Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court denying the University of Louisville’s (U of L) immunity against suit in this case. After Mark Rothstein’s Distinguished University Scholar (DUS) contract was terminated, Rothstein filed suit against U of L for breach of a written contract. The circuit court denied U of L’s argument that sovereign immunity barred Rothstein’s claims for breach of the written contract, finding instead that Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A, which waives immunity for breach of contract actions against the Commonwealth, was applicable to written employment contracts. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature has waived immunity for all claims arising out of lawfully authorized written contracts with the Commonwealth and its agencies. View "University of Louisville v. Rothstein" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal concerned a contract dispute about the provision of food services at the Fort Riley Army base in Kansas. The Department of the Army (Army) contracts with outside vendors for food preparation and related supporting services for its cafeteria dining facilities at Fort Riley. Since 2006, the State of Kansas, through the Kansas Department for Children and Families (Kansas), successfully bid under the RSA on those food preparation and related services contracts at Fort Riley. Kansas’s most recent contract awarded under the RSA was scheduled to expire in February 2016. As that date approached, the Army determined that its next dining contract at Fort Riley would be for supporting services only. The Army therefore decided that it need not solicit bids under the RSA and it approached another vendor directly, as permitted by the JWOD. Kansas took exception to the Army’s decision because it eliminated Kansas’s ability to bid on the contract. So Kansas initiated arbitration proceedings under the RSA’s dispute resolution provisions. And upon learning that the Army intended to contract with the other vendor despite the commencement of arbitration proceedings, Kansas sued in federal court, seeking to preliminarily enjoin the Army from executing the JWOD contract pending arbitration. The root of the dispute was the intersection of two federal statutes that both address the procurement of food services at federal facilities: (1) the Randolph-Sheppard Vending Facility Act of 1936 (RSA), and (2) the Javits Wagner O’Day Act (JWOD). The parties disagreed as to which of these statutes governed the award of the Fort Riley food services contract. And due to events that have occurred since this action was filed, the parties also disputed whether this appeal was rendered moot. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the issue raised by this appeal fell within an exception to the mootness doctrine for matters capable of repetition yet evading review. Because an arbitration panel has since issued its decision thereby dissolving the injunction at issue in this appeal, the Court declined to address whether the district court correctly granted the injunction. View "Kansas Department for Children v. SourceAmerica" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Vitatech International, Inc. (Vitatech) filed a breach of contract lawsuit against defendants National Marketing, Inc., CortiSlim International, formerly known as National Marketing, Inc., CortiSlim International, LLC, and Alan Sporn (collectively, Defendants). On the eve of trial, the parties settled for a one-time payment of $75,000. As part of the settlement, Defendants stipulated to entry of judgment against them “in the full prayer of the Complaint,” but Vitatech agreed to “forbear” from filing the stipulation and to accept the $75,000 “as full Settlement of its claims against Defendants” if they paid by the designated date. When Defendants failed to pay, Vitatech filed the stipulation and the trial court entered judgment against Defendants for more than $300,000, which included compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. Sporn and appellant CortiSlim International, Inc. (collectively, Appellants) moved to vacate the judgment, arguing it was an unenforceable penalty and liquidated damages provision under Civil Code section 1671(b). The trial court denied the motion because it found the judgment’s higher amount was not a penalty or liquidated damages provision subject to section 1671(b). Rather, the court concluded the reduced amount Vitatech agreed to accept was merely a discount if Defendants paid their debt as agreed. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for the trial court to grant the motion and enter a new judgment for the $75,000 settlement amount, plus trial court costs. Under well-established precedent, including this court’s decision in Greentree Financial Group, Inc. v. Execute Sports, Inc., 163 Cal.App.4th 495 (2008), the stipulated judgment for more than four times the amount Vitatech agreed to accept as full settlement of its claims was an unenforceable penalty because it bore no reasonable relationship to the range of damages the parties could have anticipated would result from Defendants’ failure timely to pay the settlement amount. “Although Defendants stipulated to entry of judgment if they did not timely pay, they never admitted liability on the underlying claims or the amount of damages allegedly caused by the breach of the underlying contract.” View "Viatech International, Inc. v. Sporn" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are homeowners in centrally-planned neighborhoods in Thompson’s Station, Tennessee. The developers established and controlled owners’ associations for the neighborhoods but have transferred that control to third-party entities not controlled by either the developers or homeowners. While under the developers’ control, the associations each entered into agreements granting Crystal the right to provide telecommunications services to the neighborhoods for 25 years, with an option for Crystal to unilaterally renew for an additional 25 years. The Agreements make Crystal the exclusive agent for homeowners in procuring services from outside providers. Homeowners must pay the associations a monthly assessment fee, which the associations use to pay Crystal, regardless of whether the homeowner uses Crystal's service, and must pay Crystal $1,500 for the cost of constructing telecommunications infrastructure. Crystal uses service easements within the neighborhoods. Crystal had no prior experience in telecommunications-services and contracts with another provider, DirecTV, and charges homeowners a premium above the rate negotiated with DirecTV. Crystal does not provide services outside of the neighborhoods. The plaintiffs claimed that the Agreements constituted self-dealing, unjust enrichment, unconscionability, unlawful tying, and unlawful exclusivity. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, in part, finding plaintiffs’ allegations plausible on their face with respect to the tying claim, but affirmed dismissal of the exclusivity claim. View "Cates v. Crystal Clear Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (Santa Cruz) entered into a business arrangement with International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) to develop a new operating system that would run on a more advanced processor manufactured by Intel Corporation (Intel). The parties signed an agreement memorializing this relationship, calling it “Project Monterey.” Another technology company, The SCO Group, Inc. (SCO), then acquired Santa Cruz’s intellectual property assets and filed this lawsuit for IBM’s alleged misconduct during and immediately after Project Monterey. SCO accused IBM of stealing and improperly using source code developed as part of the Project to strengthen its own operating system, thereby committing the tort of unfair competition by means of misappropriation. The district court awarded summary judgment to IBM on this claim based on the independent tort doctrine, which barred a separate tort action where there was no violation of a duty independent of a party’s contractual obligations. SCO also accused IBM of disclosing Santa Cruz’s proprietary materials to the computer programming community for inclusion in its Linux open-source operating system. In a separate order, finding insufficient evidence of actionable interference by IBM, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of IBM on these tortious interference claims. Finally, after the deadline for amended pleadings in this case, SCO sought leave to add a new claim for copyright infringement based on the allegedly stolen source code from Project Monterey. SCO claimed it had only discovered the essential facts to support this claim in IBM’s most recent discovery disclosures. The district court rejected SCO’s proposed amendment for failure to show good cause. SCO appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order awarding IBM summary judgment on the misappropriation claim, and affirmed as to all other issues. View "SCO Group v. IBM" on Justia Law

