Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Janet L. Brash, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Larry R. Brash, appealed judgment entered after a bench trial that dismissed her action against William M. Gulleson. We affirm. In the mid-1980s, Dr. Brash began running cows on Gulleson's ranch under an oral agreement to operate on a "60/40 share basis." Gulleson provided care and feed and received 60 percent of the calf crop from Dr. Brash's cows, and Dr. Brash provided veterinarian services. In the fall of 1997, Dr. Brash supervised an inventory and evaluation of cows on the Gulleson ranch, which included cows owned by Gulleson, Dr. Brash, and two or three others who had agreements with Gulleson. At that time, Dr. Brash had 108 cows on the Gulleson ranch. In 2000, Dr. Brash and Gulleson executed a written Cow/Calf Production Lease Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Brashes agreed to furnish 130 cows presently situated on the Gulleson farm to be cared for by Gulleson, and Gulleson would in return give the Brashes 40 percent of the calf crop each year. After Dr. Brash's death in 2004, Janet Brash testified she became the sole owner of all 130 cows and their offspring; however, when she demanded the return of the estate's and her portion of the herd, Gulleson returned only seven cows. In 2005, Janet Brash brought this action against Gulleson, alleging Gulleson failed to comply with the Agreement executed in 2000. After trial, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment, holding in part that Dr. Brash had failed to provide 130 cows as required under the contract, which constituted a failure of consideration, and that Janet Brash had failed to prove a breach of the agreement by Gulleson. The court dismissed Brash's claims with prejudice. Judgment was entered in June 2012. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding there was a failure of consideration in the performance of the Cow/Calf Production Lease Agreement between the Brashes and Gulleson. View "Brash v. Gulleson" on Justia Law

Barbara McDermott appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding Kevin Pifer $80,957.07 in damages for unlawful interference with business, and several other orders issued by the district court in connection with these proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that a purchase option given to Pifer by her mother, Dorothy Bevan, was a valid and enforceable gift. Furthermore, the Court concluded the interference with business claim was properly presented to the jury, the evidence supports the jury verdict and the court did not abuse its discretion in its related rulings and orders. View "Pifer v. McDermott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff borrowed money from Countrywide Financial and secured the loan with a mortgage on real property. The recorded mortgage was assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), which also held the note on Plaintiff's property. When Plaintiff was unable to make payments on the mortgage, BONY instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure, arguing that (1) the description of his property in the mortgage did not satisfy New Hampshire's statute of frauds, and (2) Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property to the copy of the mortgage was an act of fraud that should bar BONY from foreclosing. The district court rejected both of Plaintiff's arguments. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the description of the property, in light of the surrounding circumstances, was not so imprecise as to be unenforceable under the New Hampshire statute of frauds; and (2) because the description of the property attached to the mortgage was correct, Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property was not fraudulent. View "French v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Wilson worked as an admissions representative, recruiting students to enroll in CEC’s culinary arts college. CEC admissions representatives worked under a contract that gave them a bonus for each student they recruited, above a threshold, who completed a full course or a year of study. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Education issued regulations prohibiting this kind of arrangement; new rules were scheduled to take effect in July 2011. CEC decided announced to its admissions representatives that it would cease paying bonuses at the end of February 2011 and that no bonuses would be regarded as earned by that date unless the relevant student had completed the year of study or course by that time. Wilson sued, asserting that CEC owed him bonuses for “pipeline” students, whom he had recruited and who were on target to complete a full course or year of study between March and June 2011. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Wilson successfully pleaded that CEC exercised its right to terminate the agreement in bad faith and in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Wilson v. Career Educ. Corp," on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal arose from the district court's order certifying a class in Plaintiff's class action against Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company. Plaintiff's class action claim arose out of the Supreme Court's remand of his initial non-class third-party claim against Allstate in Jacobsen I. In Jacobsen I, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Allstate for, among other causes of action, violations of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act. Plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case for a new trial. On remand, Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, proposing a class definition encompassing all unrepresented individuals who had either third- or first-party claims against Allstate and whose claims were adjusted by Allstate using its Claim Core Process Redesign program. The district court certified the class. The Supreme Court affirmed the class certification but modified the certified class on remand, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying the Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) class action but that the certification of class-wide punitive damages was inappropriate in the context of a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Remanded. View "Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Brian and Lori Peay purchased a home manufactured by Energy Homes, Division of Southern Energy Homes, Inc. (SEHI). At closing, SEHI offered the Peays certain warranties on the home in exchange for the Peays' agreement that any disputes over the home would be submitted to binding arbitration. Brian Peay accepted the warranties and signed the arbitration agreement. After discovering flaws in the home, the Peays filed suit against SEHI, among other defendants. SEHI moved to enforce the arbitration agreement by ordering the parties to arbitrate the dispute. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the order denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding, contrary to the findings of the court of appeals, (1) the arbitration agreement was not prohibited by the merger and integration clause of the purchase contract; (2) the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable; and (3) Lori Peay was bound to the arbitration agreement even though she did not sign the agreement. Remanded. View "Energy Home, Div. of S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Peay" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendants formed a limited liability company. The operating agreement contained an arbitration provision providing that any dispute arising out of the operating agreement shall be settled by arbitration. Plaintiff later filed suit against Defendants, alleging numerous claims, including breach of good faith and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration on those two issues under the operating agreement. The trial court denied the motion, concluding (1) the two claims in question did not arise out of the operating agreement or any breach or violation of the agreement, and (2) alternatively, Defendants waived any right they had to arbitration by engaging in discovery that would not have been available as a matter of right during the arbitration process and that Plaintiffs were prejudiced by these actions. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis of waiver. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish prejudicial actions inconsistent with arbitration, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order finding waiver of contractual arbitration rights. Remanded. View "HCW Ret. & Fin. Servs., LLC v. HCW Employee Benefit Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, Irene and John Moerman each signed an oil and gas lease with Prairie Rose Resources. In 2011, the Moermans filed a complaint for declaratory judgment claiming that their leases with Prairie had expired because, inter alia, Prairie had failed to establish oil production until after the expiration of the primary term of the lease. Prairie counterclaimed for a declaration that the lease remained in effect. The district court entered judgment in favor of Prairie and awarded Prairie its attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that the parties' oil and gas leases remained in effect; and (2) because the Moermans failed to establish that the leases had been forfeited, Prairie's attorney fees in defending the action were recoverable. View "Moerman v. Prairie Rose Res., Inc." on Justia Law

