Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued his former spouse, seeking rescission and damages arising out of an allegedly fraudulent real estate sales agreement. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's lawsuit for failing to issue summons or file a waiver within ninety days of bringing the action as required by Rule 9(a), Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a discord between Rule 9(a) and 12 O.S.Supp. 2002 section 2004(I), and found the two provisions were in direct conflict to the extent Rule 9(a) shortened plaintiff's allotted time for service of summons. View "Cornett v. Carr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, purchaser of real property, sought damages resulting from alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Plaintiff purchased property advertised as development-ready with an active waste-water permit. Plaintiff then learned that the permit had expired, but nevertheless maintained possession of the property and continued making its required financing payments. Plaintiff did not allege fraud until it defaulted on the modified promissory note - the original note having been modified after plaintiff defaulted - and faced foreclosure. The court held that plaintiff, with full knowledge of the alleged fraud, ratified the purchase and sale price of the property. Such ratification foreclosed plaintiff's right to damages, because plaintiff received the benefit of its bargain. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "R&L Investment Property, L.L.C v. Hamm, et al" on Justia Law

Somascan filed suit against Philips Medical Systems, alleging that Philips had misrepresented the capabilities of the medical equipment it sold to Somascan and that the medical equipment did not meet the appropriate standards of quality. The federal district court set a deadline to amend the pleadings. More than a year and a half after the deadline, Somascan filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. The court denied the motion and later granted Philips' motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion for leave to amend, holding that the district court acted correctly in denying leave to amend, as Somascan offered no excuse for not requesting leave to amend earlier, and no new evidence was alleged to have been uncovered. View "Somascan, Inc. v. Philips Med. Sys. Nederland, B.V." on Justia Law

Clarinet sued Essex alleging that Essex wrongfully refused to pay Clarinet under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Clarinet sought payment for expenses for stabilizing and demolishing a building that it owned, in accordance with Clarinet's interpretation of the policy. Essex denied coverage and refused payment. The insurance policy contained several conditions and exclusions, including the owned property exclusion. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Essex and denied relief to Clarinet because the owned property exclusion barred coverage. View "Clarinet v. Essex Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC) brought a declaratory judgment action against the Donnellys and Rimar Construction, Inc. (RMI) to establish that under its policy of insurance with RCI, EMC had no duty or responsibility to pay damages claimed by the Donnellys in litigation between the Donnellys and RCI. The declaratory judgment action was stayed until a verdict was reached in the underlying action. In the underlying action, the Donnellys were awarded damages, costs and attorney fees against RCI. Subsequently the district court entered summary judgment in the declaratory action, finding that there was no insurance coverage for the damages the Donnellys incurred, but that there was coverage for costs and attorney fees. On appeal, EMC argued that the district court erred in its determination that it had a duty to pay attorney fees and costs when there were no damages awarded to the plaintiff subject to the policy coverage. The Donnellys cross appealed, arguing the district court erred in its conclusion that EMC did not have a duty to cover the damages in this case, and that the Donnellys were entitled to attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Employers Mutual Casualty Co v. Donnelly" on Justia Law

Several hospitals (Hospitals) sued Aetna, Inc. and Aetna Health, Inc. (collectively Aetna) for allegedly violating the Prompt Pay Statute. Aetna provided a Medicare plan (Plan) through an HMO called NYLCare. It delegated the administration of its Plan to North American Medical Management of Texas (NAMM), a third-party administrator. IPA Management Services (Management Services) provided medical services to Plan enrollees. Management Services entered into contracts with the Hospitals to secure hospital services for the Plan employees. Aetna was not a party to these contracts. The Hospitals submitted hospital bills to NAMM for payment. After NAMM and Management Services became insolvent, Aetna de-delegated NAMM and assumed responsibility for processing and paying claims. However, Aetna instructed the Hospitals to continue submitting their bills to NAMM. The Hospitals argued that Aetna was liable for NAMM's failure to timely pay claims and was responsible for $13 million in outstanding bills. The trial court granted summary judgment for Aetna. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because the Hospitals entered into contracts with Management Services and not with Aetna directly, the Hospitals had no viable prompt-pay claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lack of privity between the Hospitals and Aetna precluded the Hospitals' suit. View "Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim with his Insurer under his policy for stolen tools and equipment, which Insurer denied. Plaintiff sued. The district court granted summary judgment for Insurer. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for Plaintiff. On remand, Plaintiff requested and received attorney fees related to both the district court and the appellate proceedings. The court of appeals reversed the award of appellate attorney fees, concluding Plaintiff had waived his right to appellate fees by not filing a motion for attorney fees with the court of appeals in the prior appeal. Petitioner filed a motion requesting appellate attorney fees for his second appeal in Snider II. The court of appeals awarded additional appellate attorney fees. Plaintiff appealed, requesting a judgment for the appellate attorney fees incurred in Snider I and an award of additional fees for the appeal in Snider II. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly applied Supreme Court Rule 7.07(b), Evans v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., and Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-908; and (2) did not err in determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees related this current appeal. View "Snider v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were brother and sister. Defendant was a longtime resident of Maryland. Plaintiff allegedly lived in Iowa in 2003. After Plaintiff obtained employment in Iraq in 2003, he opened a checking account in Des Moines and provided Defendant with checks that could be used to draw on the account to provide for the needs of his children and to pay the bills. Instead of using the checks as agreed, Plaintiff claimed Defendant used the checks to withdraw funds for her personal use. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant in Iowa district court for breach of contract, conversion, bad faith, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant, finding that sufficient minimum contacts were lacking. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Iowa under the Calder v. Jones foreseeable effects test based on the claim of an intentional tort in Iowa. Remanded. View "Shams v. Hassan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Wells Fargo after plaintiffs' application for a mortgage modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was denied. The district court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and therefore granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not plausibly stated a breach of contract claim; plaintiffs' negligence claim failed because there was no express or implied contract and therefore, no tort duty could arise as a matter of law; plaintiffs' Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 13-301(1), claim failed because Wells Fargo did not make misrepresentations when it stated that it needed more information to process plaintiffs' HAMP application; and the district court court properly dismissed the negligent misrepresentation and common law fraud claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

AEGIS, an insurer, appealed from the district court's denial of its motion to compel alternative dispute resolution in its dispute with UEC. The court agreed with the district court that by agreeing in the endorsement of the contract to submit to the jurisdiction of Missouri state courts, AEGIS agreed to have any dispute relating to the insurance or to the claim resolved in those courts. Thus, the endorsement entirely supplanted the condition's mandatory arbitration provision. Even if the policy as a whole were ambiguous as to the mandatory arbitration, the court concluded that UEC would still prevail because it would be entitled to have the ambiguity resolved in its favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Union Electric Co. v. AEGIS Energy Syndicate 1225" on Justia Law