Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Defendants Pam Wood, David Wood, Justin Wood, Josh Wood and Jacob Wood filed an interlocutory appeal for the Supreme Court to determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying their motion to transfer this case to another county. The underlying case involved a car accident in which a question arose over who was covered by an insurance policy. Defendant Pam Wood applied for the coverage in Covington County; the application was faxed from an insurance agent's office in Covington to Plaintiff Safeway Insurance Company's Rankin County office where it was approved. Safeway opposed the transfer of venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Safeway could not demonstrate sufficient facts to support that venue was proper in Rankin County. Therefore the Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case with instructions to transfer it to a permissible venue. View "Wood v. Safeway Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Appellants hired Respondent as the general contractor to build a seasonal residence on Appellant's property. Respondent purchased a general liability insurance policy from Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Company that included an absolute pollution exclusion. Respondent later purchased a boiler for Appellant's home that bore a label warning that the boiler was designed to run on natural gas only. Respondent connected the boiler to a liquid propane line. Appellants were later transported to hospital due to carbon monoxide poisoning from the boiler. Appellants brought litigation against Respondent. Midwest initiated a declaratory judgment action, requesting that the district court find Midwest had no duty to defend or indemnify Respondent because coverage was barred under the absolute pollution exclusion. The district court denied Midwest's motion for summary judgment, concluding that it would be inappropriate to rule as a matter of law that the absolute pollution exclusion barred coverage under the facts in this case since Respondent did not cause any environmental pollution. The court of appeals reversed, holding that carbon monoxide constitutes a pollutant in the Midwest policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that carbon monoxide released from a negligently installed boiler is clearly a "pollutant" that is subject to the absolute pollution exclusion of the Midwest policy. View "Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters" on Justia Law

After Sarah West was involved in a motor vehicle accident, West made a claim against her insurer, State Farm, for underinsured motorist benefits of $75,000. State Farm paid only $20,000 in benefits. Attorney Tracey Morin subsequently filed a complaint against State Farm on behalf of Sarah and her parents, Ausra and James West, for breach of contract, violation of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. At the conclusion of the action, the district court imposed sanctions on Morin individually under Mont. R. Civ. P. 11. Morin appealed, contending that the depth and breadth of the sanctions constituted an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the level of sanctions imposed in this case. View "Morin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased property from Charles Johnson. During the pendency of the sale of the property, Johnson misrepresented the condition of the property and failed to disclose its prior use as a junkyard. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Johnson alleging various causes of action and seeking damages for loss of investment, undisclosed physical problems with the property, and emotional distress. While he owned the disputed property, Johnson maintained a homeowners insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate refused to defend or indemnify Johnson on Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs and Johnson subsequently reached an agreement resolving the underlying complaint, and the superior court entered a judgment against Johnson for $330,000. Plaintiffs then initiated a reach and apply action against Allstate. The trial court granted summary judgment for Johnson, determining that the policy did not cover the damages Plaintiffs suffered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' damages did not constitute covered "bodily injury" or "property damage" pursuant to the Allstate homeowners insurance policy. View "Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's finding of fraud and entry of a nondischargeable judgment for SG Homes. The court concluded that SG Homes justifiably relied on defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations and thereby suffered proven damages. Therefore, the bankruptcy court's finding of fraud on the basis of justifiable reliance was not clearly erroneous. Further, the award of damages for SG Homes was not clearly erroneous and the bankruptcy court did not err in determining that the judgment debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "SG Homes Associates, LP v. Marinucci" on Justia Law

