Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

BNY appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Morgan Stanley, arguing that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Morgan Stanley was not contractually obliged to repurchase a mortgage loan allegedly issued in breach of a contract representation because (1) the Trustee’s duty to give “notice to cure” within three business days of becoming aware of a material breach was a condition precedent to the seller’s repurchase obligation, and (2) that condition was not performed within the specified three days, but two to four weeks later. The court concluded that the contract at issue did not require notice to cure as a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley remedying breach where the phrase “notice to cure” does not appear in the contract. In this case, the contract contains distinct provisions for giving notice of breach and making request for cure, neither of which is cast in the express language of condition. Therefore, the request for cure is not a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley’s remedy obligations, and the timeliness of a request for cure, as well as of a notice of breach, is properly construed as a promise and reviewed for substantial performance. The court also concluded that the notice of breach and request for cure in this case cannot be held untimely as a matter of law, particularly when reviewed for substantial performance. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York Mellon Trust v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage" on Justia Law

Defendants were business entities that organize physically challenging obstacle course events in locations throughout the United States. The four named Plaintiffs registered to participate in one of those events. Plaintiffs filed suit in Massachusetts superior court alleging that they were unable to participate in the event because of a second change of location and that Defendants refused to refund Plaintiffs’ registration fees. Plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons. Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting that removal was permitted under the Class Action Fairness Act because the matter in controversy exceeded $5 million. Plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court arguing that Defendant failed to show that over $5 million was in controversy. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state court. The district court then dismissed the case and compelled mediation and arbitration of the dispute. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Defendants met their burden of showing that over $5 million was in controversy in this matter. Remanded with instructions to remand the case to state court for lack of jurisdiction. View "Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a merger agreement, Sellers agreed to indemnity Buyer for the tax liabilities of the company being sold. The tax bills for indemnification purposes, however, were to be calculated as if certain deductions were not going be taken when both parties knew they would be. These deductions reduced the company’s tax liability to zero. After the merger, the company’s tax prepayments and credits were refunded in their entirety, thus benefitting Buyer. Because the calculation of the indemnity obligation was based on a counterfactual measure of tax liability, that calculation resulted in Sellers’ owing Buyer a substantial amount of liability. Buyer filed this complaint asserting claims for declaratory relief and breach of contract. At issue in this case was whether the prepayments and credits affected the tax indemnification obligation of Sellers. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of Sellers, concluding that the indemnification provision unambiguously required that the indemnity obligation be offset by the amount of the refunded prepayments and credits. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the indemnification provision was ambiguous as to how the tax refunds affect the indemnification obligation of Sellers. Remanded. View "Mercury Sys., Inc. v. S’holder Representative Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The parties in this dispute were a city and a design engineer. The city and the design engineer settled their dispute pursuant to an agreement that contained a non-disparagement clause. After the city released the design engineer from all claims relating to the earlier litigation, the city pursued a claim against the engineer’s construction manager for breach of contract. When the design engineer heard of the city’s disparaging statements made during the current lawsuit, it filed a complaint against the city for injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that the city breached the non-disparagement agreement during the current litigation. The circuit court denied injunctive relief and then granted the city’s amended motion to dismiss. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that no claim can stand for a deliberate and voluntary breach of a non-disparagement agreement when the disparaging statements are made in legal proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the litigation privilege can immunize a party from a claim for breach of a non-disparagement clause; and (2) the city did not waive the litigation privilege in this case. View "O'Brien & Gere Eng'rs, Inc. v. City of Salisbury" on Justia Law

32nd Street filed suit against the insurers for quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and vexatious refusal to pay an insurance claim, as well as injunctive relief arising out of medical services provided to the insurers' insureds. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurers and denied 32nd Street's motion to compel discovery. The court concluded that the plain language of the provisions at issue support the district court's conclusion that, in the ancillary-provider agreement, 32nd Street agreed to accept the Blue Traditional rate for services rendered to insureds belonging to all of the insurers’ networks; the district court did not err by finding that the equitable claims were barred by the contracts governing the reimbursement rates paid by the insurers; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the insurers on the vexatious-refusal claim where 32nd Street fails to establish any genuine issue of material fact that the insurers refused to pay an amount due under an insurance policy; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 32nd Street's motion to compel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "32nd St. Surgery Ctr. v. Right Choice Managed Care" on Justia Law

