asserted a right of reimbursement. The Court affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment. View "Mitchell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. and Regions Bank (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Regions") appealed an order of the Baldwin Circuit Court which granted in part and denied in part their motions to compel arbitration in an action filed against them by Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC ("BCSS"). In 2001 BCSS began discussing with AmSouth Bank ("AmSouth"), the predecessor-in-interest to Regions Bank, options to finance its existing debt. AmSouth recommended that BCSS finance its debt through variable-rate demand notes ("VRDNs").1 In its complaint, BCSS alleged that in late 2008 it received a notice of a substantial increase in the variable interest rates on its 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007 VRDNs, which constituted BCSS's first notice that the interest-rate-swap agreements recommended by Regions did not fix the interest rate on the VRDNs but, instead, exposed BCSS to "an entirely new increased level of market risk in the highly complex derivative market." BCSS sued Regions Bank and Morgan Keegan asserting that Regions falsely represented to BCSS that swap agreements fixed BCSS's interest rates on all the BCSS debt that had been financed through the VRDNs. Following a hearing on the motions to compel arbitration, the trial court entered an order in which it granted the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the credit agreements but denied the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the failure of the swap transactions to provide a fixed interest rate. The trial court reasoned that the "Jurisdiction" clause in a master agreement, in combination with its merger clause, "prevent[ed] any argument that the VRDN arbitration agreement applies to disputes concerning the swap agreements" and that those clauses demonstrated that it was "the parties' intention, as it relates to the interest-swap agreement and any transaction related to that agreement, that the parties would not arbitrate but instead [any dispute] would be resolved by proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Regions presented evidence of the existence of a contract requiring arbitration of the disputes at issue. The Court reversed the order of the trial court denying the motions to compel arbitration of BCSS's claims concerning the master agreement and the swap agreement and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Regions Bank v. Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC " on Justia Law

Appellant Loan Modification Group, Inc. (LMG) appealed from a jury verdict awarding $414,000 in damages against LMG for breach of partnership duties and responsibilities owed to Appellee, Lisa Reed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the jury was entitled to find that although Reed and LMG's partnership was formed in anticipation of and carried out in accordance with the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), it could be fully performed within one year and need not last for the entire four-year duration of HAMP, and thus, the jury could have reasonably rejected application of the Statute of Frauds; (2) the evidence supported the jury's finding that a partnership existed, whether based on an express oral partnership agreement or on an implied partnership agreement; (3) having found that the partnership was never terminated and that LMG breached its fiduciary duties, the jury's damages award was proper; and (4) there was adequate evidentiary support to sustain the jury's damages award. View "Loan Modification Group, Inc. v. Reed" on Justia Law

Appellant was among a number of homeowners in multiple states claiming that their mortgage companies wrongfully demanded an increase in flood insurance coverage to levels beyond the amounts required by their mortgages. In this case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the pertinent mortgage provision explicitly gave the lender discretion to prescribe the amount of flood insurance. However, the Court held that the district court dismissal of Appellant's complaint must be vacated, as (1) a supplemental document given to Appellant at her real estate closing entitled "Flood Insurance Notification" reasonably may be read to state that the mandatory amount of flood insurance imposed at that time would remain unchanged for the duration of the mortgage; and (2) given the ambiguity as to the Lender's authority to increase the coverage requirement, Appellant was entitled to proceed with her breach of contract and related claims. View "Lass v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

This putative class action was one of a number of breach-of-contract suits being brought against financial institutions nationwide by mortgagors who claimed that they were improperly forced to increase flood insurance coverage on their properties. The plaintiff in this case asserted that Bank of America's demand that he increase his flood coverage by $46,000 breached both the terms of his mortgage contract and the contract's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court concluded that the pertinent provision of the mortgage unambiguously permitted the lender to require the increased flood coverage and, hence, it granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of dismissal in favor of the Bank, holding that the mortgage was reasonably susceptible to an understanding that supported the plaintiff's breach of contract and implied covenant claims. Remanded. View "Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law