Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Mother and Father were married in 1992 and had two children. The parties later divorced. In 2009, Mother and Father agreed to recalculate their support obligation annually using the Child Support Rules and Guidelines. However, the agreement's terms were silent about which version of the Guidelines applied. Importantly, the Guidelines were amended in 2010, and the changes significantly increased support obligations for high-income parents like Father. Father used the 2009 Guidelines when calculating his 2010 distribution clause payment, and Mother objected. The trial court interpreted the agreement as incorporating the version of the Guidelines that applied to a particular's income, and therefore, concluded that Father should have used the 2010 Guidelines for the 2010 calculation, though he correctly applied the 2009 Guidelines to his 2009 income. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, concluding that the agreement incorporated each year's version of the Guidelines as to that year's income. View "Schwartz v. Heeter" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute among the owners of an oil-drilling rig. Donald Buffington owned 62.5 percent of the rig. Newton Dorsett, through his company, Diamond Transport & Drilling, owned the remaining 37.5 percent of the rig. Two lawsuits brought by the owners were resolved when the parties entered into a compromise agreement. The third case was brought by Buffington against Diamond and Dorsett in the Lafayette County circuit court and alleged causes of action for breach of contract and conversion arising out of the agreement. The fourth case was filed by Diamond in Louisiana seeking an order enforcing the agreement. Thereafter, Louisiana court found, inter alia, that the compromise agreement remained in effect. Subsequently, the Lafayette County circuit court found that, in light of the Louisiana judgment, res judicata applied to a majority of the issues brought by Buffington in the Lafayette County circuit court. The case proceeded to trial, and the circuit court entered judgment against Dorsett. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) res judicata did not bar Buffington's action in Arkansas court; and (2) there was substantial evidence to support the jury's award of damages. View "Dorsett v. Buffington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against North American after the moving company severely damaged or loss some of plaintiff's items. Because plaintiff's claims arose out of the interstate shipment of her possessions, the Carmack Amendment, 29 U.S.C. 14706 et seq., provided the sole and exclusive remedy. The district court granted summary judgment for North America, determining that her claim for damages did not satisfy regulatory requirements. The court concluded that plaintiff's demand letter unequivocally requested that North American remit payment totaling $182,750.00 and constituted a written communication containing facts sufficient to identify the shipment, asserting liability, and making claims for the payment of a specified amount under 49 C.F.R. 1005.2(b). The plain language of the regulation's minimum filing requirements required nothing more. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for North America and remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. N. Amer. Van Lines of Texas, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Bennett was walking her dog in Garfield Heights, Ohio when she was struck on the left knee by a vehicle driven by Pastel. The accident threw Bennett onto the car’s hood. Bennett sued Pastel’s insurer, State Farm, which characterized as “ridiculous” her assertion that she was an “occupant” of the car, as that term is defined by State Farm’s policy, at the time she was on the vehicle’s hood. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The policy defines “occupying” as “in, on, entering or alighting from.” The court stated that “we have no reason to explore Bennett’s relationship with the car… the policy marks out its zone of coverage in primary colors.” View "Bennett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins." on Justia Law

Claimant suffered a lower back injury during the course of his employment and filed notice of a workers' compensation claim. Employer later informed Claimant he would be discharged from his employment. Claimant signed a termination agreement in order not to forfeit his severance pay. The agreement stipulated that Claimant released his previously accepted workers' compensation claim. The Workers' Compensation Commissioner refused to approve the termination agreement, finding there was no consideration offered by Employer to Claimant in exchange for Plaintiff's release of the workers' compensation clim. The Workers' Compensation Review Board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board properly affirmed the Commissioner's decision not to approve the agreement as a "voluntary agreement" or stipulation in light of its finding that Claimant's release of his workers' compensation claim was not supported by consideration. View "Leonetti v. MacDermid, Inc." on Justia Law

