Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement providing that Plaintiff was to provide various telecommunications equipment, software, and services to Defendant for a switch room located in Los Angeles. Defendant later terminated the purchase agreement. Plaintiff filed a complaint claiming breach of contract for Defendant’s failure to pay the amounts owed and account stated. Defendant counterclaimed for, inter alia, breach of contract for Plaintiff’s failure to provide services under the purchase agreement. The trial court entered judgment for Defendant on the complaint and the breach of contract count of the counterclaim. The court later articulated that Plaintiff had breached the purchase agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in concluding that Plaintiff breached the purchase agreement; (2) did not err in finding that Plaintiff failed to prove its breach of contract claim; and (3) properly awarded damages, cost and attorney’s fees in light of a limitation of liability clause in the purchase agreement. View "CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc." on Justia Law

After a surgical procedure was performed on Elliot Kaplan as a result of a misdiagnosis, the Kaplans filed suit against Mayo for medical malpractice, breach of contract, lack of informed consent, and loss of consortium. The district court dismissed all claims against Dr. Nagorney, the surgeon who performed the medical procedure; the district court granted Mayo's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the breach-of-contract claim; and the jury returned a verdict for defendants on the malpractice claim. On appeal, the court upheld the jury verdict but vacated the judgment in favor of Mayo on the breach-of-contract claim, and held that the district court erred by requiring expert testimony to establish a contract breach and remanded the claim to trial. The district court subsequently entered judgment for Mayo. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that Dr. Nagorney did not promise to do a biopsy of Elliot’s pancreas during the surgery and that no meeting of the minds occurred to form a contract. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that this court, in Kaplan I, forbid defendants' use of expert testimony to establish a defense to the claim of a special contract in the performance of the operation. Because the district court committed no error, the court upheld the district court's factual findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kaplan v. Mayo Clinic" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against TMBC, challenging TMBC's nationwide practice of charging a document fee when selling boats and trailers under form contracts governed by Missouri law. The district court approved class certification and then granted summary judgment to the class, awarding treble damages and attorney fees. The district court determined that TMBC prepared legal documents attendant to its sales and that charging a fee for those documents constituted unauthorized law business in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 484.010 and 484.020. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the class as ultimately defined met the requirements of Rule 23 and certifying the case as a class action; the district court did not err in granting the class members' motion for summary judgment or in calculating damages based upon the entire document fee; and the district court did not err in applying Missouri law to sales that occurred outside Missouri. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to these issues. The court then addressed plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred when it held that the attorneys’ fees should be paid from the common fund rather than paid by TMBC pursuant to the contractual fee-shifting provision, concluding that enforcement of the fee-shifting provision honors both the contract and the principles underlying the common fund doctrine. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings as to the award. The court noted that if the district court, on remand, should determine that counsel for the class is entitled to additional fees from the common fund, apart from those reasonable expenses covered by the fee-shifting provision, it is not prohibited from awarding additional fees. View "McKeage v. TMBC, LLC" on Justia Law

Shalizi purchased an apartment building and wanted to move into unit four. Geraghty had been renting unit four for 22 years and was paying $938 a month. Shalizi’s attorney sent a letter informing Geragthy that Shalizi intended to commence an owner move-in eviction (Ellis Act “no fault” eviction), but suggested a voluntary buyout agreement. Shalizi and Geragthy entered into an agreement that promised Geraghty $25,000 and gave him several months to depart. Geraghty released Shalizi from “any and all claims which have or may have arisen from Tenant’s occupancy of the Premises at any time or any and all claims related to the Premises, including, but not limited to, claims for wrongful eviction, non-compliance with or violations of the provisions of the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance [SFRRSAO] and Rules and Regulations, . . . [or the] right to reoccupy the Premises.” Geraghty vacated and Shalizi paid. Shalizi began $70,000 in renovations and occupied the unit. Months later, Shalizi lost his job. Months later, Shalizi found new work, but had to relocate. He rented unit four to a new tenant for $3,700 a month. After discovering Shalizi was again renting out unit four, Geraghty sued for violation of the San Francisco rent ordinance, negligence, fraud, and rescission. The trial court granted Shalizi summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed, finding Geraghty’s waiver valid and enforceable. View "Geraghty v. Shalizi" on Justia Law

