Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Labonte Drywall Company signed a statewide agreement with Union, which allowed Labonte Drywall to hire Union carpenters for its business. The agreement required Labonte Drywall to allow an audit of its records. After Labonte Drywall did not respond to certain audit requests, Plaintiffs, the trustees for a group of Union-related benefits funds and their collection agency, filed this action against Labonte Drywall under ERISA and the Labor Management Relations Act, seeking enforcement of the agreement. After a bench trial, the district court found that Labonte Drywall had terminated the agreement, and therefore, Plaintiffs had no legal right to conduct the requested audit. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the Union had actual notice of Labonte Drywall’s letter terminating its obligations under the agreement; and (2) Labonte Drywall had no duty to submit to Plaintiffs’ audit requests. View "New England Carpenters Central v. Labonte Drywall Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2000, Employee began working for Employer on Employer's farmland. Employee alleged that Employer promised him eighty acres of farmland if he continued his employment for ten years. Although Employee worked for Employer for more than ten years, Employer never signed over the eighty acres to Employee and subsequently terminated Employee’s employment. Employee filed a complaint against Employer for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the part performance exception to the statute of frauds applied in this case and granted Employee specific performance of the contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeal improperly relied upon Employee’s testimony as to his intent because to prove part performance, the alleged acts of performance must establish the exception without the aid of such testimony; but (2) there was other sufficient evidence to support the grant of specific performance in Employee’s favor. View "Ficke v. Wolken" on Justia Law

In 2000, Employee began working for Employer on Employer's farmland. Employee alleged that Employer promised him eighty acres of farmland if he continued his employment for ten years. Although Employee worked for Employer for more than ten years, Employer never signed over the eighty acres to Employee and subsequently terminated Employee’s employment. Employee filed a complaint against Employer for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the part performance exception to the statute of frauds applied in this case and granted Employee specific performance of the contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeal improperly relied upon Employee’s testimony as to his intent because to prove part performance, the alleged acts of performance must establish the exception without the aid of such testimony; but (2) there was other sufficient evidence to support the grant of specific performance in Employee’s favor. View "Ficke v. Wolken" on Justia Law

In 2011, a tornado struck and substantially damaged Midwest’s building and its contents. After the tornado, the medical practice was to relocate, which required substantial work. Until construction was complete, Midwest operated out of a temporary location, but was unable to operate at its normal capacity. Moving the repaired MRI machine to the new building required a crane; it was necessary to reinforce floors; replace exterior brick; and install pipe, specialized heating and air conditioning equipment, and copper shielding. The new location opened about a year after the tornado. Cincinnati Insurance paid Midwest the policy limit of $2,414,161.26 for the building; the policy limit of $388,000 for business personal property; and $828,081.75 for business income interruption and extra expenses. . Midwest requested “Extra Expense” reimbursement for the costs to repair and relocate the MRI machine and to replace the other specialty equipment necessary for normal operations. Cincinnati denied payment, contending the expenditures were covered under the Building or Business Personal Property provisions, for which it had paid the policy limits. The district court found the claimed expenses were recoverable under the Extra Expense provision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that the language of the Policy does not specifically exclude coverage under the Extra Expense provision if the expenses happen to fall under another coverage in the Policy. View "Midwest Reg'l Allergy Ctr., P.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, a tornado struck and substantially damaged Midwest’s building and its contents. After the tornado, the medical practice was to relocate, which required substantial work. Until construction was complete, Midwest operated out of a temporary location, but was unable to operate at its normal capacity. Moving the repaired MRI machine to the new building required a crane; it was necessary to reinforce floors; replace exterior brick; and install pipe, specialized heating and air conditioning equipment, and copper shielding. The new location opened about a year after the tornado. Cincinnati Insurance paid Midwest the policy limit of $2,414,161.26 for the building; the policy limit of $388,000 for business personal property; and $828,081.75 for business income interruption and extra expenses. . Midwest requested “Extra Expense” reimbursement for the costs to repair and relocate the MRI machine and to replace the other specialty equipment necessary for normal operations. Cincinnati denied payment, contending the expenditures were covered under the Building or Business Personal Property provisions, for which it had paid the policy limits. The district court found the claimed expenses were recoverable under the Extra Expense provision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that the language of the Policy does not specifically exclude coverage under the Extra Expense provision if the expenses happen to fall under another coverage in the Policy. View "Midwest Reg'l Allergy Ctr., P.