Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Seller and Buyers entered into a contract for a deed. Buyers made payments to Seller for almost three years. Because Seller did not provide Buyers with all information required by Tex. Prop. Code 5(D), Buyers later told Seller they were exercising their statutory right to cancel and rescind the contract for deed. Seller sued Buyers for breach of contract. Buyers counterclaimed for violations under the Property Code, among other statutory violations. Seller, in turn, alleged he was entitled to a setoff in the amount of the fair market rental value of the property for the time Buyers occupied the house. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Buyers, awarding actual damages for cancellation and rescission of the contract for deed, among other damages. The Court reversed the trial court's awards of actual damages for cancellation and rescission, holding (1) subchapter D's cancellation-and-rescission remedy contemplates mutual restitution of benefits among the parties; and (2) thus, Buyers were required to restore to Seller supplemental enrichment in the form of rent for their interim occupation of the property upon cancellation and rescission of the contract for deed. Remanded. View "Morton v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

Respondents were successors-in-interest to 380 acres of land once owned by Baker, now deceased. Petitioners entered into a lease agreement with Baker that contained an option allowing Petitioners to buy the land if Baker decided to sell it. Petitioners and Baker subsequently agreed that Petitioners would purchase the 380 acres for $470,000. Petitioners attempted to exercise their right to buy the property under the agreement, but Respondents brought a declaratory judgment action to void the agreement. The trial court rendered a final judgment for Petitioners. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the agreement was ambiguous as to whether it was a presently binding contract or merely an agreement to agree, and (2) therefore, the agreement's enforceability was a fact issue that should not have been determined by summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement contained all material terms and was an enforceable contract as a matter of law. Remanded. View "McCalla v. Baker's Campground, Inc." on Justia Law

Homes built with an exterior insulation and finish system (EIFS) suffer serious water damage that worsens over time. Homebuilder began a remediation program in which it offered to homeowners to remove exterior EIFS from the homes it had built and to replace it with conventional stucco. Almost all the homeowners accepted Homebuilder's offer of remediation. Homebuilder sought indemnification for the costs from its insurers (Insurers). Insurers denied coverage, preferring instead to wait until the homeowners sued. This litigation ensued. Now, only one insurer remained. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of Homebuilder, finding (1) Homebuilder failed to establish its legal liability to the homeowners to trigger Insurer's coverage; and (2) Homebuilder failed to offer evidence of damages covered by the policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Homebuilder's settlements with the homeowners established both Insurer's legal liability for the property damages and the basis for determining the amount of loss; and (2) Insurer's policy covered Homebuilder's entire remediation costs for damaged homes. View "Lennar Corp. v. Markel Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner was appointed the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City by the Mayor. Petitioner and the Mayor entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that addressed the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment, including his removal as Commissioner. The Mayor and City Council (Respondents) later relieved Petitioner of his command. Petitioner filed an amended complaint against Respondents seeking reinstatement and money damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents. The intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that the Mayor did not have the authority to remove a Police Commissioner pursuant to a contract providing for removal without cause, and therefore, the removal provisions of the MOU were invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for writ of mandamus or motion for injunction or reinstatement. The circuit court denied the motion and granted summary judgment to Respondents. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because this Court did not decide the merits of Petitioner's claims for reinstatement and monetary damages, Petitioner was not entitled to reinstatement or judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the court of special appeals did not err in granting Respondents' summary judgment motion and denying Petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment. View "Clark v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

John Stubbs, Jr., d/b/a Mississippi Polysteel Stubbs was awarded damages for breach of contract after he sued Martin and Valerie Falkner to enforce a construction lien on their home. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, but reversed its award of attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest, finding that Stubbs’s recovery was based in quantum meruit and thus, attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest were unavailable remedies. Stubbs petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the Court of Appeals failed to consider various statutory grounds for an award of attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest and requested that the Supreme Court reinstate the circuit court’s award. Upon review, the Court found the statutes Stubbs raised were an insufficient basis for an award of either prejudgment interest or attorney’s fees in this case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. View "Falkner v. Stubbs, Jr." on Justia Law