Although the court usually may not review voluntary dismissals of claims or denials of motions for summary judgment, this case presented the unusual situation in which the court was asked to review the voluntary dismissal of a claim following a denial of a motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that its review was appropriate in these circumstances because (1) the district court rejected the legal basis for appellants' counterclaim; (2) the district court disposed of all claims with prejudice; and (3) appellants consented to the final judgment solely to obtain immediate appeal of the prior adverse decision, without pursuing piecemeal appellate review. The court also interpreted several "excess" liability insurance policies, which provided insurance protection beyond the protection provided by underlying policies. The court concluded that the plain language of the insurance policies supported the view of the insurer appellees that the excess liability coverage was only triggered when liability payments reached the attachment point. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ali v. Fed. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with Employer, ostensibly for his failure to properly investigate, document, and ameliorate the misconduct of an employee under his supervision. The termination occurred just months before Plaintiff was to receive a $60,000 bonus. Plaintiff filed an action against Employer to recover the bonus on the grounds that he was terminated without good cause. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment to Employer on Plaintiff's Massachusetts Wage Act claim and allowed Defendant's breach of contract claim to go to the jury. The jury found for Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the jury verdict, holding that whether Plaintiff was terminated without good cause and thus remained eligible for the bonus was a decision within the ambit of the sole and final decision-making authority of Employer's Employment Benefits Committee under the company's "Commitment to Success Bonus Plan"; and (2) affirmed the summary judgment order in Employer's favor, as Employer was under no obligation to pay the bonus. View "Weiss v. DHL Express, Inc." on Justia Law

After receiving an arbitral award against MatlinPatterson, VRG filed a petition in the district court seeking confirmation of the award in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention), 9 U.S.C. 201-08. On appeal, VRG argued that the district court usurped the Arbitral Tribunal's role when it decided that the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement - assuming there was one - did not extend to the dispute at hand. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded so that it could decide, in the first instance and on the particular facts of this case, who - the court or the Arbitral Tribunal - had the power to determine the scope of the alleged arbitration agreement between VRG and MatlinPatterson. This power - to determine the scope of any agreement to arbitrate - was to remain with the district court unless the parties agreed to an arbitration clause that clearly and unmistakably assigned such questions to arbitration. View "VRG Linhas Aereas S.A. v. MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners II L.P." on Justia Law

In 2002, Plaintiff, the owner of a car dealership, executed two vehicle contracts with Henry Day Ford to preorder two Ford GT40s (later renamed the GT). After Henry Day learned it would not be receiving GT40s in its allocation, it refunded Plaintiff's deposit. Plaintiff did not object. In 2004 and 2005, Henry Day learned it had been allocated three GTs. Plaintiff demanded that Henry Day sell him two GTs at the price specified under the contracts. Henry Day instead offered to sell Plaintiff one GT for a higher price. Plaintiff refused the offer and filed a complaint alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The district court ruled in favor of Henry Day. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) despite a latent ambiguity in the contracts regarding the identity of the vehicles to be sold, both parties intended that the contracts cover the vehicle now known as the Ford GT; and (2) Plaintiff did not intend to abandon the vehicle contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the vehicle contracts contained a latent ambiguity, but the ambiguity did not excuse either party's performance under the contracts; and (2) the issue of whether Plaintiff abandoned his rights under the contracts required a remand for additional findings. Remanded. View "Watkins v. Henry Day Ford" on Justia Law

In 2007, a shareholder of Calais Company, Inc., Deborah Kyzer Ivy, filed a complaint against Calais seeking involuntary corporate dissolution. In May 2009, Ivy and Calais reached a settlement agreement in which Calais agreed to purchase Ivy's shares at "fair value" as determined by a three-member panel of appraisers. The appraisers disagreed over the fair value of the company. Calais sought to enforce the Agreement in superior court, arguing the two majority appraisers had failed to comply with the appraisal procedure mandated by the Agreement and the Agreement's definition of "fair value." The superior court ultimately declined to rule on the issue, concluding that interpreting the term "fair value" was beyond its scope of authority under the terms of the Agreement. Consequently, the court ordered Calais to purchase Ivy's shares based on the majority appraisers' valuation. Calais appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's final order and remanded for the court to remand to the appraisers with explicit instructions to calculate the "fair value" as defined by AS 10.06.630(a), as required by the Agreement. View "Calais Company, Inc. v. Kyzer Ivy" on Justia Law