Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Duke Energy bought, from Benton, renewable energy at a price high enough to enable construction of wind turbines, and acquired tradeable renewable‑energy credits. The contract requires Duke to pay Benton for all power delivered during the next 20 years. When Benton's 100-megawat facility started operating in 2008 it was the only area wind farm. Duke paid for everything Benton could produce. The regional transmission organization, Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), which implements a bidding system for the network, cleared the power to the regional grid. By 2015, aggregate capacity of local wind farms reached 1,745 megawatts, exceeding the local grid’s capacity. At times, would‑be producers must pay MISO to take power; buyers get free electricity. Initially, MISO allowed wind farms to deliver to the grid no matter what other producers (coal, nuclear, solar, hydro) were doing, which meant that such producers had to cut back. On March 1, 2013, the rules changed to put wind farms on a par with other producers. Under MISO’s new system, with Duke’s responsive bid, Benton has gone from delivering power 100% of the time the wind allowed to delivering only 59% of the time. The district court agreed with Duke that, when MISO tells Benton to stop delivering power, it does not owe Benton anything, rejecting Benton’s claim that Duke could put Benton’s power on the grid by bidding to displace other power, and that when Duke does not, it owes liquidated damages. The judge found that bidding $0 is “reasonable” cooperation. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the contract implies that Duke must do what is needed to make transmission capacity available. View "Benton County Wind Farm LLC v. Duke Energy Indiana, Inc." on Justia Law

Twalker Development, LLC appealed a judgment granting KLE Construction LLC's claim for unjust enrichment and ordering Twalker to pay $87,958.74 in damages. KLE and Twalker engaged in negotiations for KLE to provide construction services to Twalker in exchange for four lots located in Twalker's development. KLE and Twalker never executed a written contract finalizing the terms of an agreement. KLE began performing construction services on the property, including preliminary dirt work related to clearing and scraping the property. KLE also hired an engineering firm to create plans to subdivide the property for future sales. KLE and Twalker disagreed about certain aspects of the project, and Twalker terminated KLE's services. Twalker continued to develop the property and did not compensate KLE for the services it provided. KLE sued Twalker for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and forbearance. After a bench trial, the district court dismissed KLE's breach of contract claim, finding KLE failed to establish the existence of a contract. The court dismissed KLE's forbearance claim, stating forbearance was not a separate and distinct claim. The court granted KLE's unjust enrichment claim and found KLE was entitled to $90,857 in damages. The court ordered each party pay the other party's costs and disbursements. A judgment was entered in favor of KLE for $87,958.74. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting KLE's unjust enrichment claim and awarding damages. View "KLE Construction, LLC v. Twalker Development, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman was admitted to a hospital emergency room with pregnancy-related complications. The attending physician recommended that she be transported by medivac to a different facility. The woman and her husband informed the physician that they needed their insurer’s preauthorization for that course of action or they could be personally liable for the costs. The physician allegedly promised to call the insurer and, if it would not approve the medivac, have the hospital bear the costs itself. But the physician failed to contact the insurer until much later, and the insurer declined coverage. The couple sued the physician and the hospital, alleging that the physician breached her fiduciary duty by failing to obtain preauthorization as promised; that her promise created an enforceable contract, which was breached; and that if there was no contract the physician’s promise should be enforced through the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The superior court granted summary judgment to the physician and hospital. The couple appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior court did not err when it ruled in favor of the physician and hospital on the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract, but that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the claim for promissory estoppel. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Archer" on Justia Law

