Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Don Mealing, as Trustee of the Mealing Family Trust (Mealing), sought a judgment directing Diane Harkey for Board of Equalization 2014 (Campaign) to repay a loan Diane Harkey made to the Campaign, and to apply the proceeds to partially satisfy a nearly $1.6 million judgment Mealing obtained against Diane's husband, Dan Harkey. Mealing claimed the Campaign's indebtedness to Diane was a community property asset of Dan and Diane that could be used to partially satisfy the judgment. To preserve the Campaign's assets, Mealing applied ex parte for an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 708.240, subdivision (a), to prohibit the Campaign from making any payments to Diane on the loan. The trial court denied the application without explanation and Mealing appealed. On appeal, Mealing argued the trial court lacked discretion to deny his application because he made a prima facie showing that he obtained a judgment against Dan, the judgment remained unpaid, and Diane's loan to the Campaign was a marital asset that he could use to partially satisfy the judgment, and the Campaign presented no evidence to overcome that showing. Finding no error however, the Court of Appeals affirmed: Diane was not a judgment debtor, which was statutorily defined as the person against whom a judgment was rendered. View "Mealing v. Diane Harkey for Board of Equalization 2014" on Justia Law

While she was a student at Harvard Law School (HLS), Megon Walker was a member of the staff of the Journal of Law and Technology. During Walker’s final semester, concerns arose regarding a draft article (the Note) that Walker had written. After a hearing, the HLS Administrative Board (Board) found that the Note contained plagiarism. Walker received a formal reprimand, which ultimately appeared on her transcript. Walker graduated from HLS despite the reprimand, but the notation placed on transcript caused the loss of a lucrative employment offer. Walker filed suit against the President and Fellows of Harvard College, the then-Dean of Students at HLS, and the former Chair of the Board, seeking to have the notation removed from her transcript. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly granted summary judgment against Walker on her claims of breach of contract and defamation. View "Walker v. Harvard University Fellows" on Justia Law

Medina & Medina, Inc., a Puerto Rico-based distributor of refrigerated food products, sued its principal, Hormel Foods Corp. Medina sought a declaration that Medina was the exclusive distributor of Hormel’s retail refrigerated products in Puerto Rico and alleged that Hormel violated an alleged exclusive distributorship agreement and hence Puerto Rico’s Dealer’s Contracts Act (Law 75) by selling Supreme Party Platters directly to Costco while bypassing Medina. Hormel counterclaimed, asserting that Medina was not an exclusive distributor. The district court ruled (1) Medina’s exclusivity claim was time-barred, and (2) notwithstanding the time bar for Medina’s exclusivity claim, Hormel’s sales of Supreme Party Platters to Costco violated Law 75. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Medina’s exclusivity claim as presented was time-barred; but (2) the statute of limitations bar to recovery also extends to Medina’s Costco-related claim. View "Medina & Medina, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp." on Justia Law

BMW of North America, LLC and GMG Motors, Inc., doing business as BMW of San Diego (BMW San Diego) appealed a judgment awarding Nancy Goglin over $185,000 in attorney fees and costs for successfully settling her claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and other consumer protection statutes. Both BMW North America and BMW San Diego contended Goglin was not entitled to any attorney fees or costs because BMW San Diego offered an appropriate remedy before Goglin filed her complaint, which Goglin unreasonably refused to accept. Alternatively, BMW San Diego argued the fee award should have been be reduced because there was insufficient evidence to show Goglin's counsel's hours worked and hourly rate were reasonable given the litigation's lack of risk and complexity. After review, the Court of Appeals was not persuaded by these contentions and affirmed. View "Goglin v. BMW of North America" on Justia Law

Kiva Lodge Condominium Owners' Association, Inc. ("Kiva Lodge") was an Alabama nonprofit corporation formed for the purpose of administering and maintaining the Kiva Dunes Clubhouse and Condominium ("Kiva Dunes") located in Gulf Shores. In 2009, Kiva Lodge contracted with Hudak & Dawson Construction Co., Inc. ("Hudak") to be the general contractor for the remediation of deficiencies in Kiva Dunes buildings that were allowing water to enter the buildings. Hudak subcontracted the stucco and/or sealant portion of the work to Don Colvin d/b/a Colvin Plastering ("Colvin"). The Hanover Insurance Company ("Hanover"), as surety for Hudak, issued to Kiva Lodge a performance bond ensuring and/or securing the full performance of Hudak's contractual obligations. In September 2012, Kiva Lodge informed Hudak and Colvin of leaks and bubbling in the stucco exterior of the buildings at Kiva Dunes caused by water intrusion. Kiva Lodge alleged that Hudak and Colvin failed to determine and/or disclose the course of the problems and the proper scope of repairs necessary. It also alleged that Hanover breached the terms of its performance bond by failing to promptly remedy the default, complete the work within the scope of the contract in accordance with the terms and conditions, or arrange for payment of an alternative contractor to complete the work. Hanover filed a motion to dismiss Kiva Lodge's claims against Hanover on the ground that, under its performance bond, its claims were time-barred, falling outside of a two-year statute of limitations. In 2015, the circuit court heard arguments concerning Kiva Lodge's motion to compel arbitration, eventually granting the stay and ordering the parties to arbitration. The court also denied Hanover's motion to dismiss. Hudak, Colvin, and Hanover timely appealed the circuit court's order. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's order and affirmed. View "Hanover Insurance Co. v. Kiva Lodge Condominium Owners' Association, Inc." on Justia Law

Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. (the Mall) Owend a commercial real estate development in Paducah. SM Newco Paducah, LLC (Newco) owned a building located within that development that had been vacant and deteriorating for more than a decade. The Mall filed suit to compel the enforcement of Newco’s obligation to keep the building in good condition. When the Mall learned that Newco was considering the possibility of demolishing the building, it filed in the pending litigation a motion for a temporary injunction to stop the demolition. Eventually, counsel for the Mall tendered a proposed order designated as a temporary injunction, and the circuit court entered the temporary injunction over Newco’s objection. Newco filed a motion for interlocutory relief pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.07. The court of appeals denied the motion. Newco then moved for interlocutory relief in the Supreme Court under Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.09. The Supreme Court denied Newco’s motion, holding that Newco failed to show the “extraordinary cause” required by Rule 65.09 for obtaining such relief. View "SM Newco Paducah, LLC v. Kentucky Oaks Mall Co." on Justia Law

Richard Tryon was injured by an underinsured motorist while driving his motorcycle. At the time of the accident, Tryon owed two automobiles insured with Encompass Indemnity Co. and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. (together, the Companies). Both policies included Underinsured Motorist Insurance (UIM) coverage provisions. The Companies denied UIM coverage for Tryon on the basis of their respective insurance policies, which had owned-but-not-scheduled-for-coverage exclusions. Tryon filed suit against the Companies. The trial court granted summary judgment for Encompass and Philadelphia, ruling that the language in the policies issued by the Companies clearly excluded coverage of Tryon’s motorcycle. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the unpublished Court of Appeals opinion in Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hartley and the Supreme Court’s holding in Chaffin v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Insurance Cos. mandated coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) owned-but-not-scheduled provisions for UIM coverage are enforceable so long as they expressly and plainly apprise insureds of the exclusion; and (2) the Philadelphia policy failed to plainly exclude coverage under the circumstances, but the terms of the Encompass policy plainly excluded coverage. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tryon" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lend Lease, the construction manager of the Chicago River Point Tower Project, hired Cives as a subcontractor. Cives hired Midwest Steel. Midwest had, years before, hired AES to supply Midwest with additional workers, who were co‐employed by Midwest and AES. Lend Lease entered into a “contractor-controlled insurance program” with Starr Liability with a $500,000 deductible. All subcontractors were to join in the policy. AES had, several years earlier, obtained workers’ compensation for its workers from TIC, so that injured AES‐Midwest workers could obtain workers’ compensation from either Starr (or Lend Lease under the deductible) or TIC. Four ironworkers, jointly employed by Midwest and AES and performing work for Midwest were injured on the job and sought workers’ compensation. The claims exceeded $500,000, so Lend Lease had to pay its full deductible. Starr paid the remaining claims. Lend Lease filed suit against TIC, AES’s insurer, and AES, seeking reimbursement of the $500,000. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lend Lease made a deal with Starr and is bound by it. The court rejected an argument that AES has been unjustly enriched; AES was not obligated to purchase an insurance policy that would cover Lend Lease's deductible. View "Lend Lease (US) Construction, Inc. v. Administrative Employer Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Customers of an indoor trampoline park, of Sky Zone Lafayette, must complete a “Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk” document (“Agreement”) prior to entering the facility. The Agreement contains a clause waiving the participant’s right to trial and compelling arbitration. Plaintiff, James Duhon, was such a customer, and was injured in the course of participating in the park’s activities. After plaintiff filed suit seeking damages, Sky Zone moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. The district court overruled Sky Zone’s exception, but the court of appeal reversed, finding the arbitration provision should be enforced. After review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause in the Sky Zone agreement was adhesionary and therefore unenforceable. View "Duhon v. Activelaf, LLC" on Justia Law

Customers of an indoor trampoline park, of Sky Zone Lafayette, must complete a “Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk” document (“Agreement”) prior to entering the facility. The Agreement contains a clause waiving the participant’s right to trial and compelling arbitration. Plaintiff Theresa Alicea executed the Agreement prior to her husband, Roger Alicea, taking their minor sons to Sky Zone. The Aliceas’ son, Logan, was injured while jumping on a trampoline. The Aliceas filed suit against Sky Zone, individually and on behalf of Logan. Sky Zone moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. The district court overruled Sky Zone’s exception and the court of appeal denied Sky Zone’s writ application. After review, the Supreme Court held the arbitration clause in the Sky Zone agreement was adhesionary and therefore unenforceable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts. View "Alicea v. Activelaf, LLC" on Justia Law