Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2003, multiple residents of a nursing home (Greenwood) died or were injured when another resident set fire to the facility. Consequently, thirteen negligence actions seeking damages for serious bodily injury or wrongful death were filed against Greenwood, the owner of the property housing Greenwood, the lessee of the property (Lexington Healthcare), and the operator of Greenwood. Plaintiff issued a general liability and professional liability insurance policy to Lexington Healthcare. At issue in this case was the amount of liability insurance coverage available for the claims. The trial court determined the amount available under the policy and rendered judgment accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court improperly interpreted a policy endorsement in the policy relating to the aggregate policy limit; and (2) the trial court improperly applied a self-insured retention endorsement to reduce the available coverage. Remanded. View "Lexington Ins. Co. v. Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Marvel, contending that he conceived the comic book character "Ghost Rider," the related characters, and the origin story. Plaintiff also claimed that he owned the renewal term copyrights in those works. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Marvel, holding that plaintiff had assigned any rights he had in the renewal term copyrights to Marvel when he executed a form work-for-hire agreement (the Agreement), six years after the initial publication of the issue in question. The court, by applying the "strong presumption against the conveyance of renewal rights," concluded that the district court erred in holding as a matter of law that plaintiff had assigned his renewal rights to Marvel by signing the Agreement; plaintiff's claim was not untimely as a matter of law because there were genuine disputes regarding whether plaintiff should have known about Marvel's repudiation of his claim of ownership; and there were genuine disputes of material fact that precluded granting summary judgment on the issue of authorship. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for trial. View "Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc." on Justia Law

Atkinson filed suits against Kenray. Kenray filed a separate action against Hoosier, seeking insurance coverage for Atkinson’s claims. Atkinson and Kenray settled their suits. Kenray agreed to entry of judgments in favor of Atkinson. Atkinson agreed not to execute the judgments if Kenray pursued the coverage action against Hoosier. Kenray assigned claims against its insurance agent to Atkinson. State courts entered judgment in favor of Hoosier. Meanwhile, Atkinson sued Kenray’s insurance agent asserting errors and omissions claims. The agent obtained summary judgment. Atkinson returned to the district court that presided over the original suits to set aside the settlement covenant. Atkinson claimed fraudulent inducement: that it entered the agreement based upon Kenray’s representations that its agent had confirmed that Kenray had insurance coverage for Atkinson’s claims. The court held that, because the covenant contained an unambiguous integration clause, parol evidence could not be considered, but that if Atkinson could prove fraud in the inducement specific to the integration clause, it might prevail. Atkinson conceded that it could not establish fraudulent inducement as to the integration clause itself. The court declined to set aside the agreement. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Indiana law does not impose the bright-line rule applied by the trial court. View "Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Kenray Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner was a passenger in an uninsured vehicle that was in an accident. At the time, Petitioner had a certificate policy issued by the Department of Human Services through its Joint Underwriting Program (JUP). The JUP Bureau determined Petitioner was entitled to receive benefits under the JUP and assigned Petitioner's claim to Respondent. Respondent, however, denied Petitioner's request for coverage because Petitioner's certificate policy did not include uninsured motorist coverage. Petitioner sued Respondent, alleging claims of, inter alia, bad faith. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Respondent. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that an underlying insurance contract was required to assert a claim of bad faith against an insurer. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) under the JUP, the insurer assigned to a claim owes the same rights to the person whose claim is assigned to it as the insurer would owe to an insured to whom the insurer had issued a mandatory motor vehicle insurance policy; (2) the insurer's good faith covenant implied in such motor vehicle policies applies to claimants under the assigned claim procedure despite the absence of an insurance policy; and (3) accordingly, Respondent owed Petitioner a duty of good faith. View "Willis v. Swain " on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a retaliatory discharge claim against her former employer (FedEx), alleging that she was terminated for exercising her rights as an injured worker pursuant to the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. Plaintiff filed her suit fifteen months after she was fired. FedEx responded by claiming that, while Kansas law provides a two-year statute of limitations of Plaintiff's claim, Plaintiff was bound by her employment contract to file her suit within six months of her termination. The federal district court granted summary judgment for FedEx. The federal court of appeals certified questions of Kansas law to the Kansas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered by holding that the private contract between FedEx and Plaintiff in this case violated public policy and was invalid to the extent it limited the applicable statute of limitations for filing a retaliatory discharge claim based on Plaintiff's exercise of her rights under the Workers Compensation Act. View "Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