Chenari, a third-year George Washington University medical student, took a test published by the National Board of Medical Examiners. Before the exam, the proctor read aloud the instructions from NBME’s official manual, including that students must complete the exam in two and a half hours and that “[n]o additional time [would] be allowed for transferring answers” to the answer sheet. Chenari also received a copy of “Exam Guidelines,” containing a similar warning. When the proctor called time, Chenari discovered that he had failed to transfer 20-30 answers to his answer sheet, “panicked,” and continued to transfer answers. The proctor requested that he stop; he continued. When the proctor tried to take the exam, Chenari put his hand over it and continued entering answers, taking an additional 90-120 seconds. The proctor and another student reported Chenari. Pursuant to University procedures, an Honor Code Council subcommittee investigated and recommended dismissal for academic dishonesty. The Medical Student Evaluation Committee unanimously recommended Chenari’s dismissal. The Medical School Dean met with Chenari and upheld that recommendation. Chenari unsuccessfully appealed to the Provost, arguing that his conduct lacked “an element of deceit” like “cheat[ing]” or “l[ying].” The D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of Chenari’s suit, which alleged breach of contract and discrimination based on his disability, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), 29 U.S.C. 794(a), and 42 U.S.C. 12132. The court noted that Chenari never sought accommodation of his claimed disability under the school’s established procedures. View "Chenari v. George Washington University" on Justia Law

This case concerns BP's obligations under the Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement. Appellant is a company that filed Business Economic Loss claims under the settlement agreement on behalf of five of its stores. The CSSP and the Appeal Panel determined that the stores were not tourism businesses and denied the claims for failure to satisfy the causation requirement. In this consolidated appeal, appellant challenged the district court's denial of discretionary review. The court concluded that there was no abuse in discretion in classifying the stores under North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 441310 as automotive parts and accessories stores. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Claimant ID 100212278 v. BP Exploration & Production" on Justia Law

Leighton sued Forster for breach of an attorney fee contract and an account stated, seeking damages in excess of $114,000. In granting Forster summary judgment, the trial court found that an engagement letter Leighton emailed to Forster’s husband Bob was not a valid contract because it was never signed (Bus. & Prof. Code, section 6148) and any claim for payment of the reasonable value of Leighton’s services was barred by the two-year statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc, section 339(1)). The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that there were triable issues of material fact regarding Rochelle’s liability for the unpaid attorney fees because she produced evidence that, before Bob died, Leighton and Bob negotiated a fee arrangement that either satisfied the requirements of section 6148 or was exempt from those requirements. The absence of a written fee agreement conclusively establishes that Rochelle was entitled to summary judgment. View "Leighton v. Forster" on Justia Law

Jose and Ada Marin obtained an $8 million settlement for injuries Jose suffered when he fell forty feet while working on a building in Manhattan. At issue in this appeal was a fee dispute between Plaintiffs’ attorney-of-record in that action, Sheryl Menkes, and two attorneys she engaged to assist her, Jeffrey Manheimer and David Golomb. Supreme Court held that the fee-sharing agreements unambiguously entitled Manheimer to twenty percent of net attorneys’ fees and Golomb to forty percent of net attorneys’ fees. The Appellate Division affirmed. Menkes appealed. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division, holding that, based on the plain language of the parties’ respective fee-sharing agreements, Manheimer was entitled to twenty percent of net attorneys’ fees and Golomb was entitled to twelve percent of net attorneys’ fees. View "Marin v. Constitution Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Jacobs, a licensed California real estate broker, had the “exclusive and irrevocable right” to sell a Marin County parcel for one year. The listing price was $2,200,000; if Jacobs procured a buyer during the listing period, Jacobs would receive a commission of $200,000. The agreement specified that if one named party bought the property, Jacobs would receive no commission. Locatelli signed the agreement as trustee of the Locatelli Trust, but there were blank signature lines for five additional parties. Jacobs claimed that Locatelli stated that he was authorized to act on behalf of the other owners and that she can obtain a written “agency agreement” through discovery. When Jacobs noted interest in the property by TPL, Locatelli was angry and asserted that he had been speaking with TPL for three years and that he wanted to change the agreement. Jacobs claimed that she investigated and that her TPL contact told her that he did not know Locatelli and had not been aware the property was for sale until he was contacted by Jacobs. Later, the owners and TPL entered into a sales contract. The sale was never consummated, apparently because issues arose between the parties. Jacobs sued the owners and TPL. The trial court dismissed without explanation. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the claims were not barred by the statute of frauds or the parol evidence rule. View "Jacobs v. Locatelli" on Justia Law

In 2010, Havre High School’s roof partially collapsed. Dick Anderson Construction, Inc. (Anderson) built the roof and Springer Group Architects (Springer) designed it. Hill County High School District No. A filed suit against against Springer and Anderson, alleging negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, deceit, and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Springer and Anderson, concluding that the statute of repose time-barred the School District’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) concluding that the statute of repose barred the School District’s claims; (2) ruling that the period of repose could not be tolled; and (3) awarding Spring attorney fees under the contract. View "Hill County High School District No. A v. Dick Anderson Construction, Inc." on Justia Law