Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Defendant hosted an underage drinking party in which one of the guests known to become belligerent when intoxicated assaulted and seriously injured another guest. The victim sued Defendant and his insurer (Insurer) for damages for his injuries. Insurer disputed coverage, arguing that it had no duty to defend and indemnify Defendant because there was no "accident" or "occurrence" under Defendant's family's homeowner's insurance policy where Defendant's actions were intentional. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Insurer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was an occurrence because the assault was an accident when viewed from the standpoint of the injured person or Defendant, the insured. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable insured, Defendant's intentional actions in setting up a drinking party and procuring alcohol for underage guests, including one known to become belligerent when intoxicated, created a direct risk of harm resulting in bodily injury; and (2) thus, the victim's bodily injury was not caused by an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, and Insurer was not obligated to provide insurance coverage for Defendant. View "Schinner v. Gundrum" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff's former husband filed for dissolution, the parties reconciled and entered into two postmarital agreements specifying how their property would be divided in the event of a future dissolution. The district court approved the agreements and dismissed the dissolution proceeding. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second dissolution proceeding. On the advice of Defendants, certain attorneys and law firms, Plaintiff accepted a settlement proposal from her former husband based upon the postmarital agreements approved in the first dissolution action. The marriage was then dissolved. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants were negligent in advising her to accept the settlement proposal. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the actions of Defendants were not the proximate cause of any damage to Plaintiff, and even if Defendants breached the standard of care, Plaintiff could not have received a more favorable settlement in the second dissolution proceeding because the court was bound to enforce the order in the first dissolution proceeding under the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judgment in the first proceeding had preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata. View "Young v. Govier & Milone, LLP" on Justia Law

A union and college were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a provision that the "granting or failure to grant tenure shall be arbitrable but any award is not binding." A professor at the college, who was a member of the union, was denied tenure and submitted a grievance to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the college violated the terms of the CBA and ordered that the professor be reinstated to his position. A superior court judge confirmed the arbitrator's award. The appeals court reversed, holding that the arbitrator's award was not binding on the college pursuant to the CBA, and therefore, the judge erred in confirming that arbitrator's award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the terms of the CBA, the college and the union did not agree to binding arbitration of a tenure denial determination and therefore did not agree to binding arbitration of the grievance in this case; and (2) because the arbitrator's award was nonbinding, the union was not entitled to have the award judicially confirmed and enforced. View "Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Mass. Bd. of Higher Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home through Lender. The monthly payment on the loan was $600 greater than Plaintiffs' total monthly income. After the mortgage was funded, it was sold and assigned to Bank. Servicer serviced the loan. After Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action asserting violations of the Consumer Protection Act, the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, and the Borrower's Interest Act, and asserting that the loan was unenforceable because it was unconscionable. A superior court judge granted summary judgment to Defendants, Bank and Servicer, on all claims based on the ground that Defendants, as assignees, had no liability for the acts of Lender. The Supreme Court (1) reversed summary judgment in favor of Bank, holding that Bank was not shielded from liability as a matter of law by virtue of its status as an assignee and that Bank failed to establish the absence of material issues of disputed fact entitling it to judgment on any individual claim; and (2) affirmed summary judgment in favor of Servicer because Servicer was not shown to be an assignee and Plaintiffs offered no alternative basis on which Servicer might be held liable. Remanded. View "Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Rick and Lisa Graham filed a petition for a protection from stalking order against Elizabeth Jones in 2006. Jones counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and conversion. On June 27, 2007, while her counterclaims against the Grahams were pending, Jones died. On April 17, 2008, the Grahams filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Angela Herring, who was appointed as administratrix of Jones's estate, filed a motion to substitute the estate as the claimant against the Grahams. The district court dismissed the action based upon its determination that substitution was untimely under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-225(a)(1). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and provided an analysis to determine whether a substitution motion was filed within a reasonable time, holding (1) the relevant time period for determining the reasonableness of a delay in substituting a party begins with the statement noting the death and ends with the filing of the motion for substitution; and (2) the standard for determining whether a substitution motion has been made within a reasonable time is to consider the totality of the circumstances, which can include the fact of whether another party would be prejudiced by the substitution. Remanded. View "Graham v. Herring" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging that Restaurant.com's certificates violate the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). Restaurant.com removed the matter to the federal district court, which granted its motion to dismiss. The judge concluded that certificates purchased by plaintiffs "provide an individual with a contingent right for discounted services at a selected restaurant[,]" but such a contingent right did not constitute the purchase of "property or service which is primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Therefore, plaintiffs were not "consumers" as defined by the TCCWNA and that the certificates were not "consumer contracts." Plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit certified two questions to the New Jersey Supreme Court. (reformulated): were Restaurant.com's certificates "property" under TCCWNA; if so, were they "primarily for personal, family or household purposes;" and were they a written contract, that gave or "displayed any written consumer warranty, notice, or sign." The New Jersey Court concluded that Plaintiffs were "consumers" and the certificates were "property . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." Furthermore, the certificates purchased from Restaurant.com were "consumer contracts" and the standard terms provided on the certificates are "notices" subject to the TCCWNA. View "Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc." on Justia Law

