Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Defendant applied for homeowner's insurance with Insurer, and his application was approved. Several years later, after discovering a misrepresentation in Defendant's application, Insurer rescinded the homeowner's insurance policy issued to Defendant. Insurer then initiated this action against Defendant, alleging that it lawfully rescinded the insurance contract with Defendant. Insurer also sought recovery of all monies paid to Defendant under the insurance contract. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Insurer, determining, as a matter of law, that Defendant made a misrepresentation on his homeowner's insurance application and that the misrepresentation was material. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because no material question of fact existed regarding whether Defendant made a material misrepresentation on his application for homeowner's insurance, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment for Insurer. View "De Smet Farm Mut. Ins. Co. of S.D. v. Busskohl" on Justia Law

In 2007, Gager applied for a line of credit to purchase computer equipment. The application required that she provide her home phone number. Gager listed her cellular phone number without stating that the number was for a cellular phone, or indicating that Dell should not use an automated telephone dialing system to call her at that number. Gager defaulted on the loan Dell granted. Dell began using an automated telephone dialing system to call Gager’s cell phone, leaving pre-recorded messages concerning the debt. In 2010, Gager sent a letter, listing her phone number and asking Dell to stop calling it regarding her account. The letter did not indicate that the number was for a cellular phone. Dell continued to call, using an automated telephone dialing system. Gager filed suit, alleging that Dell violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The district court dismissed on the theory that she could not revoke her consent once it was given. The Third Circuit reversed. The fact that Gager entered into a contract with Dell does not exempt Dell from the TCPA. Dell will still be able to call Gager about her delinquent account, but not using an automated dialing system. View "Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs. LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Victor Virgin Construction Corporation appealed a Superior Court remitting a jury award following an advisory jury finding of breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation by defendant New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT cross-appealed, asking that the award be further reduced. In 2008, Virgin bid on a DOT project to replace a stone box culvert located underneath Depot Road in Hollis. Virgin submitted the lowest bid and was awarded the contract. After completion of the project, DOT paid Virgin the sum agreed to in the contract with only a minor upward adjustment. Virgin sued DOT for both breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court denied DOT's request to bifurcate the trial; subsequently the jury found in favor of Virgin. DOT then moved for a new trial or to set aside the jury's damages award. The trial court granted remittitur, but did no enter a finding of liability on the breach of contract claim, finding that the award could only be sustained on the negligent misrepresentation claim. Virgin then appealed, seeking the full amount of damages awarded by the jury. The Supreme Court found that Virgin's negligent misrepresentation claim for money damages was capped by statute, therefore it was not entitled to the full amount of damages originally awarded by the jury. That cap does not apply to breach of contract, however, and because the trial court did not include findings with regard to liability on the breach of contract claim, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Victor Virgin Construction Corp. v. New Hampshire Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Appellants, owners and/or managers of Big Drive Cattle, LLC, appealed the district court's dismissal of their counterclaims against Farm Credit. Big Drive executed various promissory notes and loan agreements with Farm Credit. Farm Credit subsequently filed suit against appellants to enforce appellants' guarantees. Appellants filed counterclaims against Farm Credit for negligence, negligent misrepresentations, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court concluded that appellants could not rely on the loan agreements, the notes, the guarantees, or any other contracts for the source of the legal duty of accurate reporting they alleged Farm Credit owed to them; appellants' allegations that Farm Credit ignored an "express directive" to remove a particular employee from Big Drive's line of credit was not relevant to their amended counterclaims; and appellants failed to state a claim for negligence where appellants have not plead any plausible duty requiring Farm Credit to provide appellants with accurate reports on the loan collateral, negligent misrepresentation where appellants did not plead the element of intent, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing where appellants failed to plead sufficient specific facts to establish damages arising from Farm Credit's breach. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Page, et al. v. Farm Credit Services, etc., et al." on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized a new tort called "malicious abuse of process," which subsumed causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Nanodetex Corporation and two of its principals (the Insureds) were successfully sued for malicious abuse of process. They then sought indemnification from Carolina CasualtyInsurance Company, which covered the Insureds under a management liability policy (the Carolina Policy). Carolina denied the claim, relying on an exclusion in the policy for losses arising from claims for "malicious prosecution." It sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the damages arising from the malicious-abuse-of-process judgment. On Carolina's motion for summary judgment, the district court agreed with Carolina and also rejected the Insureds' counterclaims. The Insureds appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the declaratory judgment, holding that the term "malicious prosecution" in the exclusion does not encompass all claims of malicious abuse of process, but only claims whose elements are essentially those of the common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution. Because the judgment against the Insureds in the tort case was affirmed on appeal on a claim that was not substantially the same as common-law malicious prosecution, the exclusion in the Carolina Policy did not apply. View "Carolina Casualty Insurance v. Nanodetex Corporation, et al" on Justia Law