Plaintiff RES-GA McDonough LLC (“RES-GA”) brought a legal malpractice action against Taylor English Duma LLP and two of its attorneys (collectively, “Taylor English”). RES-GA contended that Taylor English failed to timely assert a Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act claim, thus damaging RES-GA’s ability to satisfy its judgment against a debtor. Taylor English moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that RES-GA had failed to allege a viable underlying cause of action to support its malpractice claim. The trial court agreed and granted Taylor English’s motion to dismiss. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma, LLP" on Justia Law

In this ancillary statutory proceeding in aid of collection on a judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court awarding summary judgment in favor of Respondents. Respondents were previously awarded a judgment against Employer in a class action alleging violations of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act. Respondents later caused a suggestion a personal property to be served upon Petitioner in which they sought amounts, obligations, and things of value owed to Employer. Respondents then sought to make Petitioner liable for Respondents’ judgment. The circuit court granted, in part, the motion to make Petitioner liable for Respondents’ judgment and then directed Petitioner to pay Respondents the amount of their judgment against Employer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper where Petitioner’s contractual obligations to Employer were subject to Respondents’ suggestion and where West Virginia law provides for suggestion upon unmatured debts. View "IPacesetters, LLC v. Douglas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants in this case brought by an independent contractor who sued for damages when he purchased a used tractor from a John Deere implement dealer that proved to be a “lemon.” The contractor brought suit against several parties, including the implement dealer. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects but reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the contractor’s express warranty claim against the implement dealer. The Supreme Court vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the disclaimers contained in the purchase agreement negated any express warranties allegedly made by the implement dealer. View "Cannon v. Bodensteiner Implement Co." on Justia Law

Baxter sued her former employer, Genworth, for wrongful termination and related causes of action, based on discrimination and retaliation, arising out of her employment. Genworth moved to compel arbitration as part of Genworth’s Resolve Employee Issue Resolution Program, which consists four stages, The trial court concluded, and the court of appeal affirmed, that the arbitration agreement Baxter signed in 2006, as a condition of continued employment, is unconscionable, refusing to sever any provisions. Agreement as a condition of continued employment amounted to “modest procedural unconscionability.” The court concluded that several features of the agreement were substantively unconscionable: default discovery limitations, a prohibition against contacting witnesses, procedural deadlines that effectively shorten the statute of limitations and preclude a meaningful opportunity for a pre-litigation Fair Employment and Housing Act investigation, and accelerated hearing procedures that infringe upon an employee’s ability to adequately present his or her case. The severance of the offending provisions was not an option because the arbitration agreement is permeated by unconscionability. View "Baxter v. Genworth North America Corp." on Justia Law

This case arose out of competition in the market for software used to manage and analyze large and complex datasets. SAS filed suit against WPL, alleging that WPL breached a license agreement for SAS software and violated copyrights on that software. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment finding WPL liable for beach of the license agreement, holding that the contractual terms at issue were unambiguous and that SAS has shown that WPL violated those terms. The court vacated the portion of the district court's ruling on the copyright claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "SAS Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Ltd." on Justia Law