Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In this dispute between a judgment creditor and a Connecticut State Marshall over whether the Marshal was entitled to a statute that awards a commission, the Second Circuit concluded that Connecticut state law was insufficiently developed for the court to answer the question raised on appeal. Therefore, the court certified the following questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court: (1) Was Marshal Pesiri entitled to a fifteen percent fee under the terms of CONN. GEN. STAT. 52‐8 261(a)(F)? (2) In answering the first question, does it matter that the writ was ignored and that the monies that were the subject of the writ were procured only after the judgment creditor, not the marshal, pursued further enforcement proceedings in the courts? View "Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Pesiri" on Justia Law

Disappointed by the limited fruits of its multimillion-dollar investment with Abbott Laboratories (Abbott), John Hancock Life Insurance Company (Hancock) sued, seeking to recover damages under its contract with Abbott or, alternatively, to rescind the contract. At issue in this appeal was a contract provision that the parties viewed disparately either as a liquidated damages provision - and thus enforceable - or a penalty - and thus unenforceable. The district court concluded that the provision at issue was unenforceable. The First Circuit reversed this holding and affirmed the district court’s judgment in other respects, holding (1) Abbott failed to carry its burden of proving that the key provision was a penalty rather than a valid and enforceable liquidated damages provision; and (2) the district court did not err in striking Hancock’s prayer for rescission where Hancock recovered damages under the contract for Abbott’s breach of the contract. View "John Hancock Life Insurance Co. v. Abbott Laboratories" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork, alleging that Kolbe sold them defective windows that leak and rot. Plaintiffs brought common-law and statutory claims for breach of express and implied warranties, negligent design and manufacturing of the windows, negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations as to the condition of the windows, and unjust enrichment. The district court granted partial summary judgment in Kolbe’s favor on a number of claims, excluded plaintiffs’ experts, denied class certification, and found that plaintiffs’ individual claims could not survive without expert support. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs forfeited their arguments with respect to their experts’ qualifications under “Daubert.” Individual plaintiffs failed to establish that Kolbe’s alleged misrepresentation somehow caused them loss, given that their builders only used Kolbe windows. Though internal emails, service-request forms, and photos of rotting or leaking windows may suggest problems with Kolbe windows, that evidence did not link the problems to an underlying design defect, as opposed to other, external factors such as construction flaws or climate issues. View "Haley v. Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Co.," on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of an agent contract dispute between Bret Kunz (“Bret”) and Nield, Inc. (“N.I.”) authorizing Bret to sell insurance on behalf of N.I. N.I. is owned by two brothers, Bryan Nield (“Bryan”) and Benjamin Nield. A dispute arose concerning the method and type of compensation available to Bret under the Contract. Bret filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment interpreting the Contract. The district court held the 2009 Contract did not provide for profit sharing as Bret claimed. Bret and his wife, Marti, (collectively, the “Kunzes”) appealed. Finding no reversible errors with respect to how the district court interpreted the Contract, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kunz v. Nield, Inc." on Justia Law

The Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part a motion for summary judgment in a breach of contract dispute regarding Duffield's involvement in the design of a wastewater treatment system. The court granted the motion as to Count I against defendants Don Lockwood and John Stanton, holding them jointly and severally liable for the total amount of $82,153.17 plus pre- and post-judgment interest; imposed a constructive trust over the assets transferred to defendants, ordered a full accounting of the proceeds of the distributions, and ordered disgorgement of any profits or proceeds from the transfers; denied the motion as it related to Count I claims against Pamala Stanton; and held that the motion for rule to show cause was moot. View "Duffield Associates, Inc. v. Lockwood Brothers, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stevens Law Office appealed a trial court decision denying assignment of a future structured settlement payment from a fund administered by Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company for legal services rendered by petitioner on behalf of beneficiary Shane Larock. Shane Larock retained petitioner to represent him in a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) proceeding which he expected to follow the birth of his daughter in early 2016. As payment, petitioner asked Larock for a $16,000 nonrefundable retainer which would be paid through assignment of that sum from a $125,000 structured settlement payment due to Larock in 2022. Under this arrangement, the structured settlement payment issuer, Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company, would pay petitioner $16,000 directly when the 2022 periodic payment became due under the original terms of the settlement. Larock agreed to the fee arrangement and the assignment. The trial court issued a written order concluding that it could not find that the fee arrangement was reasonable because, given petitioner’s ongoing representation of Larock, such a determination would be speculative. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded so that the trial court can conduct the best-interest analysis required by statute before determining whether to deny or approve assignment of a structured settlement payment. View "In re Stevens Law Office" on Justia Law

