Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved a dispute between the parties over the Monster Jam Merchandise License Agreement. Traxxas argued that it clearly owed no additional royalties under the plain language of the contract, while FMS insisted that the plain language showed Traxxas owed royalties on the entire Stampede line of RC vehicles. The Fifth Circuit held that Traxxas sufficiently preserved its interlocutory legal issue by raising its argument in Rule 50 motions following a jury trial on the merits, and therefore the court had jurisdiction to consider Traxxas's appeal. The court also held that the invited error doctrine did not apply here; the district court properly determined that the Agreement was ambiguous and denied Traxxas's summary judgment and Rule 50 motions; and, under New York law, the district court appropriately left the interpretation of this ambiguous contract to the jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Feld Motor Sports, Inc. v. Traxxas, L.P." on Justia Law

In case no. 1130590, Kathryn L. Honea appealed the denial of her motion to vacate an arbitration award entered in favor of Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. ("Raymond James"), and Bernard Michaud, an employee of Raymond James (collectively, "RJFS"). In case no. 1130655, RJFS appealed the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; that appeal was dismissed. Honea opened several investment accounts with Raymond James. Honea and Raymond James executed a "client agreement" that included an arbitration provision. Honea filed a complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court asserting that she had opened four accounts with Raymond James and that Michaud had acted as her financial advisor as to those accounts. She alleged that RJFS engaged in "abusive brokerage practices" in that her investments were not diversified, "were far too risky," and "were of poor quality." The arbitration panel dismissed Honea's breach-of-fiduciary-duty, negligence, wantonness, fraud, and Alabama Securities Act claims and proceeded to hear the breach-of-contract claims. An arbitration panel entered an award in favor of RJFS. The arbitration panel found that "Michaud did not sufficiently know his client nor make sufficient inquiry to attempt to know his client, her holdings, and/or her investment experience. These failures contributed to losses in [Honea's] account." However, the arbitration panel "denied" Honea's breach-of-contract claims, stating that they were "barred by the applicable statutes of limitations." Although the Alabama Supreme Court found one contract appeared to govern this case and that RJFS breached its duties by failing to properly understand Honea's investment knowledge before March 2000, Honea contended that allegedly improper transactions--the excessive use of margin and overly aggressive, high-risk trading occurring after March 2000--represented independent breaches of the FINRA rules. Those claims accrued within the six-year limitations period before her complaint was filed. Further, any knowledge by Honea of her losses did not mean that the trading activity was proper. Thus, to the extent that any transactions after March 2000 would be considered separate breaches of contract unrelated to the failure to properly know Honea, her holdings, or her investment experience, or setting up an "unsuitable" account, the Court found Honea demonstrated probable merit--for purposes of a Rule 59(g) hearing--that those claims would not be barred by the statute of limitations. Honea demonstrated that, in relation to the certain breach-of-contract claims, she was entitled to a Rule 59(g) hearing on her motion to vacate the arbitration award. View "Honea v. Raymond James Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Hensel Phelps filed suit alleging breach of contract and indemnification claims against Marriott for, among other things, failing to meet the applicable standard of care and by failing to design the Project in accordance with applicable fire codes. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Cooper Carry, holding that the statute of limitations has run on Hensel Phelp's breach of contract claim, and the terms of the indemnification clause did not cover first party claims. View "Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. Cooper Carry Inc." on Justia Law

A final order adjudicating a judgment debtor proceeding is appealable under Nev. R. App. P. 3A(b)(1), and such an appeal is generally a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that precludes extraordinary writ relief.Petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the portion of the district court’s order that added her to a default judgment as a joint debtor. Petitioner failed to appeal the judgment. In challenging whether the challenged order was a final judgment from which she could have appealed, Petitioner argued that the order was interlocutory and that writ relief was appropriate because the order adding her to the default judgment was void on due process grounds. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) an order resolving a joint debtor proceeding is a final, appealable order, rendering extraordinary relief unavailable; and (2) extraordinary writ relief is not available when Petitioner View "Rawson v. Ninth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

