Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

A resident of a memory-care facility in Massachusetts alleged that the facility’s court-appointed receiver, KCP Advisory Group, LLC, conspired with others to unlawfully evict residents, including herself, by falsely claiming that the local fire department had ordered an emergency evacuation. The resident, after being transferred to another facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting several state-law claims against KCP and other defendants. The complaint alleged that KCP’s actions violated statutory and contractual notice requirements and were carried out in bad faith.KCP moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that as a court-appointed receiver, it was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that while quasi-judicial immunity barred claims based on negligent performance of receivership duties, it did not bar claims alleging that KCP acted without jurisdiction, contrary to law and contract, or in bad faith. The court thus denied KCP’s motion to dismiss several counts, including those for violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. KCP appealed the denial of immunity as to these counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of absolute quasi-judicial immunity de novo. The appellate court held that KCP’s alleged acts—removing residents from the facility—were judicial in nature and within the scope of its authority as receiver. Because KCP did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction, the court concluded that quasi-judicial immunity barred all of the resident’s claims against KCP. The First Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s denial of KCP’s motion to dismiss the specified counts. View "Suny v. KCP Advisory Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on approximately 930 acres of agricultural land owned by two trusts near Pocatello, Idaho. The trusts entered into a purchase and sales agreement with a developer, Millennial Development Partners, to sell a strip of land for a new road, Northgate Parkway, which was to provide access to their property. The trusts allege that Millennial and its partners, along with the City of Pocatello, failed to construct promised access points and infrastructure, and that the developers and city officials conspired to devalue the trusts’ property, interfere with potential sales, and ultimately force a sale below market value. The trusts claim these actions diminished their property’s value and constituted breach of contract, fraud, interference with economic advantage, regulatory taking, and civil conspiracy.After the trusts filed suit in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The trusts sought to delay the proceedings to complete additional discovery, arguing that the defendants had not adequately responded to discovery requests. The district court denied both of the trusts’ motions to continue, struck their late response to the summary judgment motions as untimely, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing the case with prejudice and awarding attorney fees to the defendants. The trusts appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s denial of the trusts’ motions to continue, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the district court erred by failing to analyze whether the defendants had met their burden under the summary judgment standard and appeared to have granted summary judgment as a sanction for the trusts’ untimely response. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, and declined to award attorney fees on appeal. View "Rupp v. City of Pocatello" on Justia Law

A state port authority and a group of related companies entered into a series of letters of intent (LOIs) regarding the possible expansion and operation of a port facility. The final LOI, signed in December 2019, included provisions for confidentiality, exclusivity, and certain legally binding terms, but also stated that it was not a binding agreement to consummate the potential transaction. The port authority’s board approved the LOI and several subsequent extensions, but the board minutes did not include the terms or conditions of the LOI. After negotiations failed, the port authority terminated the LOI. The companies claimed significant losses and alleged the port authority had breached the LOI and misused confidential information.The Harrison County Circuit Court found that the LOI was unenforceable under Mississippi’s “minutes rule,” which requires that public board contracts be sufficiently detailed in the board’s official minutes. The court dismissed all claims based on the LOI, including breach of contract and quantum meruit, but allowed claims for unjust enrichment and misappropriation of trade secrets to proceed. Both parties sought interlocutory appeal, and the appeals were consolidated.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the LOI was unenforceable because the board minutes did not contain enough terms to determine the parties’ obligations, and held that the minutes rule was not superseded by the Open Meetings Act. The court also held that unjust enrichment, as an implied contract claim, was barred by the minutes rule and reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on that claim. However, the court affirmed that the companies’ notice of claim regarding misappropriation of trade secrets was sufficient under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the remaining claim. View "The Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport v. Yilport Holding A.S." on Justia Law