ABB filed a complaint against CSX alleging that the electrical transformer that CSX transported was damaged in transit and that CSX was liable for the full amount of the damage. CSX denied full liability, alternatively contending that the parties had agreed in the bill of lading to limit CSX's liability. The court vacated the portion of the district court's judgment limiting any liability on the part of CSX because it concluded that the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 11706, subjected CSX to full liability for the shipment and that the parties did not modify CSX's level of liability by written agreement as permitted in that statute. View "ABB, Inc. v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

A corporation entered into an agreement with Wells Fargo for a business line of credit. The owners of the corporation signed the document as officers of the corporation. The corporation later defaulted on the line of credit. Velocity Investments, the alleged successor in interest to Wells Fargo, subsequently filed suit against the corporation and the owners as personal guarantors of the debt. The trial court granted summary judgment for Velocity after the owners, acting pro se, failed to respond to Velocity's statement of material facts and requests for admissions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in denying the owners' motion for leave to answer requests for admissions, as (i) allowing the owners to answer the requests for admissions would serve the presentation of the merits of this case, and (ii) Velocity failed to demonstrate that it would be prejudiced if the owners were allowed to answer; and (2) because the trial court granted summary judgment based solely upon the owners' failure to respond to the request for admissions, genuine issues of material fact still existed, and the motion for summary judgment should have been denied. View "Velocity Invs., LLC v. Dybvig Installations, Inc." on Justia Law

The Wicks Law requires public entities seeking bids on construction contracts to obtain separate specifications for three subdivisions of the work to be performed. Until 2008 when the law was amended to raise the threshold, the Wicks Law applied to contracts whose cost exceeded $50,000. The new, higher thresholds, unlike the old one, were not uniform throughout the State. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the amendments violated the Home Rule section of the State Constitution by unjustifiably favoring the eight counties with higher thresholds. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the Home Rule cause of action and that, in any event, the challenged amendments did not violate the Home Rule section because they "were enacted in furtherance of and bear a reasonable relationship to a substantial State-wide concern." The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) at least one plaintiff had standing to assert the Home Rule claim, but that claim failed on the merits; and (2) most of Plaintiffs' other claims failed, but four causes of action challenging the apprenticeship requirements as applied to out-of-state contracts should be reinstated. View "Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition against Defendants alleging a single cause of action for fraud. Plaintiff claimed that he purchased a house only after Defendants had misrepresented the location of the property's corners and lot lines, the location of the water well serving the property, and the availability of an easement to access the driveway leading to the house. Defendants filed a counterclaim for breach of contract relating to a waiver and release, alleging that, in the real-estate-sales contract, Plaintiff had agreed to forgo a survey and to hold them harmless for any boundary line or corner discrepancies that may exist and that in a closing document, Plaintiff agreed to release Defendants from any claims relating to the negotiation of the real-estate contract. The circuit court concluded that Defendants committed constructive fraud, awarding damages of $34,094 against Defendants and dismissing Defendants' counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) ruling that the waiver and release were vitiated by the constructive fraud; (2) ruling that Plaintiff's reliance on Defendants' marking of the boundaries was reasonable; (3) calculating damages; and (4) applying the burden of proof. View "Henry v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Ground Control, LLC appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Capsco Industries, W.G. Yates & Sons Construction and Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. The parties contracted to build the "Margaritaville Spa and Hotel" in Biloxi. The circuit court held in part that Ground Control's failure to obtain a certificate of responsibility rendered its contract with Capsco null and void. After its review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court agreed (and affirmed) that the lack of the certificate of responsibility rendered the contract null and void. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in part so that the circuit court could determine whether Ground Control was entitled to recover based on claims of unjust enrichment and/or quantum meruit. View "Ground Control, LLC v. Capsco Industries, Inc." on Justia Law