Clifford Sabo and Sabo Brothers Construction (the Sabos) entered into a written lease agreement with Vernon and Laura Caldwell for the excavation of scoria, a substance used in road construction, on the Caldwells' land. The Sabos agreed to pay the Caldwells a royalty rate for all scoria sold from the Caldwells' land, but the lease was silent as to when royalty payments were to be made. For several months, the Sabos made royalty payments to the Caldwells but for another period of several months, the Sabos did not make any royalty payments at all. The Caldwells subsequently filed a complaint against the Sabos, alleging breach of the lease for failure to pay royalties in a timely manner. The Caldwells also filed an application for a preliminary injunction. The district court enjoined the Sabos from hauling or selling any scoria from the Caldwells' land, concluding that the Caldwells had made a prima facie case that the Sabos had not paid them for all the scoria sold. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting the Caldwells a preliminary injunction in a breach of contract action when pecuniary compensation was contemplated and would afford adequate relief. Remanded. View "Caldwell v. Sabo" on Justia Law

This case arose from disputes between the Department of Information Technology and Defendant, a computer equipment supplier, over two contracts between the parties. The Department filed this action against Defendant, alleging breach of contract and fraud claims. Defendant filed an amended counterclaim, alleging takings and due process violations. The Department moved to dismiss the takings and due process claims based on the State's sovereign immunity. The trial court determined that the Department had waived the State's sovereign immunity regarding Defendant's counterclaims by bringing this cause of action against Defendant. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded Defendant damages on its procedural due process counterclaim. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant on the procedural due process counterclaim, holding that the Department did not waive the state's sovereign immunity by initiating the present litigation, and therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Defendant's counterclaims; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "Chief Info. Officer v. Computers Plus Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law