Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The complex insurance coverage dispute arose out of a 2007 fire that destroyed portions of a home that was still under construction. Fontana Builders, Inc., the construction contractor, and James and Suzy Accola, the occupants/presumptive purchasers, had separate insurance policies. The Accolas settled with Chubb Insurance Co., the insurer that provided their homeowner’s policy. Assurance Company of America, which had issued a builder’s risk policy to Fontana, denied all coverage for the fire. Fontana commenced this action against Assurance alleging breach of the insurance contract and bad faith failure to pay under the policy. Fontana’s lender, AnchorBank, FSB, eventually intervened. After a retrial, the jury found that the Assurance policy did not provide coverage for Fontana’s fire loss, concluding that the Chubb policy “applied” to the underlying facts so as to terminate Fontana’s builder’s risk coverage. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that the homeowner’s policy issued by Chubb to the Accolas did not apply so as to terminate Fontana’s builder’s risk policy from Assurance. Remanded. View "Fontana Builders, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an application with the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) seeking to expand his condominium unit. Defendants filed an objection to the proposal, asserting that Plaintiff did not own the property upon which he sought to expand his unit. CRMC denied the application. Plaintiff subsequently brought a complaint alleging slander of title and breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment that he had the right to file his application with the CRMC. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Rhode Island’s anti-SLAPP statute protected them from liability for questioning Plaintiff’s ownership of the land in their communications with the CRMC. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendants then filed a motion seeking attorney fees incurred in defending the anti-SLAPP judgment on appeal. The hearing justice awarded Defendants $8,924 in attorney’s fees in connection with the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees, holding (1) the issue of attorney’s fees was properly before the superior court; and (2) the superior court did not abuse his discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. View "Sisto v. America Condo. Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking interest and attorney's fees after General American notified plaintiff that the treasury warrant in the amount of his annuity transfer had never cleared. General American reversed the transaction. The court found that, under the terms of plaintiff's annuity, General American promised to make periodic payments to plaintiff at agreed upon dates; plaintiff does not allege that General American failed to make payments or otherwise failed to fulfill an obligation under the terms of the annuity; nor does this action arise from a declaratory judgment action or an effort by General American to cancel or lapse the policy. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff did not suffer a “loss” covered by Ark. Code Ann. Sections 23-79-208 and 23-79-209, and the district court was correct that neither a 12% penalty nor attorney’s fees are owing by American General under these sections. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in finding plaintiff was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 16-22-308. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney’s fees in this case. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cooper v. General American Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

John Kugler appealed the grant of summary judgment in his suit against Ron Nelson, David Powers, Steven Kenison, William Armstrong, and Powers Candy Co., Inc. (collectively “the Defendants”). Until mid-2010, Kugler, Nelson, Powers, Kenison, and Armstrong were all shareholders of H & M Distributing, Inc. (H & M), a wholesale distributor of beverages, cigarettes, and other miscellaneous items. In his complaint, Kugler alleged breach of various agreements and wrongful actions taken by the Defendants all in relation to Nelson's departure from H & M. The district court dismissed all of Kugler’s claims because it found that the claims were derivative and Kugler failed to comply with derivative action requirements. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kugler v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Goat Island South Condominium (GIS) was comprised of three subcondominium residence areas - Harbor Houses Condominium (Harbor Houses), America Condominium (America), and Capella South Condominium (Capella). The Constellation Trust owned Unit 18 in Harbor Houses. Plaintiffs, America and Capella, filed an action against Defendants, the trustee of the Trust and Harbor Houses, seeking injunctive relief to bring a halt to the expansion of Unit 18 onto a limited common element. The trial justice concluded (1) Defendants were liable for breach of contract and for committing a common law trespass, (2) Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants breached restrictive covenants contained in the GIS Second Amended and Restated Declaration of Condominium (GIS SAR) was moot, and (3) Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the trial justice erred in failing to award attorneys’ fees and costs to Plaintiffs based on the terms of the GIS SAR; and (2) the trial court did not otherwise err in its judgment. View "America Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mardo" on Justia Law

Appellant Bryan Trucking, Inc., sued Respondent Terry Gier for fraud, based on statements and representations Gier allegedly made to Bryan Trucking that induced Bryan Trucking to purchase a used commercial truck from a third party. Gier was a member of Gier Jammer’s Diesel Repair, LLC. Gier Jammer’s serviced long-haul trucks for Bryan Trucking starting in 2009. In August 2012, Gier Jammer’s overhauled the motor in a 2005 Kenworth truck owned by Niel Ring Trucking, Inc. (“Ring Trucking”). Niel Ring (“Ring”) notified Gier that Ring Trucking wanted to sell the truck, and Gier arranged the deal. The district court dismissed the claim by stipulation of the parties. Bryan Trucking appealed the district court’s subsequent award of costs and attorney fees to Gier. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bryan Trucking v. Gier" on Justia Law

