Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The family of a nursing home patient filed this action against the nursing home for, inter alia, medical negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and retaliation. Plaintiffs asserted the retaliation claim under the Texas Health & Safety Code, which creates a cause of action against a nursing facility that retaliates against a resident or family member who makes a complaint concerning the facility. Defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims pursuant to the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) because the expert report was deficient. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims except for the retaliation claim, concluding that the claim was not a health care liability claim (HCLC) for which the TMLA requires a supporting expert report. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment with respect to the retaliation claim, holding that because the retaliation claim was based on the same factual allegations on which one of Plaintiffs' HCLCs was based, the claim should have been dismissed for lack of a sufficient expert report. View "PM Management-Trinity NC, LLC v. Kumets" on Justia Law

Southern Natural Gas Company (Sonat) sued Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London and Certain London Marketing Insurance Companies (Phase III), alleging breach of numerous umbrella and excess liability policies. Sonat contended the insurance companies failed to pay certain environmental-remediation costs. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers based on prior trials in Phases I and II of the case; Sonat appealed, and the insurers cross-appealed Phase III's outcome. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Southern Natural Gas Company " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned an undivided five-sixths interest of land on which they executed an oil and gas lease to Prestige Exploration, Inc. Plaintiffs ownership interests were managed by Regions Bank who helped negotiate the terms of the lease. Prestige acquired the lease on behalf of Defendant Matador Resources Company. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the extension of that lease. Plaintiffs sought to rescind or reform the extension agreement to make it applicable only to a portion of their property. After several preliminary partial summary judgment rulings, a jury found in favor of Defendant for the extension to cover the entirety of Plaintiffs' land interest. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reformed the lease to extend only to the portion of land for which Plaintiffs asked. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs were precluded from rescinding the agreement on "excusable error." Further, the Court found no manifest error in the district court proceedings. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment in its entirety. View "Peironnet v. Matador Resources Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mary Soileau was injured while working for the Town of Mamou when a front-end loader detached from a tractor and struck her in the leg. She named the tractor manufacturer, the Town, Smith's Hardware (where the Town rented the tractor for employees' use), the hardware store's owners and their insurance company. Trial began with only the owners and their insurer as the remaining defendants in the suit. On the third day, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the owners and their company in the presence of the jury, stating that she did not seek any damages personally against them. Hearing no objections, the trial court granted the request, but made no written (and therefore signed) judgment of dismissal. On day four, the insurer moved for a directed verdict, based on contract language that it was obligated to pay only if its insureds were legally obligated to pay. The insurer's motion was denied, and ultimately over $9 million in damages were awarded to Plaintiff. Concluding that the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion, the appellate court reversed, dismissing the insurance company. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the effect Plaintiff's in-court dismissal of the insured parties was during her personal injury action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred in its analysis, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Solieau v. Smith True Value & Rental" on Justia Law

Appellant Tommie Patterson was involved in a motor vehicle accident. His insurance company paid his medical providers to the policy limit. Two years later, Appellant sued the insurance company, arguing it had shown bad faith following the accident. The company moved for summary judgment, which was granted. A month after that decision, Appellant filed a second lawsuit, alleging the company falsely advertised its services, breached his insurance contract, embezzled money from him, falsified documents and threatened to make him at fault for the accident. The company moved for summary judgment again, which was granted. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Appellant's embezzlement claim in the second lawsuit alleged a different cause of action than in the first, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment with regards to that claim. All other claims were barred by res judicata. Therefore the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Patterson v. Infinity Insurance Co." on Justia Law

ACT brought this suit against PCI and First National, alleging claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and recovery on a payment bond under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131(b). Because United States ex rel. Celanese Coatings Co. v. Gullard was clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority, the court overruled it and held that the Miller Act's statute of limitations was a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional rule. Because nothing on the face of ACT's complaint indicated that it did not work on the project or rent equipment to PCI within one year of the date it filed the complaint, the complaint could not have been dismissed if the district court had treated the Miller Act's statute of limitations as a claim-processing rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Air Control Tech. v. Pre Con Indus." on Justia Law

Pruco Life Insurance Company sought rescission of a life insurance policy, owned by the Paul E. L'Archevesque Special Revocable Trust on the life of Paul L'Archevesque, after it discovered that the policy application contained material misrepresentations about the health of Paul. Pruco tendered to Wilmington Trust Company, a co-trustee of the trust, a check in the amount of the policy premiums paid along with a letter stating Pruco was rescinding the policy. Wilmington cashed the check. Pruco subsequently filed a complaint seeking a rescission of the policy and a declaration that the policy was void ab initio. The district court granted summary judgment to Pruco, concluding that, under the circumstances, a mutual rescission had taken place as a matter of law. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly interpreted Rhode Island law regarding the standard for mutual rescission; (2) there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Pruco made material misrepresentations in its rescission letter that could have prevented summary judgment; and (3) the district court did not err in finding that the issue of whether Pruco acted in bad faith was irrelevant to the rescission analysis. View "Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co." on Justia Law

After a general contractor (Perini) was sued in connection with alleged reinforcing steel defects on commercial construction project, Perini filed a counterclaim against the steel installer (Century) and the company to whom the steel installer assigned its assets (PCS). Century and PCS in turn filed third- and fourth-party complaints against several entities, including the company that provided structural engineering services for the project (Halcrow), alleging negligence, indemnity, contribution, an declaratory relief. Halcrow moved to dismiss the third- and fourth-party complaints, arguing that unintentional tort claims against design professionals in commercial construction projects are barred when the claimant incurs purely economic losses. The district court granted Halcrow's motion. The district court subsequently granted Century's and PCS's motions to amend their complaints to allege a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Halcrow then filed this petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court issued the writ and directed the district court to vacate its order granting PCS and Century leave to amend their third- and fourth-party complaints, holding that, in commercial construction defect litigation, the economic loss doctrine applies to bar claims against design professionals for negligent misrepresentation where the damages alleged are purely economic. View "Halcrow, Inc. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's automobile insurance policy with Geico included a condition that Plaintiff submit to examination under oath (EUO) before recovering personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. Geico denied Plaintiff's PIP claim due to her failure to satisfy this condition after she was injured in a car accident. Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Geico had violated Florida's PIP statute. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding that the PIP statute did not prohibit an insured from requiring an EUO. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of law to the Florida Supreme Court, which answered by holding that, under Fla. Stat. 627.736, an insurer cannot require an insured to attend an EUO as a condition precedent to recovery of PIP benefits. View "Nunez v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Hernandezes (Hernandez) entered into a real-estate contract to buy 100 acres of land in Van Buren County from the Humphries (Humphries). The sales contract included the mineral rights to the property. However, Humphries subsequently leased the oil-and-gas rights to New Century, which assigned the rights to SEECO. Humphries then sold the oil-and-gas rights to Paraclifta and Claughton. Therafter, Hernandez entered into a contract for sale of the property to the Walls (Walls). Hernandez and Walls (Appellants) filed suit against New Century, SEECO, Paraclifta, and Claughton (Appellees), alleging that Appellees were not innocent purchasers the oil-and-gas rights and seeking cancellation of the lease issued to New Century and the assignment to SEECO, as well as the deed conveying the rights to Paraclifta and Claughton. The circuit court granted Appellees' motions for summary judgment and Appellees' requested attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) a question of fact remanded as to whether Hernandez was in exclusive possession of the property, thus imputing notice of Hernandez's interest in the property; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. View "Walls v. Humphries" on Justia Law