Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Access sells software for mobile communication, owns the patents at issue, and entered into an exclusive license agreement with APAC, a subsidiary of Acacia. The agreement gave APAC the exclusive right to grant sublicenses, to sue for damages and to seek relief for infringement of the patents. The agreement disclaims third-party-beneficiary rights, states that APAC may not enforce the patents against, or seek licenses to practice the patents from, Access’s customers and end-users in connection with Access’s products and services, and states that APAC and Access consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of any California state or federal court. APAC assigned all of its rights and liabilities in the patents to a wholly owned subsidiary, SmartPhone. SmartPhone sued Huawei, which makes mobile handsets and tablets, in Texas, alleging that Huawei products infringe the patents. Huawei then sued SmartPhone, Acacia Research, and Access in California, alleging that Huawei has been an Access customer for more than 10 years and seeking declaratory judgments of noninfringement. Based on the Texas filing, the district court dismissed the noninfringement and invalidity counts under the first-to-file rule. Dismissing remaining counts, the court stated that.an allegation that the parties intended Huawei to benefit from the license agreement conflicted with its terms. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Futurewei Tech., Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant to recover on a promissory note. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court concluded that, construing the evidence most favorably to plaintiffs, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the primary purpose of the loan was consumer or non-consumer in nature. The district court correctly declined to create a de minimus exception to the no notice rule. The court reversed and remanded. View "Crozier, et al. v. Wint" on Justia Law

Michele Beach sued a clinic and its executive director, alleging that they had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by conducting an unfair investigation and unlawfully retaliating against Beach for her suggestions about improvements in security systems. Beach had worked for the clinic when the clinic's executive director concluded that prescription drug records had been systematically falsified and that Beach was responsible. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Beach appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Beach v. Handforth-Kome" on Justia Law

Petitioners were sued by Investors who alleged that Petitioners had breached various statutory, contractual, and fiduciary duties. Petitioners filed numerous counterclaims alleging (1) Dana Gentry, a local television reporter, helped Investors investigate and prepare their lawsuit in order to manufacture news stories intended to embarrass Petitioners; and (2) Gentry received personal favors from Investors in connection with the news stories. During discovery, Petitioners served a subpoena on Gentry requesting information relating to Gentry's relationship with Investors. Gentry filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that the information sought was protected by Nevada's news shield statute, which protects journalists from being required to reveal information gathered in their professional capacities in the course of developing news stories. The district court granted the motion to quash. The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' petition for extraordinary relief, concluding that Gentry's motion to quash the subpoena properly asserted the news shield privilege and that Petitioners failed to overcome this privilege. View "Aspen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., a commercial wholesale retail center, offered a free supervised play area called the "Incredible Kids' Club" for children to use while their parents shopped. To use the Kids' Club, BJ's required parents to sign an agreement containing an exculpatory clause and an indemnification clause. Russell Rosen executed the agreement on behalf of his three minor children. Rosen's son, Ephraim, was allegedly injured in the Kids' Club. Rosen and his wife (the Rosens) filed a negligence action against BJ's, and BJ's filed a counterclaim against the Rosens alleging breach of contract for failing to indemnify, defend, and hold BJ's harmless pursuant to the indemnification clause. The circuit court granted summary judgment for BJ's. The court of special appeals struck down the exculpation and indemnification clauses and reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the court of special appeals erred by invoking the State's parens patriae authority to invalidate the exculpatory clause in the Kids' Club agreement. Remanded. View "BJ's Wholesale Club v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a sales representative who had CVS as a client at Allied Printing Services and at his subsequent employment at Strine Printing Company (SPC). While working for Allied, Plaintiff had surreptitiously helped to pay the car lease of a CVS employee. When CVS later learned of Plaintiff's role in the apparent kickback, CVS decided it would not do business with Plaintiff and asked SPC to remove him from the CVS account. SPC subsequently dismissed Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued SPC and its owner (collectively, Defendants) for contract, quasi-contract, and tort claims. The federal district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that relief was warranted on his unjust enrichment, intentional interference, misrepresentation, and contract claims. View "Bisbano v. Strine Printing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Monsanto, through a wholly owned subsidiary, owns a quartzite mine near Soda Springs. Monsanto and Washington Group International, Inc. (WGI) contracted with each other for WGI to operate the mine. This agreement was memorialized in an agreement set to expire at the end of 2002. A by-product of WGI's operations was silica sand. Silicon International Ore, LLC (SIO) contacted Monsanto about acquiring the sand. SIO presented Monsanto with a proposed contract, but that contract was never executed. However, Monsanto and WGI executed an Addendum to the agreement that authorized WGI to construct and operate a processing facility for silica sand at the quartzite mine and to pay Monsanto royalties for silica that was sold by WGI to a third party. SIO and WGI executed a Master Agreement, under which WGI agreed to provide silica sand to SIO; SIO agreed to pay for the construction of the processing facility for the silica sand; SIO agreed to pay WGI to dry, screen, and bag the silica sand; SIO agreed to pay WGI an additional amount for processed sand; and WGI agreed to load the bagged silica sand onto SIO trucks. Shortly before the First Quarzite Agreement was set to expire, Monsanto and WGI executed a second Quarzite Agreement and addendum. The Second Addendum was almost identical to the First, but provided that WGI would pay Monsanto different amounts for sand based on several considerations and that the "[t]itle to the silica sand sold by SIO shall pass directly from [Monsanto] to SIO upon processing . . . subject to payment." WGI notified SIO that it would no longer be providing SIO with silica sand after the end of the year. After discussions with SIO, SIO was permitted to continue processing and bagging sand through April 29, 2008. SIO dismantled its operations in the quarry and removed its building and equipment. The following year, SIO sued Monsanto and WGI for damages for violating and interfering with an alleged verbal agreement to continue processing silica sand. SIO alleged that it and Monsanto entered into a verbal agreement separate and apart from the Master Agreement for the sale of silica sand. SIO asserted breach of the alleged verbal agreement, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, equitable estoppel, and quasi-estoppel. Monsanto denied SIO's claims and asserted the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense. Against WGI, SIO claimed that WGI breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied into the Master Agreement, and SIO alleged that WGI tortiously interfered with the alleged verbal agreement between SIO and Monsanto. Monsanto and WGI moved to dismiss, which were ultimately granted by the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Silicon Int'l v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Albert Boogaard argued that the comprehensive marine liability insurance policy he purchased from International Marine Underwriters (IMU) for his general partnership, ABCD Marine, covered bodily injuries he suffered while working as an independent contractor for Northland Services Inc. (NSI). Specifically, petitioner claimed that even as a general partner he qualified and was covered as a third party under the "insured contract" provision of the policy. IMU contended that as a general partner and insured, Boogaard was not a third party under the insured contract provision. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of IMU. As a general partner, Boogaard did not qualify as a third party under the "insured contract" provision in accordance with Washington partnership law. View "Int'l Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine, LLC" on Justia Law