A trading company and a base oil manufacturer entered into a sales agreement in 2016, under which the manufacturer would serve as the exclusive North American sales representative for a high-quality base oil product distributed by the trading company. The agreement included noncompete provisions and was set to expire at the end of 2021. In late 2020, suspicions arose between the parties regarding potential breaches of the agreement, leading to a series of letters in which the trading company accused the manufacturer of selling a competing product and threatened termination if the alleged breach was not cured. The manufacturer responded by denying any breach and, after further correspondence, declared the agreement terminated. The trading company agreed that the agreement was terminated, and both parties ceased their business relationship.The trading company then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging antitrust violations, breach of contract, business disparagement, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The manufacturer counterclaimed for breach of contract and tortious interference. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of the manufacturer on the breach of contract and trade secret claims, awarding over $1.3 million in damages. However, the court determined that the agreement was mutually terminated, not due to anticipatory repudiation by the trading company, and denied the manufacturer’s request for attorneys’ fees and prevailing party costs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the trading company did not commit anticipatory repudiation and that the agreement was mutually terminated. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the denial of prevailing party costs under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the appellate court vacated the denial of attorneys’ fees under the agreement’s fee-shifting provision and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Penthol v. Vertex Energy" on Justia Law

Several residential property owners in the Pauoa Beach Subdivision, part of the Mauna Lani Resort in Hawaiʻi, challenged the use of a residential lot (Lot B) owned by Exclusive Resorts PBL1, LLC (PBL1). PBL1’s parent company operates a luxury destination club, allowing its members to stay at properties like Lot B in exchange for annual dues. The plaintiffs argued that this arrangement constituted a prohibited “commercial use” under the subdivision’s governing documents, which restrict commercial activity but allow short-term rentals.The dispute began in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, where the court granted summary judgment in favor of PBL1, finding no violation of the residential use restrictions. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated that decision, holding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether PBL1’s use amounted to a “gainful occupation, profession or trade,” and remanded for further factual findings. On remand, the circuit court reinterpreted the project documents and initially found PBL1 to be a commercial owner, but ultimately determined, based on evidence of actual use, that PBL1’s activities did not rise to the level of commercial use. The court denied the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction, and both sides appealed again.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case. It affirmed the ICA’s conclusion that PBL1’s use of Lot B did not violate the project documents, agreeing that the law of the case doctrine precluded reinterpreting the documents’ meaning. The court also held that the ICA did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to PBL1. However, it reversed the ICA’s award of attorney fees to PBL1, holding that the relevant contract only allowed prevailing plaintiffs, not defendants, to recover such fees. The ICA’s judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Cowan v. Exclusive Resorts PBL1, LLC" on Justia Law

A Canadian corporation specializing in industrial heaters sought a new supplier and entered negotiations with a South Dakota manufacturer to custom-build 30 heaters. The parties initially agreed to the purchase and sale of 21 units, with a 20% down payment, and later extended the agreement to include the remaining nine units, for a total of 30 heaters at a set price per unit. The manufacturer began production and delivery as payments were made. However, after partial delivery and payment, the buyer stopped making payments, citing performance issues with the heaters and ultimately notified the manufacturer of its intent to terminate the relationship. Despite complaints about the heaters, the buyer did not reject or return any units but continued to accept and sell them until the manufacturer withheld further shipments due to nonpayment.The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Day County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer, finding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of a contract for 30 heaters and that the buyer breached the agreement by failing to pay and by terminating the contract. The court also found that the manufacturer had taken reasonable steps to mitigate damages and that the buyer had not properly rejected the goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. The Supreme Court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a contract for the sale of 30 heaters. However, the Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the alleged defects in the heaters substantially impaired the value of the whole contract, which could excuse the buyer’s nonperformance under the UCC. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s finding of contract formation, reversed the grant of summary judgment on the breach issue, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson Industries v. Thermal Intelligence" on Justia Law

A company leased 24 properties from a landlord under separate agreements that included options to renew the leases for additional terms, provided the tenant gave written notice 120 days before expiration. The tenant successfully renewed twice, but in 2021, failed to send the required renewal notice to the landlord by the deadline. The landlord notified the tenant that the leases would terminate, and after unsuccessful negotiations for new leases, the tenant sought a court declaration that its late renewal was still effective, citing the significant value of improvements made to the properties.The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of the tenant, finding that equity could forgive the tenant’s “honest mistake” in missing the deadline and prevent forfeiture of the improvements. The court also found that the landlord’s acceptance of rent after the expiration of a tolling agreement estopped the landlord from terminating the leases. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on prior Ohio appellate decisions that allowed equitable relief for honest mistakes or even negligence if forfeiture would result and the landlord was not prejudiced.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District’s judgment. The court held that while equity may excuse a failure to comply with a lease renewal option in cases of fraud, accident, or mistake, it does not extend to negligence. The court clarified that “mistake” refers to a misapprehension of a basic assumption at contract formation, not a negligent failure to act. Because the tenant’s failure to timely exercise the renewal option was due to negligence, equitable relief was not warranted. The case was remanded to the Tenth District Court of Appeals to consider the landlord’s remaining arguments regarding equitable estoppel. View "Ashland Global Holdings, Inc. v. SuperAsh Remainderman, Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law