John Lanier appealed the denial of his motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment, and for relief from the judgment. Lanier's motion was filed after plaintiff McMath Construction, Inc. filed a "Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment" pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("the UEFJA"). After careful consideration, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that under Louisiana law (the foreign jurisdiction), McMath did not properly serve Lanier. Therefore, a preliminary default judgment and the Louisiana judgment were void. Because the Louisiana judgment was void, the trial court erred when it denied Lanier's motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Lanier v. McMath Construction, Inc. " on Justia Law

Owners Insurance Company appealed a circuit court judgment declaring Owners was obligated to pay an arbitration award entered against Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC ("JCH"), under the terms of a commercial general-liability insurance policy Owners had issued. Owners initiated a declaratory-judgment action against JCH seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to indemnify JCH for any judgment entered against JCH arising from a dispute that a house JCH constructed was poorly built. After the homeowners prevailed in their action against JCH, the trial court in the declaratory-judgment action entered a summary judgment holding that Owners was required to pay pursuant to the terms of the Owners policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because JCH's faulty workmanship was not an "occurrence," the trial court's judgment was in error, and it was hereby reversed. View "Owners Insurance Company v. Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC et al. " on Justia Law

Brian Harnett worked as an account executive and salesman for Corporate Technologies, Inc. (CTI), which provided Harnett information technology solutions to sophisticated customers. When Harnett was hired, he signed an agreement that contained non-solicitation and non-disclosure provisions. Harnett later left CTI and began working for OnX USA LLC (OnX), where he participated in sales-related communications and activities with certain of his former CTI customers on behalf of OnX. CTI sued Harnett, alleging breach of contract and tortious interference with CTI's contractual rights and advantageous relationships. CTI sought a preliminary injunction restraining Harnett from doing business with certain customers, which the district court granted. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance of the preliminary injunction, holding that the district court's conclusion that Harnett likely engaged in solicitation in violation of the agreement was reasonable, and therefore, the court did not err in granting injunctive relief. View "Corporate Techs., Inc. v. Harnett" on Justia Law

This case concerned the 2011 NFL lockout. Active NFL players filed a class action suit (Brady suit) against the NFL, alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws and other claims. Retired NFL players also filed suit against the NFL and its teams, alleging antitrust violations (Eller I suit). After both actions were consolidated, the Brady suit was settled, the players re-designated the NFLPA as their collective bargaining agent, the NFL and NFLPA signed a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the settlement terms, the Brady plaintiffs dismissed their action, the lockout ended, and the 2011 NFL season commenced. Carl Eller and other retired NFL players (plaintiffs) then filed this class action (Eller II) against the NFLPA and others. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed, alleging claims for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage under Minnesota law. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of a prospective separate contractual relation with the NFL that would provide more than the increased benefits provided in the 2011 CBA. Even if plaintiffs alleged a reasonable expectation of prospective contractual relations or economic advantage with the NFL, plaintiffs failed to allege facts proving that defendants improperly or wrongfully interfered with these advantageous prospects. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Eller, et al. v. NFL Players Assoc., et al." on Justia Law

Thoroughbred Associates drilled a gas well (Well) in Comanche County. Thoroughbred subsequently acquired leases of land near the Well and created a unit called the Thoroughbred-Rietzke Unit (Rietzke Unit). Defendants became successors-in-interest to a lease (OXY Lease) Thoroughbred entered into for oil and gas underlying a tract near the Well. The parties disagreed, however, about whether the Well was draining the Rietzke Unit. Thoroughbred stopped submitting royalty payments to Defendants accruing from the Rietzke Unit. Thoroughbred subsequently filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that it had been mistaken when it included the OXY Lease in the Rietzke Unit. Defendants counterclaimed. The district court concluded (1) Defendants failed to prove that any drainage of the leased lands occurred; and (2) the Lease was properly included in the Rietzke Unit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendants failed to prove their drainage claim; and (2) the court of appeals erroneously granted summary judgment to Defendants on their claim that the Lease should be included in the Rietzke Unit. View "Thoroughbred Assocs., LLC v. Kansas City Royalty Co., LLC " on Justia Law