Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Contracts
Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Ent
The Bank of Commerce filed suit to foreclose on two mortgages against properties under development by Jefferson Enterprises, LLC. Jefferson raised a variety of counterclaims. Ultimately the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, ordering the foreclosures. Jefferson raised numerous issues on appeal, but finding no error or abuse of the district court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Ent" on Justia Law
Bald, Fat & Ugly v. Keane
Richard and Lisa Keane and the companies they managed, and Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC (BFU) had a disagreement arising from a development deal involving the Houston Professional Plaza. They went to mediation, but the parties had a disagreement regarding the terms of the mediated agreement. They then turned to arbitration. The arbitrator granted two awards in favor of BFU. The award did not specify any date by which the Keanes were to pay the money, nor did the award include interest. The district court confirmed the arbitration awards, and issued a writ of execution. The sheriff returned the writ not satisfied. BFU then obtained an order for a debtor's examination. A partial satisfaction of judgment was made, but the Keanes did not direct how the payment made was to be applied to the two arbitration awards. BFU applied the partial satisfaction to one of the awards, and filed a motion to have the Keanes held in contempt for failing to pay the second. The Keanes challenged the contempt action. The Supreme Court, after its review of the matter, found that because the order confirming the arbitration award did not require the Keanes to do anything and because contempt cannot be used to enforce payment of the debt in this case, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding them in contempt and the order later entered awarding the respondent attorney fees and court costs. View "Bald, Fat & Ugly v. Keane" on Justia Law
Adv Medical Diagnostics v. Imaging Center of Idaho
Plaintiff Advanced Medical Diagnostics entered into a contract for services with Defendant Imaging Center of Idaho, LLC. Defendant stopped making payments and Plaintiff sued for damages for breach of contract. The matter was tried to a jury and the jury returned a special verdict finding that Plaintiff had proved its claim but was not entitled to damages because Defendant proved its affirmative defense. The trial court determined that Defendant was the prevailing party, and was awarded costs and attorney fees. Plaintiff appealed that award to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's decision and affirmed. View "Adv Medical Diagnostics v. Imaging Center of Idaho" on Justia Law
Kofmehl v. Baseline Lake, LLC
Petitioner Patrick Kofmehl bought a piece of land from Baseline Lake, LLC. By closing, the parties disputed the amount of land to be covered by their sales contract. Petitioner was willing to close only if the disputed parcel was included; the sale ultimately failed to close. The trial court invalidated the contract for failing to comply with the statute of frauds and denied specific performance to either party. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether Petitioner was entitled to recover his down payment before the dispute arise. Upon review, the Court concluded that because neither party breached the contract. The Court affirmed the appellate court which reversed the grant of summary judgment that granted restitution. View "Kofmehl v. Baseline Lake, LLC" on Justia Law
Columbia Cmty. Bank v. Newman Park, LLC
Newman Park, LLC was formed for the sole purpose of developing a piece of property. In 2004, it took out a loan to purchase the property at issue in this suit. In 2008, without knowledge of the other owners in Newman Park, one member went to Columbia Community Bank and requested a loan for his 95%-owned company, Trinity. Trinity had nothing to do with Newman Park, but the Bank's loan to Trinity was secured by a second deed of trust on the Newman Park property. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Bank, who was tricked into refinancing the property that the borrower lacked authority to pledge as security, could benefit from equitable subrogation when that Bank had no preexisting interest in the property. The property-owner/debtor argued that the Bank's lack of the preexisting interest barred it from equitable subrogation because of the "volunteer rule" which would characterize it as an intermeddler. The Court rejected the volunteer rule as a bar to equitable subrogation. The Court affirmed the appellate court which held that the defrauded Bank was entitled to be equitably subrogated as first priority lienholder. View "Columbia Cmty. Bank v. Newman Park, LLC" on Justia Law
Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Wilburn