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This matter involved a former presidential yacht whose owner (the LLC) and its sole member (together, Plaintiffs) co-induced Defendant by means of fraud to extend the owner a loan with the yacht as collateral. Under the operative loan documents, Defendant had the option to purchase up to a 100 percent interest in either the LLC or the yacht itself. Plaintiffs brought this case to enjoin Defendant from pursuing its rights in connection with the loan. Once the fraud came to light, Plaintiffs entered a stipulated order in default judgment (the judgment order). The judgment order provided that Defendant was entitled to exercise its rights under the loan documents, specifically including the option, and provided for the appointment of an independent counsel to determine outstanding current and potential liabilities of the LLC and the yacht. The judgment order retained the Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction to hear disputes arising out of the interpretation and enforcement of the order. The parties disagreed about the conclusions of the independent counsel concerning liabilities that may constitute liens against the LLC or the yacht. The Court of Chancery held (1) Defendant must exercise its option within sixty days of this letter opinion at the default option price as defined by the judgment order; and (2) the deduction for the liabilities used in reaching the default option price are as stated in the report of the independent counsel. View "Sequoia Presidential Yacht Group LLC v. FE Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Prairie Supply, Inc. appealed a district court judgment ordering Prairie to pay Apple Electric, Inc. damages for conversion by the wrongful repossession of some ground heaters. In late 2011, Prairie and Apple entered into separate oral lease-to-own agreements for two ground heaters. The combined sales price for the heaters was $70,000. Apple took possession of the heaters and made monthly payments. After Apple made late payments, Prairie repossessed the heaters on July 1, 2012, and sued to recover past due rental payments. Apple had paid over $60,000 to Prairie at the time of repossession. At trial, Apple claimed the agreements were for the purchase of the heaters, and Prairie claimed the agreements were leases and it had the right to repossess the heaters after Apple made late payments. The district court concluded the parties' agreements were purchase agreements, not lease agreements; Prairie's repossession of the heaters was wrongful and constituted conversion; and Apple was entitled to damages. After the district court issued its memorandum decision, findings of fact, conclusions of law and order for judgment, Prairie moved for amended findings, additional findings, or in the alternative, a new trial. Prairie requested a new trial, arguing: (1) "[t]he damages awarded to [Apple] by the Court were excessive and not supported by law or the evidence presented at trial;" and (2) "there was no evidence presented as to the actual market value of the heaters." The court denied Prairie's motions and a final judgment was entered. Prairie appealed the district court's memorandum decision, findings of fact, conclusions of law and order for judgment, and judgment. Prairie did not appeal the court's order denying the motion for amended findings, additional findings, or in the alternative, a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding its review of the issues raised by Prairie on appeal was limited to the issue of damages, and the award of damages to Apple was supported by the evidence. View "Prairie Supply, Inc. v. Apple Electric, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996, the developer of Double Diamond Ranch Master Association (Association) entered into a maintenance agreement with the City of Reno. In 2012, the Association gave notice to the City that it was terminating the contract pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3105(2), which permits a homeowners’ association that provides at least ninety days’ notice to terminate “any contract…that is not in good faith or was unconscionable to the units’ owners at the time entered into.” The City rejected the Association’s notice of termination. Approximately twenty months later, the City brought an action against the Association seeking specific performance of the maintenance agreement. The Association filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that section 116.3105(2) required the City to file suit within ninety days. The district court denied the Association’s motion to dismiss. The Association subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the district court to vacate its order denying the Association’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that section 116.3105(2) does not act as a statute of limitations, and a recipient of an association’s notice of termination of a contract is not required to take legal action within ninety days. View "Double Diamond Ranch Master Ass’n v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In 1996, the developer of Double Diamond Ranch Master Association (Association) entered into a maintenance agreement with the City of Reno. In 2012, the Association gave notice to the City that it was terminating the contract pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3105(2), which permits a homeowners’ association that provides at least ninety days’ notice to terminate “any contract…that is not in good faith or was unconscionable to the units’ owners at the time entered into.” The City rejected the Association’s notice of termination. Approximately twenty months later, the City brought an action against the Association seeking specific performance of the maintenance agreement. The Association filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that section 116.3105(2) required the City to file suit within ninety days. The district court denied the Association’s motion to dismiss. The Association subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the district court to vacate its order denying the Association’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that section 116.3105(2) does not act as a statute of limitations, and a recipient of an association’s notice of termination of a contract is not required to take legal action within ninety days. View "Double Diamond Ranch Master Ass’n v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Voorhees Cattle Co. brought a foreclosure action against Dakota Feeding Co. (DFC). In answering the complaint, DFC brought a third party complaint against B and B Equipment, Inc. (B&B) for breach of contract. B&B counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and impossibility of performance. After a jury trial, judgment was entered for Voorhees on the foreclosure claim and for B&B on its counterclaims against DFC. DFC satisfied the judgment granted to Voorhees, leaving DFC and B&B as the remaining parties to this appeal. DFC appealed, arguing that evidence admitted at trial violated the attorney-client privilege and that the error prejudicially tainted the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the privileged evidence should not have been allowed, but the evidence did not prove, nor go to the heart of B&B’s claims; and (2) as a result, the erroneous admission of the privileged communications was not unfairly prejudicial to DFC as against B&B. View "Voorhees Cattle Co. v. Dakota Feeding Co." on Justia Law