Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked for the Town of Camden for thirty-one years prior to being laid off. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the police union and the Town provided for recall of qualified employees based on seniority. During the twelve-month period after Plaintiff was laid off, vacancies opened in the Camden Police Department, but the Town did not recall Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his wife brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the Town had deprived Plaintiff, without due process of law, of his property interest in his right to be recalled. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded. On remand, the district court entered judgment for the Town, concluding that the CBA contained a condition precedent requiring Plaintiff to submit his address and phone number to the Town after his layoff in order to assert his recall rights and that Plaintiff did not submit such information post-layoff. The First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the CBA recall provision did not unambiguously create a condition precedent, and therefore, further fact-finding was necessary. View "Clukey v. Town of Camden, Maine" on Justia Law

JHM rents commercial laundry machines to Chicago-area apartment buildings. Firestone made four loans to JHM, totaling $254,114.99. JHM defaulted on each. Firestone sued. JHM filed an answer, asserting a counterclaim of promissory estoppel, alleging that after Firestone’s first two loans to JHM, Firestone vice president McAllister had represented that his company “wanted to expand [its] investment in the laundry business,” and that it “would create a $500,000 line of credit” to fund equipment purchases, which “induced JHM into purchasing equipment” that it would not otherwise have purchased and that it was unable to pay for. As a result, JHM’s equipment supplier (Maytag) refused to sell it laundry equipment, resulting in substantial losses. JMH raised affirmative defenses, including promissory estoppel and prior breach of contract. Defense counsel withdrew from the case. JMH did not obtain substitute counsel, so the court granted Firestone default judgment, on grounds that corporations are required to have legal counsel under Illinois law. The court later dismissed the counterclaims as facially implausible and entered summary judgment on a breach of guaranty claim. The Seventh Circuit vacated; the plausibiity standard does not allow a court to question or otherwise disregard nonconclusory factual allegations simply because they seem unlikely. View "Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a travel company with which she booked a vacation tour, alleging negligence after one of defendant's employees sexually assaulted her during the trip. At issue was whether a hyperlink to a document containing a forum selection clause may be used to reasonably communicate that clause to a consumer. The court concluded that the forum selection clause in this case was enforceable. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court's holding that the United States was an improper forum because defendant had reasonably communicated the terms and conditions applicable to the tour, which included an enforceable forum selection clause that required plaintiff to litigate her claim in Canada. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Starkey v. G Adventures, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellants Carl McCaffree, Jimmy Helvey, and Sam McCaffree (director-defendants) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to BancInsure, Inc. BancInsure issued a Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy to Columbian and its parent Columbian Financial Corporation (CFC). the Kansas State Bank Commissioner declared Columbian insolvent and appointed the FDIC as receiver. By operation of law, the FDIC-R succeeded to "all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of [Columbian], and of any stockholder, member, accountholder, depositor, officer, or director" of Columbian. BancInsure received notice of potential claims the FDIC-R intended to file against the bank's officers and directors. In anticipation of such a suit, CFC and director-defendant Carl McCaffree brought suit against BancInsure seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy covered claims made after the date Columbian was declared insolvent, but before the expiration of the policy. The district court ultimately held that the policy remained in effect until May 11, 2010, relying in part on its finding that a regulatory endorsement in the policy "provide[d] coverage for actions brought by deposit insurance organizations as receivers during the policy year," which would have been meaningless if the policy terminated upon appointment of a receiver. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit sua sponte determined that no case or controversy existed at the time of the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment for lack of jurisdiction. BancInsure filed the instant action against the director-defendants in Kansas state court seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed no duty of coverage to the director-defendants for claims brought against them by the FDIC-R. The FDIC-R joined and removed the action to the federal district court in Kansas. At approximately the same time, the FDIC-R brought claims against several of Columbian's former directors and officers alleging negligence, gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court held that claims by the FDIC-R were unambiguously excluded by the policy's "insured v. insured" exclusion and that BancInsure was not judicially estopped from denying coverage. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "BancInsure v. FDIC" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from promises Defendant Daniel Ochsner allegedly made during Plaintiffs’ several-year tenure living and working on Defendants’ ranch. The district court denied all of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ claims to a number of cattle; (2) erred in denying Plaintiffs’ claims to a cattle brand; (3) did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ Wyo. R. Civ. P. 15(b) motion to amend their complaint to conform to the evidence and to add promissory estoppel claims; and (4) did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motion to confirm an alleged settlement agreement between the parties. View "Gould v. Ochsner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants counterclaimed for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and abuse of process. After a second jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for damages on Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants appealed from the denial of a variety of motions and an award of costs and attorney fees to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the filing of a post-judgment motion that tolls the time to appeal also tolls Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)’s twenty-day deadline to move for attorney fees; (2) the district court erred in finding that the $100,000 offset in Defendants’ favor from the first trial was extinguished by this Court’s previous order of reversal and remand; (3) the district court erred in finding that all Defendants, rather than just a real estate agency, were liable for attorney fees; and (4) the district court’s judgment is otherwise affirmed. View "Barbara Ann Hollier Trust v. Shack" on Justia Law