CareFirst, Inc., a nonstock, nonprofit Maryland corporation, is a holding company with two subsidiaries that provides health insurance for millions of Maryland residents. State law confers broad authority on the Maryland Insurance Commissioner to oversee its operation and adherence to its mission. This case arose from the termination of Leon Kaplan, a former executive of CareFirst. CareFirst declined to pay part of the post-termination compensation set forth in Kaplan's employment contract, reasoning that the compensation was not for "work actually performed," as that standard had been interpreted by the Commissioner. The Commissioner affirmed the decision not to pay the benefits, concluding that the payments would violate Md. Code Ann. Ins. 14-139. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Commissioner's determination was not preempted by ERISA; (2) the Commissioner's construction of the insurance code was legally correct; and (3) there was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's determination in this case. View "Md. Ins. Comm'r. v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

In case no. 1111525, M & F Bank ("M & F") appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of First American Title Insurance Company ("FATIC") on negligence, breach-of-contract, and bad-faith-failure-to-pay claims M&F asserted against FATIC related to a title-insurance policy ("the title policy") FATIC issued M & F in connection with a mortgage loan made by M & F to a developer of property in Auburn. In case no. 1111568, FATIC appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of M & F on FATIC's counterclaims asserting abuse of process, conspiracy, breach of contract, and negligence. Upon review of both cases, the Supreme Court affirmed both judgments. View "M & F Bank v. First American Title Insurance Company " on Justia Law

Liberty Anesthesia Associates, LLC (Liberty), an independent contractor that provides anesthesia services at the Jersey City Medical Center (JCMC), contracted plaintiff Karen Cole to provide anesthesia services at JCMC. Cole's employment agreement with Liberty included an arbitration provision. After JCMC revoked Cole's work privileges, Liberty terminated Cole's employment pursuant to their agreement. Cole filed a complaint against JCMC asserting statutory and common law claims. JCMC impleaded Liberty as a third-party defendant and filed an answer to Cole's amended complaint, asserting thirty-five affirmative defenses, none of which referred to arbitration. After discovery, which included interrogatories and depositions, both Liberty and JCMC moved for summary judgment. After Cole settled her claims with JCMC, the court entered summary judgment in Liberty's favor on two of four causes of action and scheduled trial. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant could compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement after being joined and actively participating in litigation between a party and a non-party to the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court concluded that Liberty's active participation in the litigation for twenty-one months before invoking the arbitration provision on the eve of trial constituted a waiver of its right to arbitrate. View "Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center" on Justia Law

In 1997, Crum, a small company near insolvency, agreed to service Martin’s light-duty vehicles. Martin was a subsidiary of Massey Coal, a publicly-traded corporation. The agreement allowed Crum to enter Martin’s property to pick up vehicles; Martin required Crum to enter into an indemnification agreement and Crum agreed to Martin’s terms. Crum obtained insurance coverage required by the agreement from Universal. Philip, a Crum employee, rode with a Martin employee to pick up a truck from Martin property. A boulder rolled down hill, hit the vehicle, severely injuring Philip. The U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration cited Martin for having loose rock above the roadway. Philip and Crum sued Martin; Martin counterclaimed based on the indemnification. Universal declined to defend on the counterclaim. After mediation, Martin agreed, without admitting liability, to pay $3,650,000. The parties also entered an “agreed judgment” against Crum for $3,650,000, on Martin’s counterclaim. Martin agreed not to pursue Crum for that judgment and sued Universal. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that Universal had no duty to indemnify Martin because there was enough evidence to show that Crum was not actually liable to Martin. The indemnification was unenforceable as against public policy; it was the product of a significant disparity in bargaining power and attempted to shift liability for compliance with at least one mining-safety statute. View "Martin Cnty. Coal Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Healix and HHI compete in the business of infusion therapy services: administration of substances such as pharmaceuticals intravenously or by any method other than ingestion. Some medical care providers offer these services to patients in their offices. Healix and HHI provide support. In 2007 Healix recruited the Clinic as a new customer. The Clinic had two members: Keller, a physician, and Porter, a nurse practitioner. Under their five-year contract, Healix would provide services after the Clinic built an in-office pharmacy and hired staff to work there. The Clinic was responsible for the cost of construction. Healix required Keller and Porter to execute personal guarantees and took a security interest in accounts receivable. Four months after signing the contract, the Clinic notified Healix that it would not fulfill its responsibilities. The Clinic was in breach, but Healix did not sue. One month later, the Clinic entered into a contract with HHI. Healix learned of the new contract and sued HHI for copyright and trademark infringement and for tortious interference with a contract. The intellectual property claims were dismissed. After a trial, the district judge rejected the tortious-interference claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding lack of causation because the evidence indicated that the Clinic would have “walked away” regardless of HHI’s actions. View "Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. HHI Infusion Servs., Inc.." on Justia Law