This was a companion case to Green River Ranches, LLC v. Silva Land Company, LLC, Docket No. 43548. In an appeal arising out of Twin Falls County, Appellant Silva Dairy, LLC (“Silva Dairy”), challenged a district court’s holding that Silva Dairy’s claim against Respondent Jack McCall for herd management services was offset by amounts that Silva Dairy owed McCall for feed expenses and pasture rent. McCall owned a livestock business and used Silva Dairy’s herd management services. The district court found that McCall’s total claims against Silva Dairy were at least $492,464.77 and exceeded Silva Dairy’s claim by $287,487.12. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Silva Dairy’s claim with prejudice. Finding no reversible error in this, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "McCall v. Silva Dairy" on Justia Law

A final determination of liability but not damages in arbitration can satisfy the final requirement of Article V(1)(e) of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards when the parties have agreed to submit the issue of liability to the arbitrator for a distinct determination prior to a separate proceeding to assess damages.At issue in this appeal was the district court’s judicial recognition of an English arbitrator’s determination of joint contract liability against the seller and the renovator of a building. The parties agreed to bifurcate litigation of the liability and damages issues. Accordingly, the district court treated the liability judgment, which was decided before the damages issues, as final and thus entitled to judicial recognition. Specifically, the district court held the contractor for the renovation work bound as a party to the agreement providing for arbitration of disputes. The renovator and contractor appealed, claiming that the arbitrator’s judgment of liability in the bifurcated arbitration proceeding lacked the finality required for judicial confirmation of a foreign arbitral award under 9 U.S.C. 207. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator’s liability judgment was final in this instance and that the contractor could indeed be subjected to arbitration. View "University of Notre Dame (USA) in England v. TJAC Waterloo, LLC" on Justia Law

The district court did not err in finding that Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (PRA) had met its burden of proof and by admitting PRA’s exhibits into evidence. The district court entered judgment in a small claims proceeding finding Max Bickford liable on debt that PRA had purchased from a prior creditor. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by finding that PRA had met its burden of proof to establish its ownership of Bickford’s debt; and (2) the district court did not err by admitting PRA’s affidavits into evidence where the affidavits and other documents fell within the general grant of admissibility created in Maine Rules of Small Claims Procedure rule 6(b) and where none of that rule’s grounds for exclusion applied in this case. View "Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Bickford" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division affirming Surrogate’s Court’s grant of summary judgment to Petitioners, holding that Petitioners’ claim against the decedent’s estate seeking to enforce an oral promise was barred by the statute of frauds.Surrogate’s Court concluded that promissory estoppel should be applied to Petitioners’ claim to remedy a potential injustice. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the elements of promissory estoppel were met and that application of the statute of frauds would be unconscionable under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioners could not invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel because application of the statute of frauds would not inflict an unconscionable injury upon Petitioners. View "In re Hennel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of Standard Fire Insurance Co.’s case against Continental Resources Inc. pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-12(b)(5). Standard Fire brought suit seeking statutory reimbursement or, in the alternative, equitable subrogation of workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee. The circuit court found that the terms of a settlement agreement barred further litigation and that res judicata applied. The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred when it determined that the plain language of the settlement agreement barred Standard Fire’s claim. View "Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Continental Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ivey and Kornmann, a partnership, on the Partnership’s action brought against William Welk to collect on a debt, holding that the circuit court incorrectly resolved two preliminary questions of law that foreclosed the court’s analysis of numerous additional issues of law and fact that both parties raised on appeal.When the Partnership commenced this action, Welk raised numerous affirmative defenses and also filed counterclaims against the Partnership for breach of contract, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Partnership on its action and on Welk’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred in resolving the questions of law regarding the legal effect of the partnership agreement and the viability of Welk’s counterclaims and that numerous unaddressed issues must be addressed by the circuit court. View "Ivey & Kornmann v. Welk" on Justia Law