Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants for failing to pay compensation he alleged was owed to him under an employment contract. The complaint asserted claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and violations of the Wage Act. The superior court dismissed all but Plaintiff's claim under the Wage Act, concluding that the Wage Act was the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid claims, thereby preempting Plaintiff's common-law claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend the Wage Act to be the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages, and therefore, Plaintiff's common-law claims should not have been dismissed. Remanded. View "Lipsitt v. Plaud" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation engaged in international asset recovery operations, filed a complaint against Defendants, the Republic of Ukraine and some of its agents and instrumentalities, for, inter alia, breach of contract after Plaintiff performed asset recovery work for which Defendants allegedly did not compensate Plaintiff. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that they were entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court denied the motion in regard to the breach of contract claim, concluding that jurisdiction could be asserted over that claim under the commercial activity exception to the FSIA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, holding that Defendants' transactions with Plaintiff constituted commercial activity exempt from immunity under FSIA. View "Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Bureau for Representing Ukrainian Interests" on Justia Law

In 1996, Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with an underinsured driver. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff had an automobile insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers). In 2001, Plaintiff settled with the underinsured driver. In 2011, Plaintiff filed this action based on contract, alleging that her damages from the accident exceeded the coverage she received from the tortfeasor's insurer and that Farmers had failed to pay "sums available" for her benefit pursuant to her underinsured motorist coverage. Farmers responded by alleging that Plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations or by laches. The district court entered summary judgment for Farmers, concluding that the limitations period commenced when Plaintiff settled with the tortfeasor in 2001 and that her claim was barred by the five-year contract statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it determined that Plaintiff's action accrued upon her settlement with the tortfeasor; and (2) instead, the Court should have applied the Supreme Court's holder in Snyder v. EMCASCO that the action accrues upon the insurer's breach. Remanded. View "Shada v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

The City of Boston transferred a Boston police sergeant who served as a union representative due to what the City said were ongoing concerns about the officer's supervisory authority. The Boston Police Superior Officers Federation (union) sought to enforce a provision of its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the City, which prohibited the involuntary transfer of certain union representatives between stations or assignments. A grievance arbitrator concluded that the City had violated the CBA and awarded the officer damages and reinstatement to his original position. The superior court confirmed the award. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for judgment vacating the award, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in invalidating the officer's transfer, where assignment and transfer of officers within the Boston police department are nondelegable statutory powers of the Boston police commissioner. View "City of Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n" on Justia Law

Insureds purchased a homeowner's insurance policy from Insurer with a personal liability limit of $500,000. The policy contained an animal liability endorsement (endorsement) which limited coverage to $25,000 for claims arising from animal bites. Both Insurer's agent and Insureds mistakenly believed the policy did not contain the limitation of liability but neither conveyed their mistaken belief to the other. After Plaintiff was bitten by Insured's dog, he and his wife successfully brought an action against Insureds. Insurer paid only $25,000 of this judgment. Plaintiffs and Insureds reached a settlement regarding the balance of the judgment and Plaintiffs became assignees of Insureds' claims against Insurer. Plaintiffs sued Insurer, alleging that Insureds and Insurer were mutually mistaken as to the application of the endorsement, and therefore, the policy should be reformed by striking the endorsement. The superior court concluded Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the reformation claim. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that, absent full, clear, and decisive proof of some prior agreement between the parties as to coverage for animal bites different than that contained in the policy, there was no mutual mistake warranting reformation of the policy. View "Caron v. Horace Mann Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Aloha Tower Development Corporation filed a petition to expunge a deed restriction on a park requiring that it be preserved as a public park. Scenic Hawaii, Inc. subsequently intervened in the litigation. After a non-jury trial, the land court denied the petition. Scenic Hawaii filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs under the private attorney general doctrine. The land court granted the request. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversed the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and affirmed the final judgment of the land court, holding that the land court was correct in awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Scenic Hawaii under the private attorney general doctrine inasmuch as the three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine were satisfied in this case. View "In re Application of Honolulu Constr. & Draying Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs bought a townhouse condominium unit from Defendant. After the sale, repairs of leaks in the other condominium units caused by poor construction required the condominium board to collect special assessments in the amount of $65,000 from each unit holder, including Plaintiffs. Recoupment from the builder offset the sum, but Plaintiffs remained out-of-pocket over $40,000. Plaintiffs sued Defendant, alleging fraud and equitable fraud due to Defendant's allegedly insufficient disclosures made to Plaintiffs before the sale. The Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of Defendant, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to prove Defendant committed common-law fraud because they failed to show Defendant misrepresented or omitted some material fact before the sale of the condominium; and (2) rescission was not warranted under the facts of this case, and therefore, equitable fraud was inappropriate. View "Grzybowski v. Tracy" on Justia Law

Claimant sustained injuries in a car accident. The car was insured under a standard Massachusetts automobile insurance policy (auto policy) issued by Liberty Mutual that included optional "medical payments" coverage (MedPay). Claimant was also insured under a separate policy of health insurance issued by Blue Cross Blue Shield (Blue Cross). Liberty Mutual paid personal injury protection benefits to Claimant and Claimant's additional medical expenses. After Liberty Mutual declined to pay Claimant any MedPay benefits because Blue Cross had already submitted the expenses, Claimant commenced this action against Liberty Mutual on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated individuals. On remand, the superior court granted Liberty Mutual's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Claimant was entitled to the MedPay benefits provided by her auto insurance policy, notwithstanding that her medical expenses were covered by and paid under a separate policy of health insurance. Remanded. View "Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Taurus sued DaimlerChrysler, alleging that external websites infringed its patent for “a computer system for managing product knowledge related to products offered for sale by a selling entity.” Daimler Chrysler asserted license and release defenses, asserted a breach of contract counterclaim, and filed a contract claim against third-party defendants (including Orion), which, it claimed violated a 2006 patent licensing agreement between DaimlerChrysler and Orion, to settle prior patent infringement suits. The district court entered summary judgment, finding that the accused websites did not infringe any asserted claims and that certain claims were invalid as anticipated by prior art. The district court found the DaimlerChrysler suit to be exceptional under 35 U.S.C. 285, and awarded damages of $1,644,906.12, for costs incurred in Chrysler’s defense. With respect to remaining issues, the district court: found that certain third parties were alter egos and declined to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; held that the 2006 agreement did not provide a release to the infringement alleged in the patent suit; held that issues of fact remained as to whether certain third parties had breached a warranty in the 2006 agreement; held that Orion had breached the warranty; and imposed sanctions on Orion and another for pre-trial witness tampering (those parties were not permitted to present evidence to support their defense that Chrysler did not rely on the warranty). The Federal Circuit affirmed, except with respect to attorney fees. View "Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp." on Justia Law

Defendants, the children of the late Jack Kirby, one of the most influential comic book artists of all time, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Marvel. This case concerned the property rights in 262 works published by Marvel between 1958-1963. After defendants served various Marvel entities with Termination Notices purporting to exercise statutory termination rights under section 304(c)(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 304, Marvel filed suit seeking a declaration that defendants have no termination rights under section 304(c)(2). The court concluded that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Lisa and Neal Kirby and, therefore, vacated the district court's judgment against them; Lisa and Neal are not indispensable parties and it was appropriate for the action against Barbara and Susan Kirby to have proceeded on its merits; the district court did not err in determining as a matter of law that the works at issue were "made for hire," made at Marvel's instance and expense, and that the parties had no agreement to the contrary; and the district court properly granted Marvel's motion for summary judgment as to Susan and Barbara, who were without termination rights under section 304(c). View "Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby" on Justia Law