Duit, an Oklahoma highway contractor, contracted with the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD) to reconstruct I-30 between Little Rock and Benton. Duit encountered soil conditions that, it alleges, differed materially from information provided by the ASHTD during bidding. Duit’s claims for compensation were denied by the ASHTD, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, and the General Assembly. Duit sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the “in re Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Duit alleged violations of the Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. 101, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses and sought to “enjoin Defendants from accepting federal aid … until . . . they fully comply with the federally mandated differing site clause.” The court dismissed the FAHA claim because that statute is enforced exclusively by an executive agency, dismissed the due process claim because Duit’s interest in future highway contracts is not a protected property interest and because the state appeals process for claim denials satisfies procedural due process requirements. The court declined to dismiss the equal protection claim, concluding Duit sufficiently alleged that the Commission treated out-of-state-contractor Duit differently from similarly situated in-state contractors without a rational reason. The Eighth Circuit held that Duit lacks standing to bring its equal protection claim and that the court erred in not dismissing that claim. View "Duit Constr. Co. Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Tipton, Gilbert, and Padgett worked for Treadway, under agreements that contained a noncompete provision: when you leave Treadway’s employ, for whatever reason, you will not compete with Treadway … by soliciting or accepting business from Treadway’s customers within your territory … for at least one (1) year after leaving; and . . . you will not solicit the employment of any Treadway representatives for at least one (1) year after leaving. Irby bought Treadway with an assignment of Treadway’s contracts, in 2012. Tipton, Gilbert, and Padgett became Irby employees, keeping essentially the same benefits and seniority. In 2013, the three left Irby to work for Wholesale. Tipton apparently spoke to Gilbert and Padgett about the move in advance. Irby sued, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with a contract. The district court granted summary judgment and awarded the defendants in excess of $200,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding genuine disputes of material fact about whether Wholesale recruited and hired Tipton, Gilbert, and Padgett so that they would solicit or accept business from Irby customers in their former territory within one year. View "Stuart C. Irby Co., Inc. v. Tipton" on Justia Law

Latoya Brown purchased a Mazda 6 from Dick Smith Nissan, Inc. through the dealer's salesman, Robert Hiller. The purchase was contingent on acquiring third-party financing. Due to continuing and unresolved issues with financing, Brown returned the vehicle to Dick Smith. The car was later repossessed and sold by Sovereign Bank with a deficiency against Brown. Brown filed a complaint against Dick Smith and Old Republic Surety Company, the surety on Dick Smith's licensing bond, alleging violations of the South Carolina Dealers Act. The trial judge, in a bench trial, found in favor of Brown and awarded damages plus interest as well as attorney's fees and costs. Dick Smith and Old Republic appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that any misconceptions that Brown had about her financing were caused by Sovereign Bank, not Dick Smith. Despite evidence in the record to support the trial judge's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals ignored those findings and substituted its own. By doing so, the Court of Appeals exceeded its standard of review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial judge's decision. View "Brown v. Dick Smith Nissan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, entered into an oral contract with Defendant, a construction firm, for the assembly of a prefabricated house on a lot that they owned. The parties subsequently entered into a second oral agreement for the assembly of a smaller and cheaper home. Defendant failed to complete construction of Plaintiffs’ home as agreed. Citing diversity of citizenship, Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court alleging breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract. The jury found Defendant to have defaulted on its contractual obligations and awarded $150,000 in damages. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that it could not be said that no rational jury could have found in favor of Plaintiffs. View "Magee v. BEA Constr. Corp." on Justia Law