Representing a class of truck owner-operators, Walker sued Trailer Transit, a broker of trucking services, for breach of contract in Indiana state court. Trailer Transit removed the suit to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), section 1332(d)(2). Walker argued that notice of removal was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after Trailer Transit “first ascertained” that the class’s theory of damages could result in recovery of more than $5 million. The district court denied a motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The earliest possible trigger for removal was Walker’s response to Trailer Transit’s requests for admission seeking clarification of the theory of damages. Even that response did not affirmatively specify a damages figure under the class’s new theory, so the removal clock never actually started to run View "Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc." on Justia Law

The Finnemans owned 17,000 acres of farmland that they deeded to Rock Creek Farms (RCF). RCF funded a series of redemptions of the property, and the Arnoldys purchased existing judgments on the property. Rabo Agrifinance and Rabo AgServices (Rabo) subsequently initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Finnemans, RCF, and all parties who had an interest in the land. The trial court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure in the Rabo foreclosure proceedings and adjudged RCF as having the final owner's right of redemption as to the entirety of the property. The Arnoldys sought to have the judgment and decree of foreclosure set aside by filing a motion for relief pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-60(b). On May 26, the trial court granted the motion and vacated the portion of the judgment recognizing RCF's final redemption rights. RCF and the Finnemans sought relief from the May 26 order by filing separate motions pursuant to Rule 60(b). The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court judge correctly determined that a Rule 60(b) motion was not appropriate and denied relief in this case. View "Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. v. Rock Creek Farms" on Justia Law

Thomas Konrad accepted a loan from Bob Law upon the advice of attorney Douglas Kettering. Law and Kettering had been partners in at least one of Law's business ventures and had an attorney-client relationship. Thomas's parents (the Konrads) provided their land as collateral for Thomas's loan. Thomas later defaulted on the note. Seven months after Kettering passed away, Law brought suit to enforce the note and mortgage against Thomas and the Konrads. Law settled with Thomas and the Konrads. Law then sought to recover from the Kettering Estate the amounts outstanding on the note, claiming that Kettering's acts - including his conflict of interest with Law and his alleged fraudulent inducement of the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage - voided the note and mortgage, and therefore, the Estate was liable to Law for the interest due on the note. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the contract between Law and Thomas did not contravene public policy because it was drafted by an attorney who failed to disclose a conflicting attorney-client relationship; and (2) the theory that Kettering fraudulently induced the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage rested on mere speculation. View "Law Capital, Inc. v. Kettering" on Justia Law

Druid Ridge Cemetery Company entered into a contract to sell thirty-six acres of the approximately 200 acres it owned and were a part of its cemetery operation. The intended purchaser entered into the contract to construct residences on portions of the land immediately adjacent to Park Heights Avenue. The Dumbarton Improvement and Long Meadow Neighborhood Associations challenged the sale, claiming that the residential development violated a restrictive covenant contained in the deed conveying the cemetery property to Druid Ridge. The circuit court determined (1) the language of the restrictive covenant was ambiguous, and (2) alternatively, there were radically changed circumstances in the area rendering the restrictive covenant ineffective and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the language of the restrictive covenant was unambiguous; and (2) the nexus between the changed circumstances and the purpose of the covenant was not sufficient to render the restrictive covenant unenforceable. Remanded. View "Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co." on Justia Law

JAS Enterprises, Inc. (JAS) entered into a purchase agreement with BBS Enterprises, Inc. (BBS), which sold vehicles, equipment, and inventory used in a sheet metal installation business. The agreement also contained a covenant not to compete. The agreement was signed by the Statons as personal guarantors of the agreement. When BBS failed to make timely monthly payments, JAS filed suit against BBS and the Statons, alleging breach of contract. BBS and the Statons counterclaimed, arguing that JAS and James Swaby, JAS's principal shareholder, violated the covenant not to compete. A jury concluded that BBS and the Statons breached their contract and that JAS and Swaby breached the covenant not to compete. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) erred when it denied Swaby's motion to dismiss him personally; (2) erred in admitting certain testimony; (3) erred in admitting parol evidence in interpreting the contract; and (4) erred by not requiring the jury to choose the date when the damage occurred to enable the trial court to properly calculate prejudgment interest. Remanded. View "JAS Enters., Inc. v. BBS Enters., Inc." on Justia Law