A construction worker employed by a subcontractor was injured when a scaffold collapsed at a Manhattan worksite. The worker sued the property owner and general contractor in New York Supreme Court, alleging negligence and violations of state labor laws. The owner’s insurer, Liberty Insurance Corporation, sought a declaration in federal court that the subcontractor’s insurer, Hudson Excess Insurance Company, was obligated to defend and indemnify the owner as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s commercial general liability policy. The subcontract between the general contractor and the subcontractor required the latter to provide insurance coverage for the owner and general contractor.In the New York Supreme Court, summary judgment was granted to the injured worker on some claims, while other claims remained pending. The court denied summary judgment to the owner on its contractual indemnification claim against the subcontractor, finding factual questions about the scope of the subcontractor’s work. Later, after the federal district court’s decision, the state court dismissed all third-party claims against the subcontractor, finding the indemnity provision in the subcontract invalid due to lack of a meeting of the minds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s finding, after a bench trial on stipulated facts, that the subcontractor’s actions proximately caused the worker’s injuries and that Hudson owed a duty to indemnify the owner under the policy. The Second Circuit held that the later state court decision did not alter this result. However, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to Liberty, holding that Hudson was entitled to a statutory safe harbor under New York Insurance Law, and thus was not required to pay Liberty’s attorney’s fees for the federal action. View "Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Hudson Excess Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Residents and businesses in Lumberton, North Carolina, experienced severe flooding during Hurricanes Matthew and Florence in 2016 and 2018. The flooding was exacerbated by a gap in the city’s levee system, which existed because a CSX Transportation rail line crossed the area. The City of Lumberton had previously entered into a licensing agreement, known as the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA), with CSX’s predecessor and a local drainage district. The TPA allowed the City to construct and maintain an earthen dike across CSX’s property and, under certain conditions, to close the dike in the event of imminent flooding. However, the City never built the dike. When the hurricanes approached, the City sought permission from CSX to close the gap with emergency sandbags, but CSX refused, resulting in significant flood damage.The plaintiffs, representing a putative class of affected residents and businesses, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, asserting contract and tort claims against CSX. The district court dismissed the tort claims as preempted by federal law and initially dismissed the contract claim, finding the plaintiffs were not intended third-party beneficiaries of the TPA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the contract claim, allowing it to proceed. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to CSX on three alternative grounds: federal preemption, lack of third-party beneficiary status, and failure to show breach of contract.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs could not show CSX breached the TPA. The court held that, because the earthen dike contemplated by the TPA was never constructed, CSX had no contractual obligation to allow closure of the gap by other means, such as sandbags. The judgment was affirmed. View "Edwards v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of employees at a wealth management firm in Richmond, Virginia, decided to leave their employer and establish a competing business. These employees, who had access to proprietary client information, had signed employment agreements with their former employer that included non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses. The agreements also addressed the industry-wide Protocol for Broker Recruiting, which generally allows departing financial advisors to take certain client information and solicit former clients if specific procedures are followed. However, the agreements stated that their terms would control over the Protocol in the event of any conflict. After resigning, the employees formed a new firm and began contacting their former clients, resulting in the loss of hundreds of accounts and significant assets for their previous employer.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the former employer, barring the former employees and their new firm from contacting former clients or using confidential information. The district court found a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the trade secrets claims against all defendants, reasoning that even under the Protocol, the defendants’ conduct constituted impermissible “raiding.” The court also found that the employer would likely suffer irreparable harm and that the balance of equities and public interest favored injunctive relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the Protocol and the employment agreements. The Fourth Circuit held that the Protocol’s “raiding” exception applies only to actions by outside firms targeting another firm’s employees, not to employees leaving to form their own business. The court concluded that the employment agreements, not the Protocol, governed the former employees’ conduct and supported the injunction against them. However, because the new firm was not a party to those agreements, the injunction as to the new firm was vacated. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction against the former employees but vacated it as to the new firm. View "Salomon & Ludwin, LLC v. Winters" on Justia Law