Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Homeowners obtained loans from Bank for the construction of a new home and entered into an agreement with Contractor to complete the new home construction. When Homeowners defaulted on payments owed to Contractor and on both loans, the house was sold at foreclosure, and Homeowners filed for bankruptcy. Contractor filed a fourth amended complaint against Homeowners, who were later dismissed as parties, and Bank. Following a trial the court granted summary judgment for Bank on Contractor’s claims of fraud and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court reversed. After remand, Contractor filed a fifth amended complaint, which differed from the fourth amended complaint in several respects. The district court determined that the election of remedies doctrine and judicial estoppel required a dismissal of Contractor’s claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Contractor’s claims were consistently premised on the existence of a contract, and therefore, no election was required; and (2) Contractor’s claims were based on different facts and obligations, and therefore, both could be pursued. View "deNourie & Yost Homes, LLC v. Frost" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of a judgment: (1) denying recovery on an alleged oral promise to grant the Plaintiffs a right of first refusal with respect to a parcel of real property they were leasing; (2) denying recovery on an alleged oral promise to purchase the Plaintiffs’ buildings that were located on that property; and (3) finding that the Plaintiffs were guilty of unlawful detainer. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Nicholson v. Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Corp" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute over a contract to perform flow-back services to improve the performance of an offshore natural-gas well when performance eventually required the use of a crane barge. At issue was the applicability of maritime or state law. The court agreed with the district court, applied the approach in Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., and concluded that the oral work order was the relevant contract and that it is a maritime contract. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Larry Doiron, Inc. v. Specialty Rental Tools & Supply" on Justia Law

Defendant Century Surety Company (Century) issued a Commercial Lines Policy to Plaintiff Siloam Springs Hotel, L.L.C. (Siloam). This policy included general liability insurance coverage of Siloam's hotel in Siloam Springs, Arkansas, for the policy period from November 13, 2012, through November 13, 2013. The insuring agreement of the general liability coverage form provided that Century would pay sums the insured was legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury to which the insurance applies and that Century would have the right and duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking such damages. On January 17, 2013, several guests inside of the hotel allegedly suffered bodily injury due to carbon monoxide poisoning. The carbon monoxide allegedly escaped into the air due to leakage from the hotel's indoor swimming pool heater. Siloam sought coverage under its policy from Century, which Century denied based on an Indoor Air Exclusion at issue. The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma certified a single question of Oklahoma law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court under the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S. 2011 sections 1601-1611: “Does the public policy of the State of Oklahoma prohibit enforcement of the Indoor Air Exclusion, which provides that the insurance afforded by the policy does not apply to ‘Bodily injury', 'property damage', or 'personal and advertising injury' arising out of, caused by, or alleging to be contributed to in any way by any toxic, hazardous, noxious, irritating pathogenic or allergen qualities or characteristics of indoor air regardless of cause?” The Oklahoma Supreme Court answered the question in the negative. View "Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC v. Century Surety Co." on Justia Law

Prior to filing condemnation proceedings the Appellee Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) offered Appellants, Cedars Group, L.L.C., A. Sam Coury and Bush, Ltd. d/b/a Deer Creek Texaco, (collectively, Coury Defendants), $562,500.00 for the acquisition of certain real property. The offer was not accepted and ODOT commenced two condemnation proceedings. In one, a commissioners' report estimated the value of just compensation for the property to be $285,000.00. In the second proceeding, the value of just compensation was estimated as $177,500.00. The combined value of the two commissioners' awards totaled $462,500.00. The Coury Defendants hired Gregg Renegar's law firm to provide representation in the condemnation proceedings. Pursuant to the firm’s attorney-client agreement, the Coury Defendants agreed to pay forty percent of the difference between an award and jury verdict, plus any attorney’s fees allowed by the court. A jury trial was held, and the jury awarded just compensation of $525,000 for the two tracts. Defendants applied for attorney fees. The trial court determined Defendants were not entitled to an award of fees because they never actually incurred any. In the end, the trial court awarded appraisal fees but denied reasonable attorney, engineering and expert witness fees, costs and expenses of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part; the case was remanded for a determination of reasonable attorney fees, engineering and expert witness fees, and costs. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Trans. v. Cedars Group, LLC" on Justia Law