Appellees, Sherry and Kevin Wilburn, purchased a vehicle that they financed by executing a retail installment sales contract with Appellant. After Appellees failed to make payments as agreed in the contract, Appellant sold the vehicle at a private sale. Appellant later filed an action against Appellees to recover the balance due on the contract. Appellant obtained a default judgment against Appellees. Appellant then filed a writ of garnishment, naming as garnishee the alleged employer of Sherry. The circuit court issued a garnishment order. Sherry later filed a motion to set aside the garnishment, asking the court to cancel the garnishment as of January 8, 2012, the date the judgment allegedly became stale, and to direct Appellant to return the funds received after that date. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court's conclusion that the judgment became stale and expired were clearly erroneous. View "Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Wilburn" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Arkansas Supreme Court, Contracts
VC&M, Ltd. v. Andrews
Defendant moved to dismiss a breach of contract suit. Plaintiff e-filed a response to the motions. There was no objection. The circuit court dismissed; plaintiff e-filed a motion to reconsider. Defendant asserted that e-filing the motion was improper. The trial court denied the motion on the merits without comment on the manner of filing. Plaintiff e-filed its notice of appeal. The appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that plaintiff improperly e-filed its motion to reconsider in violation of local rule 5.03 so that the motion was ineffective to toll the time for filing notice of appeal and that plaintiff also violated the rule by e-filing notice of appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The violation of the rule was brought to the court’s attention at the hearing on the motion to reconsider. Defendants did not claim prejudice and the court chose to consider plaintiff’s motion on its merits, which it had discretion to do. Where a deficiency in the notice of appeal is one of form only and not of substance, the appellate court is not deprived of jurisdiction; in this case, the notice of appeal, although improperly filed, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, particularly because a backup paper copy was required to be maintained in a parallel manual court file. Defendants were advised of the nature of the appeal and have not argued that they suffered any prejudice. View "VC&M, Ltd. v. Andrews" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Contracts, Illinois Supreme Court
Pennington v. Flaherty
Bruce Nelson subdivided property in the 1970s. Appellant claimed he purchased tract eighteen from Nelson ten days after Nelson filed the plat. Appellant claimed that at the time of the conveyance, Nelson guaranteed that it would not sell adjoining tracts sixteen and seventeen. Appellee filed a notarized declaration four years later. In 2005, however, Nelson sold tracts sixteen and seventeen. Appellee purchased tracts sixteen and seventeen in 2008. Appellee filed a quiet title action to clear her title of any cloud that may have arisen as a result of Appellant's declaration. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellee, concluding that Appellant's declaration did not create a restriction on development and that there was no restriction on the property prohibiting the sale of the disputed tracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Appellee. View "Pennington v. Flaherty" on Justia Law
Lopez v. Admin Office of the Court
Plaintiff-Appellant George Lopez conducted mediations in a program created and managed by the Administrative Office of Courts of the State of Utah. In 2006, he was removed from the panel of mediators that mediated certain domestic matters. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court alleging that his removal from that list of mediators violated his right to due process and his right to equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. He also alleged breach of contract, breach of implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Upon review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Tenth Circuit found that because Plaintiff's primary argument was based on his alleged contractual rights as a public employee, and because the Court found that there was no implied contract (because evidence in the record revealed Plaintiff was not a public employee), Plaintiff's arguments necessarily failed.
View "Lopez v. Admin Office of the Court" on Justia Law
Williamson v. Hartford Life & Accident, etc.
Plaintiff filed suit seeking interest on benefits she received under an Accidental Death and Dismemberment (ADD) insurance policy issued by Hartford. The parties disagreed on whether Tennessee law or Missouri law applied. Plaintiff did not dispute Hartford's argument that under Missouri law and the policy language, Hartford paid the benefit to her when it was payable. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to interest under Missouri law. Assuming Tennessee law applied, the court relied on Performance Sys., Inc. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, to conclude that the Tennessee Supreme Court would likely construe "due" in Tenn. Code Ann. 7-14-109(b) to mean the time of payment designated in the policy, not the date of loss. In this instance, Hartford paid the benefit to plaintiff within the time of payment designated in the policy and, therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to interest under subsection (b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Williamson v. Hartford Life & Accident, etc." on Justia Law