Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the interpretation of a commercial general liability (CGL) policy that Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange sold to Plaintiff Bresee Homes, Inc. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Farmers and denied Bresee's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The dispute stemmed from a homeowner suit in which Bresee claimed Farmers had a duty under the CGL to defend, and to reimburse for any damages arising out of the homeowners' suit. Upon review of the subject policy, the Supreme Court concluded that the Farmers owed a duty to defend to Bresee. Accordingly, the Court concluded the trial court erred in granting Farmers' motion for summary judgment, and for denying Bresee's cross-motion on the issue of the duty to defend. The Court could not determine whether the policy afforded a basis for indemnification, and as such, neither party was entitled to summary judgment on that issue. The case was reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Bresee Homes, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS) signed an employment agreement with Plaintiff containing a clause to compel arbitration for any disputes regarding the employment agreement. After Plaintiff's employment was terminated, Plaintiff brought an action against BCBS claiming that BCBS violated the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA). Plaintiff, however, could bring a WDEA claim only if she did not have a written contract of employment for a specific term. The district court compelled arbitration to allow the arbitrator to determine in the first instance whether Plaintiff had a term employment contract. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order to compel arbitration, holding that because the instant dispute implicated the terms or provisions of the employment agreement, the district court correctly determined that an arbitrator should decide, in the first instance, whether Plaintiff was an at-will employee or whether she had a term contract. View "Marsden v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc." on Justia Law

Respondents brought an action against Appellants, alleging breach of contract and fraud- and tort-based claims based on their purchase of two furniture stores from Appellants. The district court entered judgment for Respondents. The court allowed Respondents to rescind the agreement and awarded them damages. Although they appealed the judgment, Appellants did not obtain a stay of execution. Thus, despite the pending appeal, Respondents obtained a writ of execution on the judgment, allowing them to execute against one appellant's personal property. Respondents subsequently purchased Appellants' rights and interests in the district court action. Respondents moved to substitute as real parties in interest and dismiss the appeal on the basis that they acquired Appellants' claims and defenses at the sheriff's sale. The Supreme Court denied Respondents' motion, holding that Nevada's judgment execution statutes do not include the right to execute on a party's defenses to an action, as permitting a judgment creditor to execute on a judgment in such a way would cut of a debtor's defenses in a manner inconsistent with due process principles. View "Butwinick v. Hepner" on Justia Law

This appeal involved litigation between Coverall North America, Inc. and its franchisees. Proceeding under federal diversity jurisdiction, the franchisees asserted a variety of state-law claims against Coverall. Which of the various plaintiffs were subject to the arbitration provisions of the Franchise Agreement was at issue in this appeal. Appellees were a subgroup of Plaintiffs who became Coverall franchisees by signing consent to transfer agreements, which by reference incorporated under franchise agreements that contained arbitration clauses. The district court determined that Appellees did not have to arbitrate their claims against Coverall because they did not have adequate notice of the arbitration clauses contained in the franchise agreements. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court erred because (1) Massachusetts law, which governed this dispute, did not impose any such special notice requirement upon these commercial contractual provisions; and (2) in any event, any special notice requirement would be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Awuah v. Coverall N.A., Inc. " on Justia Law

Defendant's father was a resident at Plaintiff's nursing care facility until his death. After Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff the outstanding bill from her father's assets, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant, claiming breach of contract and fraud. The trial court held in favor of Defendant, concluding that Defendant did not have a power of attorney for her father and did not have access to his checking account or to any of his other financial resources. The court also awarded attorney's fees to Defendant under Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-150bb for successfully defending against a commercial party's action based on a contract. The appellate court reversed in part, concluding that Defendant was not entitled to attorney's fees under section 42-150bb because she was not the personal representative of her father. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that, in order to be a "personal representative" entitled to fees under section 42-150bb, Defendant would have to be a legal representative of the party to the contract. Remanded. View "Aaron Manor, Inc. v. Irving" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Willie Barlow, Jr., appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, C.R. England, Inc., on his claims for race discrimination, wrongful discharge in violation of Colorado public policy, and failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). England employed Plaintiff as a security guard and also paid him to perform janitorial work through a company Plaintiff formed. Plaintiff began receiving workers’ compensation benefits after he sustained an injury at work in June 2007. In November, England terminated its janitorial services contract with Plaintiff's company. A few months later, England fired Plaintiff from his security guard position after he failed to notice and report a theft of several trailer doors from England’s premises. The district court concluded that: (1) there was no evidence England fired Plaintiff for race-based reasons, or in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim; (2) Plaintiff performed his janitorial work as an independent contractor, not an employee, and thus could not assert a claim for wrongful discharge from that position; and (3) Plaintiff's status as an independent contractor precluded an FLSA claim for overtime. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed with regard to Plaintiff's claims for discrimination and violation of the FLSA. The Court reversed, however, Plaintiff's state-law claim for wrongful discharge. View "Barlow, Jr. v. C.R. England Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and violation of the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court was persuaded that the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 24, 484(A), and federal regulations preempted the CLEC, and that plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract. The court held that the district court erred in deeming plaintiff's CLEC claim against Capital One preempted by federal law and regulations where Capital One was subject to the terms of the CLEC in loans it acquired through assignment. The court also held that a breach of contract claim had been adequately pleaded and therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the claim. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Decohen v. Capital One N.A." on Justia Law

DFA, a Kansas cooperative, sued Bassett, an international commodities broker and a Canadian corporation, for failure to pay. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Bassett did not transact business within Missouri; sent no product there or ordered none from Missouri; did not advertise there; no Bassett employee ever entered Missouri; and Bassett's communications with DFA's Missouri headquarters did not alone amount to the transaction of business. Therefore, Bassett did not transact business in Missouri and was not within the reach of Missouri's long-arm statute. Even if Bassett had transacted business in Missouri, the district court could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Bassett. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dairy Farmers of America v. Bassett & Walker International" on Justia Law

This case arose when First Investment entered into a series of shipbuilding contracts with FSIGC and Mawei (collectively, the "Fujian Entities"). First Investment alleged that the Fujian Entities breached the contracts by refusing to honor an option agreement. On appeal, First Investment appealed the district court's decision to deny confirmation of a foreign arbitral award against the Fujian Entities and the People's Republic of China. At issue was whether a court could dismiss a petition to confirm a foreign arbitration award for lack of personal jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of the petition on personal jurisdiction grounds was appropriate. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed the People's Republic of China for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "First Invst Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd, et al" on Justia Law

Several years ago, Plaintiffs entered into a fifteen-year lease with Defendant's predecessor in interest (Miller). The lease included a purchase option. After Defendant refused to allow Plaintiffs to exercise the purchase option on the ground that they were in default on their obligations under the lease, Plaintiffs instituted this action, demanding specific performance or damages. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered specific performance of the purchase option, determining that Miller had waived a provision which prohibited Plaintiffs from subleasing without prior written permission and that all alleged defaults were inconsequential and immaterial. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that summary judgment for Plaintiffs was proper, where (1) the district court correctly found that Miller waived the requirement that Plaintiffs obtain written permission before subleasing any portion of the premises; and (2) the district court properly found that Defendant had failed to present evidence of how alleged violations the lease provision requiring them to comply with state and municipal laws harmed her or Miller. View "Bachorz v. Miller-Forslund" on Justia Law