After James Walsh’s (Plaintiff) employment with Zurich American Insurance Company (Defendant) was terminated, he filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging breach of contract, willful violation of New Hampshire’s wage and hour law, and other claims based on Defendant’s substantial reduction of his incentive pay for a lucrative deal and failure to pay incentive on another deal. A jury found that Defendant willfully and without good cause withheld the compensation owed to Plaintiff and awarded him double damages and attorney’s fees. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment insofar as it incorporated the jury’s verdict on one deal (the Great American Insurance Company, or GAIC, deal) and affirmed the judgment with respect to the other deal (the Automobile Protection Corp., or APCO, deal), holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract and wage claims; (2) the jury’s breach and willfulness findings stemming from Defendant’s withholding of incentive compensation for a deal made with GAIC were not in error; but (3) the district court erred in concluding that, if Plaintiff had an enforceable incentive plan when the deal was struck with APCO, Defendant lacked discretion as a matter of law to change Plaintiff’s incentive formula for that deal. Remanded. View "Walsh v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After the loan secured by Susan Alexander’s property went into default, Bank of America, N.A. (BANA) initiated foreclosure proceedings. The property was sold to BANA after a trustee’s sale. When Alexander refused BANA’s demand to vacate the property BANA filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Alexander. Alexander asserted counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of an oral agreement, and frivolous litigation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BANA, concluding that the foreclosure sale was valid and that Alexander was unlawfully holding possession of the property. The court also concluded that Alexander’s counterclaims were either barred by the statute of limitations or statute of frauds and that there was a lack of supporting evidence for her claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) BANA was entitled to summary judgment and a writ of assistance based on unlawful detainer; (2) Alexander failed to state a claim of fraud; (3) Alexander’s claims of breach of written or oral contract and breach of oral agreement were barred by the statute of limitations and statute of frauds; and (4) Alexander did not properly allege or offer supporting evidence for her claim of unjust enrichment. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Alexander" on Justia Law

After Robert Fitte burned tree branches on his property, a fire rose from the ashes of the burn and erupted into a wildfire known as the Corral Fire. At the time of the fire, Fitte carried two insurance policies issued by Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, including the commercial automobile policy at issue in this appeal. Fitte stipulated to entry of a judgment in favor of Associated Dermatology and Skin Cancer Clinic of Helena, P.C. Profit Sharing Plan and Trust for the benefit of Stephen D. Behlmer, M.D. (Behlmer). Fitte and Behlmer subsequently entered into an agreement wherein Fitte assigned his rights in the Mountain West policies to Behlmer. Behlmer then filed this action seeking a declaration that the automobile policy provided coverage for the Corral Fire damages. The district court ruled in favor of Behlmer and directed that the insurance proceeds be deposited into the district court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in holding that there was coverage for the Corral Fire damage under Mountain West’s commercial automobile policy. View "Associated Dermatology & Skin Cancer Clinic of Helena, P.C. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust for the Benefit of Stephen D. Behlmer v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

GEM Razorback, LLC appealed a judgment dismissing its declaratory judgment action because GEM failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissing its claim for specific performance because GEM could not establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of a contract. GEM and Zenergy, Inc. owned working interests in two oil and gas wells located in McKenzie County. Zenergy operated the wells, but GEM had not consented to pay its share of the drilling and operating costs. GEM did not execute a joint operating agreement for the wells and consequently was assessed a risk penalty as a nonconsenting owner. In 2013, Zenergy assigned its interest in the wells to Oasis Petroleum North America LLC. The assignment conveyed all assets, including "all files, records and data maintained by" Zenergy. After the assignment, GEM requested the same information from Oasis. Oasis provided Zenergy with the requested information. However, according to Oasis, some of the requested information for the time period before the assignment was not in its possession. Because of differences in the numbers provided by Zenergy and Oasis, GEM filed applications for hearing with the Industrial Commission requesting that the Commission determine the actual reasonable costs plus risk penalty for the two wells. After a hearing, Oasis agreed to allow GEM to conduct an audit of the wells. The Commission then dismissed the applications without prejudice. During the ensuing audit process, GEM discovered there were documents it requested that were not in Oasis' possession for the time period before the assignment when Zenergy operated the wells. GEM contacted Zenergy and requested an extensive list of 39 specific types of information regarding the wells. Zenergy refused to provide GEM with the requested information. GEM then commenced its declaratory judgment and specific performance action against Zenergy. Zenergy argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the request for declaratory relief because GEM failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with the Commission before filing the complaint. Zenergy further argued the claim for specific performance failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because a provision of the assignment agreement specifically bars third-party beneficiary status. The court agreed with Zenergy's arguments and dismissed GEM's action. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "GEM Razorback, LLC v. Zenergy, Inc." on Justia Law

Justin Beckstrand and James Beckstrand, through his surviving spouse, Cynthia, appealed a judgment awarding $164,202.40 in 2015 farm rental payments to Julie Beckstrand, the personal representative of John Beckstrand's estate. The Supreme Court found that because the district court's findings were inadequate to explain the basis for its equitable decision to award the farm rental payments to Julie Beckstrand, it reversed and remanded for the court to explain the rationale for its decision. View "Beckstrand v. Beckstrand" on Justia Law