In a commercial general liability policy (GCL) coverage case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) whether, for an "occurrence" to exist under a standard CGL policy, Georgia law requires there to be damage to "other property;" and (2) if "no" to the first question, whether for an "occurrence" to exist under a standard CGL policy, Georgia law requires that the claims being defended not be for breach of contract, fraud, or breach of warranty from the failure to disclose material information. The Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, and the second in the affirmative to fraud, but negative as to breach of warranty. View "Taylor Morrison Services, Inc. v. HDI-Gerling America Insurance Co. " on Justia Law

Precision Gear Company, Precision Gear LLC, and General Metal Heat Treating, Inc. were granted permission to appeal an interlocutory order denying their motion to dismiss the third-party claims against them filed by Continental Motors, Inc. The trial court certified a question to the Supreme Court of whether, in a suit for non-contractual indemnification arising from an accident and alleged damage that occurred out of state, Alabama's six year statute of limitation for implied contract actions controlled because the foreign jurisdiction's law considered its common law and statutory claims for indemnity as claims based upon contract implied in law or quasi-contract, or whether Alabama's two year statute of limitation for tort actions controlled. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Alabama's two-year statute of limitations applied in this case and that Continental Motors' claims against the gear manufacturers were time-barred. View "Precision Gear Co. v. Continental Motors, Inc. " on Justia Law

Appellant received treatment at Hospital for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. Appellant granted two statutory liens to Hospital on settlement proceeds she obtained from the tortfeasor for hospital services rendered. Appellant subsequently settled her case against the tortfeasor, and the tortfeasor's insurer (Insurer) agreed to pay Appellant $1.3 million in exchange for Appellant's agreement to indemnify Insurer from all healthcare provider liens. Hospital subsequently sued Insurer, and Appellant tendered to Hospital all money it asserted was due. Appellant then filed a complaint against Hospital, alleging that Hospital overcharged her pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 439B.260(1), which provides that hospitals must reduce charges by thirty percent to inpatients who lack insurance "or other contractual provision for the payment of the charge by a third party." The district court entered judgment in favor of Hospital, finding that Appellant's settlement agreement with the tortfeasor rendered Appellant ineligible for the thirty percent statutory discount. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that a patient's eligibility is determined at the commencement of hospital services, and therefore, a later settlement agreement with a third party for the payment of such services does not disqualify the patient for the statutory discount. View " Bielar v. Washoe Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals brought claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., related to their mortgage transactions. The court held that to accomplish rescission within the meaning of section 1635(f), the obligor must file a rescission action in court. Because neither plaintiffs accomplished rescission in this way within three years of their respective transactions, their right to rescind expired and the district court correctly entered summary judgment on these claims. Further, plaintiffs were not entitled, as a matter of law, to money damages for the banks' refusal to rescind, although their claim was cognizable, where the violation - that each set of plaintiffs were given one, rather than two TILA disclosures - was not facially apparent on the loan documents as set forth in section 1641. View "Keiran, et al. v. Home Capital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law