Rigney Construction & Development, LLC contracted with Red Dot Building System, Inc. for a portion of a school construction project. A dispute arose as to the scope of the work Red Dot was to perform under the contract. Red Dot later sued Rigney in Henderson County district court for an unpaid invoice. Thereafter, Rigney sued Red Dot in Hidalgo County. All of the claims related to the contract with Red Dot. Red Dot asked the Hidalgo County court to transfer the suit to Henderson County or abate the suit. The Hidalgo County court denied the motions to transfer and abate. Both courts set their cases for trial. Red Dot sought mandamus relief and, alternatively, asked the Supreme Court to instruct the Hidalgo County court to transfer its case to Henderson County or to abate the Hidalgo County suit. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief insofar as Red Dot asked the Court to order the Hidalgo County court to transfer the case to Henderson County, holding that Hidalgo County court should have abated the suit pending in that court because Henderson County court acquired dominant jurisdiction. View "In re Red Dot Building System, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the former attorneys who had represented her in a personal injury action. Plaintiff alleged eight causes of action arising from alleged misconduct during the course of the parties’ attorney-client relationship. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s operative first amended complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations. The court concluded that all of plaintiff's causes of action are time-barred as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foxen v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Stephen Shapiro was a licensed real estate broker and the principal of plaintiff Westside. Shapiro's friends, James and Eleanor Randall, agreed to have Shapiro represent them in a residential real estate purchase. However, the agreement was never put in writing. The Randalls later worked with their attorney, Richard Meaglia, to buy the $65 million dollar estate Shapiro had originally identified and negotiated offers and counteroffers on. Westside then filed suit against the Randalls for breach of an implied contract and filed suit against Meaglia for intentional interference with an implied contract. Westside sought compensatory damages of $925,000, the same amount as the broker’s fee Meaglia eventually collected. Westside subsequently dismissed its case against Meaglia, and the trial court entered a final judgment dismissing the first amended complaint (FAC) against all defendants. The court concluded that the trial court correctly ruled that the statute of frauds applies to Westside's claim; the FAC alleges no written agreement between Westside and the Randalls; and thus Westside’s claim for its commission is subject to—and barred by—the statute of frauds. Finally, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend its claim against the Randalls. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Westside Estate Agency v. Randall" on Justia Law

Following court-ordered mediation, spouses Gary Rolison and Martha Rolison and Caleb Fryar and his father, Robert Fryar, entered into a mediation settlement agreement that resolved four lawsuits pending between the Rolisons and the Fryars. After a bench trial, the Circuit Court found that the Rolisons had breached the settlement agreement, and the court entered a final judgment pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and postponed hearing the issue of damages. The Rolisons appealed the final judgment but later dismissed the appeal voluntarily. After the trial on damages, the trial court awarded the Fryars $399,733.02 in damages, including lost profits and attorney fees. The Rolisons appealed, arguing that their jury trial waiver was ineffective, the trial court’s Rule 54(b) certification was erroneous, and the trial court erroneously denied a motion to intervene filed by two interested parties. Because the Rolisons dismissed their appeal from the Rule 54(b) final judgment, those issues were not at issue before the Supreme Court. After further review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court committed no error by finding that the Rolisons had waived their right to a jury trial on damages and attorney fees. Further, the Court rejected the Rolisons’ challenges to the trial court’s awards of damages and attorney fees because those awards were supported by substantial, credible evidence. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Rolison v. Fryar" on Justia Law

Arundel Valley, LLC, the developer of a facility for a butter manufacturer, filed a complaint against Branch River Plastics, Inc., a manufacturer and distributor of insulated roofing panels, alleging, inter alia, defects in roofing panels that Branch River had manufactured and supplied to Arundel Valley for a construction project. A jury found in Arundel Valley’s favor on its claims that Branch River breached implied warranties by supplying defective roofing panels. Branch River filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in declining to adjudicate whether Branch River had disclaimed implied warranties. Remanded. View "Arundel Valley, LLC v. Branch River Plastics, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, John Sebo purchased a home. American Home Assurance Company (AHAC) provided homeowners insurance as of the date of the purchase. It later became clear that the house suffered from major design and construction defects when water began to intrude during rainstorms. Hurricane Wilma further damaged the residence. AHAC denied coverage for most of the claimed losses. Sebo sued AHAC seeking a declaration that the policy provided coverage for his damages. The jury found in favor of Sebo, and the trial court entered judgment against AHAC. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that coverage did not exist under Sebo’s all-risk policy when multiple perils combined to create a loss and at least one of the perils was excluded by the terms of the policy. The Supreme Court quashed the Second District’s opinion, holding that the plain language of the policy did not preclude recovery in this case. View "Sebo v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Dreamstreet sold a vacant lot for home construction and MidCountry financed the lot's purchase by a third party. This case arose from the "seller holdback" agreement between Dreamstreet and MidCountry, where part of the purchase price owed to Dreamstreet instead would be retained by MidCountry, pending completion of the home and subject to certain conditions. Dreamstreet alleged that MidCountry fraudulently induced it to enter into the seller holdback agreement, in violation of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA). Dreamstreet also alleged a claim under the common-law doctrine of constructive fraud. The district court granted summary judgment to MidCountry. With respect to the UDTPA claim, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to MidCountry on statute of limitation grounds. The court also concluded that the undisputed facts of this case reveal an ordinary contractual relationship, with nothing that could give rise to a special fiduciary relationship. Because the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a necessary element of constructive fraud, the district court properly granted summary judgment to MidCountry on this claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dreamstreet Investments, Inc. v. MidCountry Bank" on Justia Law