Defendants, Markel Corporation, Markel Services, Inc. (Markel Services), and Essex Insurance Company (Essex), appealed a superior court order denying their motions for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to plaintiff Michael Newell, in this insurance coverage action. Newell was allegedly injured in a slip and fall accident at a property owned by Brames, Inc. (Brames) in Laconia. Brames was insured under an Amusement Park General Liability Policy issued by Essex. Essex was a subsidiary of Markel Corporation and Markel Services was Markel Corporation’s claims handling branch. Newell filed two personal injury actions arising from his slip and fall. The first action against Brames' co-owner and treasurer, was settled out-of-court. In the second lawsuit, Newell sued Ivy Banks, the person who allegedly cleaned the floor upon which Newell slipped and injured himself. Defendants received notice of the Banks action, but declined to defend Banks or intervene. Banks, although properly served, filed neither an appearance nor an answer and was defaulted. A default judgment was entered against Banks for $300,000, the full amount of damages sought by Newell. Newell brought suit against defendants to recover the amount of the default judgment, arguing he was a third party beneficiary under the insurance contract between Brames and Markel/Essex. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred in determining that the language of the Policy was ambiguous and that Banks was a “volunteer worker” under the Policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Newell v. Markel Corporation" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Van Rees, Sr. contracted with respondent Unleaded Software, Inc. to perform web-related services and to design additional websites. After Unleaded missed deadlines and failed to deliver the promised services, Van Rees sued, asserting multiple tort claims, a civil theft claim, three breach of contract claims, and a claim for violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). The trial court granted Unleaded's 12(b)(5) motion, dismissing all but Van Rees' contract claims, on which a jury found in Van Rees' favor. Van Rees appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. After its review, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court had determined that the tort and civil theft claims were barred by the "economic loss rule" because they were related to promises memorialized in the contracts, and the CCPA claim failed to allege a significant public impact. The Supreme Court found the issue pertaining to the economic loss rule was not whether the tort claims related to a contract, but whether they stemmed from a duty independent of the contact. The Court found pre-contractural misrepresentations in this case distinct from the contract itself, and could have formed the basis of an independent tort claim. Accordingly, the Court reversed as to Van Rees' tort claims. With respect to civil theft, the court affirmed the court of appeals on the ground that the claim failed to adequately allege the "knowing deprivation of a thing of value." View "Van Rees v. Unleaded Software, Inc." on Justia Law

Menda Warne appealed the court of appeals' judgment reversing dismissal of Bill Hall's complaint, which asserted a claim of intentional interference with contract. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted without addressing the applicable case law in its written order. The court of appeals expressly declined to apply more recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence governing Fed. R. Vic. P. 12(b)(6), finding itself bound by the Colorado Supreme Court's existing precedent, which heavily relied on the federal Supreme Court's earlier opinion in "Conley v. Gibson," (355 U.S. 41 (1957)). The court of appeals reversed the trial court, finding the complaint sufficient to state a claim. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the court of appeals too narrowly understood the Court's existing precedent. After review of the complaint, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Warne v. Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against Kamehameha Investment Corporation (KIC), the developer of a hillside area, and Sato and Associates, Inc. and Daniel Miyasato (collectively, Sato), the civil engineer. KIC tendered defense against Plaintiffs’ claims to Sato pursuant to a hold harmless clause in a project consultant agreement between Sato and KIC. KIC filed a cross-claim against Sato, alleging that Sato had agreed to defend and indemnify KIC against Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court granted KIC’s motion for partial summary judgment against Sato. Relying on Pancakes of Hawaii, Inc. v. Pomare Properties Corp., the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that Sato had a contractual duty to defend KIC in the wrongful death action. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) Haw. Rev. Stat. 431:10-222 renders invalid any provision in a construction contract requiring the promisor to defend “the promisee against liability for bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of willful misconduct of the promisee, the promisee’s agent or employees, or indemnitee”; (2) Pancakes does not apply to defense provisions in construction contracts; and (3) the scope of a promisor’s duty to defend imposed by a construction contract is determined at the end of litigation. Remanded. View "Arthur v. State, Dep’t of Hawaiian Home Lands" on Justia Law