American Family filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether an umbrella insurance policy issued to Todd Patton provided any coverage for an automobile accident in which a passenger in a vehicle driven by Todd's son, Jacob Patton, was seriously injured. The district court granted summary judgment for American Family. The court concluded that the Pattons breached the umbrella policy's cooperation clause by entering into a Miller-Shugart agreement after already being protected from personal liability in the Drake-Ryan settlement, and that such breach was material and prejudicial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "American Family Mutual Ins. v. Donaldson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were the attorney's fees earned in a wrongful death civil litigation settlement, and two law firms' dispute over who was entitled to how much. Richard Eazor was killed and Lynn Sharp was injured in a single automobile accident in Clearfield County. Eazor’s estate and Sharp sued each other, with Sharp contending that Eazor drove the vehicle when the accident occurred and Eazor’s estate alleging that Sharp was the driver. Progressive Insurance Company, the liability carrier for Sharp, retained counsel to represent both parties as defendants in the respective actions, while Sentry Insurance, the carrier for Eazor, remained potentially liable for underinsured motorists’ coverage payable to the person deemed to be the passenger in the vehicle. Attorney William Weiler, Jr., entered his appearance on behalf of the Eazor estate. Later that year, Weiler became associated with the law firm of Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C., (“Meyer Darragh”). Attorney Scott Millhouse of Meyer Darragh subsequently became primarily responsible for the case and drafted a proposed settlement agreement, which was sent to all counsel, but was never signed. Shortly thereafter, Weiler resigned from Meyer Darragh. Upon his departure, he agreed that Meyer Darragh would receive two-thirds of the attorney’s fees arising from the Eazor estate litigation, and that he would retain one-third of the fees. Weiler subsequently became affiliated with the law firm of Malone Middleman, P.C. (“Malone Middleman”). The Eazor estate decided to discharge Meyer Darragh and seek representation from Weiler and Malone Middleman. Malone Middleman took over the case and entered into a contingency fee agreement with the estate, providing that the firm would represent the estate in exchange for one-third of the proceeds of any settlement reached before suit was filed. The contingent fee agreement did not address the payment of attorney’s fees to Meyer Darragh. Further, Malone Middleman did not agree in writing or otherwise to protect the fee purportedly earned by Meyer Darragh. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to examine the propriety of the Superior Court’s holding that a Meyer Darragh was entitled to breach of contract damages against Malone Middleman. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the specific facts presented here, any recovery that may have been due to Meyer Darragh would lie in quantum meruit, and not breach of contract. As such, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Malone Middleman, P.C." on Justia Law

Stresscon Corporation, a subcontracting concrete company, filed suit against Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, alleging, among other things, that Travelers acted in bad faith, unreasonably delaying or denying its claim for covered insurance benefits; and Stresscon sought awards of two times the covered benefits along with fees and costs, as prescribed by statute. Stresscon’s claims for relief arose from a 2007 serious construction accident which was caused by a crane operator employed by a company that was itself a subcontractor of Stresscon. Stresscon’s general contractor, Mortenson, sought damages from Stresscon, asserting Stresson’s contractual liability for the resulting construction delays, and Stresscon in turn sought indemnification from Travelers. Travelers petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the district court’s denial of its motion for directed verdict in a lawsuit brought by its insured, Stresscon. Much as the district court had done, the appellate court rejected Travelers’ contention that the no-voluntary-payments clause of their insurance contract relieved it of any obligation to indemnify Stresscon for payments Stresscon had made without its consent. Instead, the court of appeals found that the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in "Friedland v. Travelers Indemnity Co.," (105 P.3d 639 (2005)) had effectively overruled the Court's prior “no voluntary payments” jurisprudence to the contrary and given Stresscon a similar opportunity. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that its adoption of a notice-prejudice rule in "Friedland" did not overrule any existing “no voluntary payments” jurisprudence. The Court declined to extend a notice-prejudice reasoning to Stresscon’s voluntary payments, made in the face of the no-voluntary-payments clause of its insurance contract with Travelers. View "Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Stresscon Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of James Cameron and Lightstorm Entertainment, Inc. on claims that defendants fraudulently expressed interest in developing plaintiff’s science fiction story KRZ and used parts of that story in Cameron’s 2009 film Avatar. Avatar is a science fiction film set in the future on Pandora, a moon of a fictional gas giant planet, occupied by an indigenous species of humanoids called Na’vi and by humans affiliated with the Resources Development Administration, and its “Sec-Ops” security force. KRZ takes place in the future mostly on Europa, an ice-covered moon of Jupiter. KRZ tells the story of a corporate assassin who works for the Malloc super-corporation, which harvests organisms from ocean vents beneath Europa’s icy surface. To do so, the corporation uses humans as well as organic-bionic hybrid robots called “KRY’s,” which have “Y’s” on their foreheads and “limitation chips” that block emotions and free will. KRZ is a robot with a smaller limitation chip than KRY’s and is self-aware and self-motivated. The court concluded that plaintiff's contract and fiduciary duty claims failed because there was no similarity between the projects as a matter of law; plaintiff's fraud claims fail because he has not offered evidence raising a triable issue of material fact; and plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion for discovery sanctions is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ryder v. Lightstorm Enter." on Justia Law

Plaintiff a former SMU student, filed suit against the university, alleging nineteen causes of action stemming from his dismissal as a community advisor (CA). The only claim at issue on appeal, whether SMU breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing, was dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff had not alleged facts that, taken as true, would give rise to the type of special relationship that creates a duty of good faith and fair dealing under Texas law; even assuming arguendo that the student-university relationship could possibly give rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to show that such a relationship existed; none of plaintiff's theories demonstrate that his purported special relationship with SMU administrators existed before and independently of the immediate circumstances of the course of events that led to his dismissal as a CA; and plaintiff’s claims demonstrate at most the sort of unilateral, purely subjective sense of trust that Texas courts have determined is insufficient to convert an ordinary arm’s-length relationship into a special or confidential relationship. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hux v. Southern Methodist Univ." on Justia Law