Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust. View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, FIA Card Services, filed a complaint against Defendant to recover damages for Defendant's unpaid credit card account. The district court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff, as the moving party and party with the burden of proof at trial, failed to establish that there was no dispute of material fact as to each element of the cause of action where the record did not sufficiently establish either the existence of Defendant's credit card account or that Plaintiff was the owner of that account. Remanded. View "FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Saintonge" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned a house trailer on a leased lot in Defendants' trailer park. Plaintiffs desired to sell their trailer to a third party, which required a transfer of the lot lease to the purchaser. Defendants refused to approve the lease transfer unless Plaintiffs agreed to pay for the removal of an abandoned oil tank on the leasehold. Plaintiffs filed this action for damages and injunctive relief, contending Defendants' demands violated the lease agreement. More than one year after Plaintiffs served discovery requests, Defendants moved to dismiss the action with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that because Plaintiffs declined the opportunity to go forward, the case was dismissed with prejudice. View "Valdes v. MCH Mariner's Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between Elm Ridge Exploration Company, LLC, an operator of oil and gas leases in New Mexico, and Fred Engle, who owned a majority of those leases. Elm Ridge sought to recover drilling expenses by foreclosing on Engle's lease interests. Engle counterclaimed, arguing that Elm Ridge had no authority to operate, and broadly that Elm Ridge breached its contractual and fiduciary duties. Engle also filed a third-party complaint against the previous operators, Central Resources, Inc. and Giant Exploration & Production Company. The district court dismissed two counts on Engle's counterclaim against Elm Ridge and the third-party complaint on statute of limitations grounds. After a trial on Engle's remaining counterclaim count (breach of contractual and fiduciary duties), a jury found that Elm Ridge breached the Operating Agreement and could not recover drilling expenses. The jury found that Engle still owed Elm Ridge for other drilling costs. The district court calculated Engle's share of the costs not attributable to the breach, and held Elm Ridge was entitled to a foreclosure order. Both parties appealed. Finding no error in the district court's calculation or ultimate disposition of the case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Engle v. Elm Ridge Exploration Co." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant XTO Energy, Inc. appealed a district court's certification of a class of Kansas royalty owners who sought recovery for its alleged underpayment of royalties. Specifically, the class claimed XTO violated Kansas law by improperly deducting costs for placing gas into a "marketable condition." After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the class did not meet Rule 23(a)'s commonality, typicality and adequacy requirements or Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. Furthermore, the Court found the class' argument in favor of certification through collateral or judicial estoppel unavailing. The class certification order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Trust v. XTO Energy" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute involving a Master Services Agreement (MSA) between BHP and Deep Marine. At issue on appeal was whether Underwriters could enforce BHP's contractual insurance, defense, and indemnity obligations to Deep Marine after Deep Marine's bankruptcy discharge. The court concluded that, even assuming arguendo that the MSA required indemnification against liability and that Deep Marine will eventually be held liable, Underwriters still could not prevail because BHP's indemnification obligation runs only to Deep Marine; Deep Marine would not, and could not, incur any loss in the Duval action, so Underwriters could not seek indemnification from BHP; because BHP had agreed to continue providing Deep Marine with a nominal defense, Underwriters would not have a breach of contract claim against BHP; the additional insured and primary insurance requirements do not apply BHP's self-insurance; BHP's only obligation was an indemnification obligation to Deep Marine; unlike Underwriters, it had no secondary liability to injured tort victims, like Duval; and Duval had no claim against BHP and, therefore, tender under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c) was improper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Duval v. Northern Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a manufacturer of various personal care, household, and organic products, filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not breach its contract with defendants. On remand from the court, the district court reentered summary judgment for plaintiff and dismissed defendants' equitable counterclaims. The court held that, regardless of whether the 1988 Agreement or the 2006 Agreement governed, changing the status of the Lambert Group from sales associate to manufacturer's representatives was not prohibited by either contract and there could not be a breach. The court rejected defendants' implied covenant argument on the merits and were not persuaded that plaintiff's actions breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; even if it was unclear which agreement controlled, summary judgment was still appropriate if plaintiff did not breach either agreement; and the court rejected defendants' counterclaims for relief under theories of quantum meruit, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment where equitable relief was unavailable in Minnesota where the rights of the parties were governed by a valid contract and where defendants have not identified any evidence suggesting an incomplete or confusing agreement regarding compensation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Watkins Inc. v. Chilkoot Distributing, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Wehrles were struck by drunk-driver Barth. Robert Wehrle’s injury claim exceeded $750,000 and his wife's claim exceeded $1.5 million. Barth’s auto insurance policy included a $100,000 per-person liability limit. Each recovered that amount from Barth’s insurer. The Wehrle’s own policy, issued by Cincinnati, included underinsured-motorist coverage, for up to $1 million. Cincinnati paid $800,000, reasoning that the Wehrles’ policy reduces its $1 million maximum payout “by all sums paid by anyone who is legally responsible,” and that the Wehrles had recovered $200,000 from Barth’s insurer. The Wehrles claimed that the $100,000 that they each received from the drunk-driver’s insurer should reduce their individual claims. The district court ruled in favor of the insurer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the policy language unambiguously supported the insurer’s interpretation and was consistent with the gap-filling purpose of underinsured-motorist insurance. View "Wehrle v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, Kevin and his wife Marjorie moved to Indiana, to manage car dealerships owned by Savoree. In 2007 Savoree proposed selling the dealerships to the couple through a series of stock purchases to be financed by a $3.5 million loan from CSB. After negotiating the loan with CSB, Kevin took out a life insurance policy with Cincinnati Life that named Marjorie as the beneficiary. Two months later, Kevin assigned that policy to CSB. The couple eventually declared bankruptcy and litigation between all of the parties ensued. Kevin died of cancer in 2010. Cincinnati Life deposited the proceeds, $3 million, with the clerk of court and sought judicial determination of ownership. The district court dismissed Marjorie’s claims with prejudice for failing to meet pleading standards and entered summary judgment for CSB. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Marjorie did not present any evidence to create a genuine disputed issue of material fact. She identified lack of consideration for the assignment as a potential disputed fact, but the assertion was made and repeated without any support or citation to evidence. View "Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Conoco for breach of the Offer Letter and breach of its obligations under a severance plan (the Plan). The court concluded that plaintiff waived any challenge to the Trustee's application of the common law presumption of integration or Texas's parol evidence rule; plaintiff's arguments regarding his change in title were unpersuasive; plaintiff's "at will" employment argument relied on outdated and out-of-context Texas authority and was unpersuasive; the waiver was not invalid and unenforceable on account of fraud in the inducement; plaintiff ratified an alleged fraud, thereby preserving the validity and enforceability of the waiver regardless by submitting a claim to Conoco Human Resources but then continuing to work at Conoco; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), civil enforcement provision "completely preempts" plaintiff's state law claims against Conoco and the district court did not err by denying plaintiff's first motion for remand; the district court correctly denied plaintiff's renewed motion for remand; plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees; and plaintiff waived his claim for breach of the Offer Letter, pertaining to a substantial reduction in his post-merger job position and responsibilities, for failure to plead with specificity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff. View "Clayton v. ConocoPhillips Co., et al" on Justia Law