The rights that flow through a subrogation clause allow an insurer to seek reformation of a contract between its insured and a third party. After Associated paid the portion of the underlying settlement that was in excess of the Westfield policy, Associated sought reimbursement from Scottsdale, an insurer that issued a commercial umbrella policy to Alpha. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in reading reformation’s privity requirement to necessitate a specific connection to the Alpha-Scottsdale insurance policy. Rather, privity in Texas focuses on the relationship to a party. In this case, the subrogation clause in the Associated-Alpha policy provided that connection. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Associated International Insurance Co. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff loaned money to GSM Nation, LLC in a series of transactions. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against GSM Nation and others, alleging, among other claims, breach of contract for failure to repay the loans. Defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the complaint merely sought to collect a debt, and damages provided an adequate remedy at law. The Court of Chancery granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because the complaint did not assert any equitable claims, and an adequate remedy existed at law. View "Yu v. GSM Nation, LLC" on Justia Law

The one-action rule, which generally requires a creditor seeking to recover debt secured by real property to proceed against the security prior to seeking recovery from the debtor personally, must be timely interposed as an affirmative defense in a party’s responsive pleadings or it is waived.Plaintiff contributed more than $2 million toward funding a loan that was secured by the personal residence of Defendant. When the borrower defaulted on the loan and Defendant refused to repay the loan under a personal guaranty agreement, Plaintiff filed a complaint to recover damages against Defendant. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court granted based on Defendant’s failure to oppose the motion on the merits. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, raising the one-action rule defense for the first time. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the one-action rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant failed to raise the one-action rule defense until prior to the commencement of the second trial in this case, Defendant failed timely to interpose the one-action rule defense. View "Hefetz v. Beavor" on Justia Law

Drilling operations commence when: (1) work is done preparatory to drilling; (2) the driller has the capability to do the actual drilling; and (3) there is a good faith intent to complete the well. It is not necessary that the drill bit actually penetrate the ground. GADECO, LLC, appealed a judgment and orders declaring its oil and gas lease with Laurie Abell was terminated, dismissing its counterclaim against Abell, and awarding Abell her costs and attorney fees. GADECO and Abell began negotiating a surface use and damage agreement in mid-November 2011. GADECO sent Abell a proposed agreement on December 26, 2011, and later attempted to contact Abell about the agreement, but she refused to execute it. GADECO applied for a well permit in early 2012, shortly before the primary term of the lease was set to expire, and the permit was approved on January 23, 2012. Two days later, Abell leased the same mineral interests to Kodiak Oil & Gas. Unable to secure a surface use and damage agreement from Abell, GADECO relocated the well off the subject property but within the spacing unit, and a producing oil and gas well was completed in 2013. After giving notice of termination, Abell brought this lawsuit seeking a determination that GADECO's lease had terminated and an award of costs and attorney fees. GAEDCO counterclaimed for breach of contract and damages. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that where the failure to produce oil or gas from leased land is due to the fault of the lessor, the lease is not terminated at the end of the primary term, since the lessor is not entitled to set up termination of the lease where she has prevented the lessee from conducting operations which might bring about an extension of the lease. The Court reversed and remanded, finding genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abell v. GADECO, LLC" on Justia Law