Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 1907, Florence conveyed her 1/7 interest in "the surface only" of a 225-acre tract of land to Walter, her brother, who was vested with an undivided 6/7 interest in the tract. The subject tract was subsequently conveyed several times. In 1967, Respondent purchased the interest in the 225-acre tract that was previously owned by Walter. Respondent asserted that he was the sole owner of all oil and gas rights under the tract. Petitioners, successors to Florence, contended that they owned a portion of the 1/7 interest in the oil and gas under the tract. The circuit court ruled in favor of Respondent after declaring that the term "surface only" was ambiguous and relying on contemporary testimony to interpret the deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "surface," when used as a term of conveyance, is not presumptively ambiguous and does have a definite and certain meaning; (2) the deed clearly conveyed from Florence to Walter her share of "the surface only" to the tract and reserved to Florence the remainder of the tract, including the oil and gas underlying the tract; and (3) accordingly, Petitioners were owners of a portion of Florence's 1/7 interest in the minerals underlying the tract. View "Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery of Terra Alta v. Morgan " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an in-home registered nurse, was injured in an automobile accident while driving her employer's vehicle to to a patient's home to perform her nursing duties. Plaintiff incurred $382,849 in medical expenses as a result of the accident. After Plaintiff's employer's workers compensation carrier (AIG) denied Plaintiff's workers compensation claim, Plaintiff filed a medical payments claim with Allstate, with whom Plaintiff had a personal automobile insurance policy that provided $100,000 in medical payments coverage. Allstate failed to provide medical payments benefits immediately to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and AIG later settled Plaintiff's worker's compensation claim for $150,000. Plaintiff then commenced this breach of contract and bad faith action against Allstate based on Allstate's failure to pay medical benefits. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law for $33,000 on the breach of contract claim and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred in excluding Allstate's evidence of AIG's acceptance of the worker's compensation claim, and that exclusion prejudiced Allstate's ability to defend the bad faith and punitive damages claims. View "Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in two underlying lawsuits (the Briley Lawsuit and the McSpadden Lawsuit). These underlying lawsuits sought damages arising out of Doe Run's operation of a five-hundred-acre waste pile (Leadwood Pile). The court concluded that the pollution exclusions in the CGL policies precluded a duty to defend Doe Run in the Briley Lawsuit. The court concluded, however, that the McSpadden Lawsuit included allegations and claims that were not unambiguously barred from coverage by the pollution exclusions in the policies. The McSpadden Lawsuit alleged that the distribution of toxic materials harmed plaintiffs, without specifying how that harm occurred. The McSpadden complaint also alleged that Doe Run caused bodily injury or property damage when it left the Leadwood Pile open and available for use by the public without posting warning signs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in an underlying lawsuit. The underlying lawsuit alleged environmental property damage resulting from Doe Run's mine and mill operations. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Lexington had no duty to defend because the policies' absolute pollution exclusions unambiguously barred coverage of all claims asserted in the underlying lawsuit. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the court's holding in Grochowski v. Phoenix Construction, which held that the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. 3141-3148, barred third-party private contract actions, brought under state law, aimed at enforcing the Act's prevailing wage schedules. The court concluded that Grochowski was the controlling law of this Circuit and foreclosed plaintiff's third-party beneficiary contract claim for failure to pay prevailing wages; the district court did not err in setting aside the jury's award of punitive damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50; the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial as to damages on his discrimination claim; and, therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Carrion v. Agfa Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was a political subdivision for purposes of the governmental-immunity provisions of Ohio Rev. Code 2744. Appellee sued Appellant, asserting several claims. Appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming political-subdivision immunity. Appellant then unsuccessfully sought to file an amended answer raising political-subdivision immunity as an affirmative offense. Thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment to Appellant on two of Appellee's claims. After Appellant appealed the trial court's denial of leave to file an amended answer, the case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee on two of its remaining claims. Appellant filed a second appeal from the judgment. While Appellant's appeals were pending, the Supreme Court held that Appellant's first appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with a trial of any claim subject to the political-subdivision immunity defense. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed Appellant's appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for leave to file an amended answer to raise the affirmative defense of political-subdivision immunity precluded Appellant from enjoying the benefits of the alleged immunity; and (2) the court of appeals therefore possessed jurisdiction to determine Appellant's appeal of that order. View "Supportive Solutions, LLC v. Elec. Classroom of Tomorrow" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent Action Concrete Contractors, Inc. in a mechanic's lien foreclosure action. Owners Elvira Chappelear, Craig Chappelear, Premier Southern Homes, LLC, Henry G. Beal, Jr. and First Citizens Bank and Trust Co., Inc. argued on appeal there were material issues of fact and that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. The Supreme Court disagreed after its review of the trial court record and affirmed. View "Action Concrete v. Chappelear" on Justia Law

Petitioner Shannon Hutchinson was the beneficiary of a mortgage life insurance policy. She sued Liberty Life Insurance Company after it denied her benefits under a policy exclusion for injury resulting from the insured's being intoxicated. The insured-decedent was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of his accidental death. The circuit court granted Petitioner summary judgment, finding methamphetamine was not a narcotic under the policy. The appellate court reversed, finding the plain meaning of "narcotic" was enough to qualify as a narcotic. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court; the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the appellate court ready the policy exclusion to deny coverage for injuries from unlawful use of intoxicating substances: "this reading rewrites rather than interprets the insurance policy's exclusionary clause." View "Hutchinson v. Liberty Life Insurance" on Justia Law

Alea London Limited (insurer) appealed a circuit court's denial of its motion to set aside an order of a special referee that granted Respondent Elisa Narruhn an assignment of rights in supplemental proceedings held in conjunction with another lawsuit. The underlying suit was filed after Respondent was shot while attending a nightclub in Myrtle Beach. A special referee was appointed to conduct supplemental proceedings to determine whether the club had any assets to satisfy Respondent's judgment. The referee granted Respondent an assignment of any and all rights, including any claims, the club might have had against the Insurer (which issued the club a liability insurance policy). Respondent subsequently sued the Insurer seeking damages for failing to pay or defend a claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court modified the circuit court's order, but affirmed. View "Narruhn v. Alea London Limited" on Justia Law

Tenant-Defendant Bhole, Inc. terminated its commercial lease before the lease expired. Before the end of the lease, Plaintiff-landlord Shore Investments, Inc. filed suit to recover the entire unpaid rent for the balance of the term. The lease agreement did not contain an acceleration clause. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that though defendants breached the lease, the trial court erred by not considering the lease did not have an acceleration clause. The trial court's award of damages and attorney's fees was inappropriate, and its decision regarding the landlord's claim for tortious interference with the lease (with a punitive damages award) was also made in error. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bhole, Inc., at al. v. Shore Investments, Inc." on Justia Law