On October 18, 2000, Tenant leased Landlord's billboard for fifteen years, commencing on December 1, 2000 and ending September 30, 2015. The lease obligated Tenant to pay the full annual basic rent for 2007 to Landlord on January 1, 2007. Tenant later terminated the lease, effective January 8, 2007, and gave Landlord a check representing rent for the period of January 1, 2007 through January 8, 2007. Landlord filed suit against Tenant seeking the balance of the basic rent for 2007. Tenant moved for summary judgment, suggesting that Landlord agreed to pro-rate rent for 2007 during an oral communication. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Tenant. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment for Landlord. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Tenant was obligated to pay the full annual basic rent for the calendar year 2007, the parties did not agree in the lease to apportion rent post-termination except in specified circumstances not relevant here, and Tenant's claim that the parties orally agreed to such apportionment was barred by the lease's "no oral modification" clause. View "Eujoy Realty Corp. v. Van Wagner Commc'ns, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties in this case entered into an agreement with two writings drafted by U-Haul of West Virginia. The first writing was a rental contract signed by the three plaintiffs. The second writing was a rental contract addendum that was not signed. The addendum contained a provision requiring that any disputes between the parties be arbitrated and was not made available to U-Haul customers prior to their execution of the rental contract. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against U-Haul for breach of contract and false advertising, among other claims. U-Haul sought to compel Plaintiffs to resolve their claims in arbitration, arguing that the addendum was incorporated by reference into the signed rental contracts, and thus, U-Haul was allowed to enforce the arbitration provision. The circuit court denied U-Haul's motion to compel arbitration. U-Haul then filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking a writ of prohibition to set aside the circuit court order that refused to compel Plaintiffs to participate in arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the addendum was not incorporated by reference into the signed rental contracts. View "State ex rel. U-Haul Co. of W. Va. v. Zakaib" on Justia Law