Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

When Charlotte Fischer moved into a nursing home, she received an admissions packet full of forms. Among them was an agreement that compelled arbitration of certain legal disputes. The Health Care Availability Act (“HCAA” or “Act”) required such agreements contain a four-paragraph notice in a certain font size and in bold-faced type. Charlotte’s agreement included the required language in a statutorily permissible font size, but it was not printed in bold. Charlotte’s daughter signed the agreement on Charlotte’s behalf. After Charlotte died, her family initiated a wrongful death action against the health care facility in court. Citing the agreement, the health care facility moved to compel arbitration out of court. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, determining the arbitration agreement was void because it did not strictly comply with the HCAA. At issue was whether the Act required strict or substantial compliance. The Colorado Supreme Court held "substantial:" the agreement at issue her substantially complied with the formatting requirements of the law, notwithstanding the lack of bold type. View "Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer" on Justia Law

An action is commenced under Utah law not by the filing of a motion for leave to amend but by the filing of a complaint.Many years after filing suit against other defendants a homeowners association sued the general contractor on a construction project. By the time the homeowners association finally filed an amended complaint naming the general contractor the statute of repose had run on six buildings in the project. The general contractor filed motion for summary judgment, asserting that the claims against it were time barred. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the amended complaint related back to the date the motion for leave to amend was filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the homeowners association’s claims were time barred because no viable complaint was filed within the repose period and the complaint did not relate back to a timely pleading. View "Gables v. Castlewood" on Justia Law

In January 2017, a jury found that an enforceable contract bound Mike Von Jones to pay Safaris Unlimited, LLC, (Safaris) $26,040 for a 2012 big game hunt Jones went on in Zimbabwe, Africa (2012 hunt). After the jury’s verdict, Safaris was awarded attorney fees plus interest on the judgment, bringing the judgment against Jones to $122,984.82. Safaris obtained a writ of execution in June 2017 and attended the sheriff sale as the only bidder. At the sale, Safaris purchased a pending lawsuit arising from Jones’s business venture by making a $2,500 credit bid. Jones was later successful in moving to vacate the sale. Jones appealed three issues from the jury trial: (1) the admission of a handwriting exemplar; (2) certain statements made by the district court concerning the handwriting exemplar; and (3) a jury instruction on agency law. Safaris cross appealed the district court’s decision to vacate the sheriff sale. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined: (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the handwriting exemplar; (2) the district court did not violate Jones’s procedural due process rights by instructing Jones to answer whether he signed a particular document after viewing the exemplar; and (3) the Court did not reach the merits of Jones’s argument that the district court erred by giving jury instruction 13 since Jones failed to object to the instruction below. Thus, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Safaris Unlimited v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirming the circuit court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and reinstated the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Plaintiff as to Defendant’s liability under Haw. Rev. Stat. 481B-14.Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant-hotel on behalf of himself and other customers who paid a service charge to the hotel in connection with the purchase of food or beverages, claiming that the hotel’s conduct was an unfair or deceptive act or practice (UDAP) under sections 481B-14 and 480-2. The circuit court granted summary judgment as to liability only, ruling that Defendant was liable under section 481B-14. After a jury trial on damages, the jury awarded $269,114.73 to the class. The circuit court subsequently granted Defendant’s motion for JMOL on the theory that there was insufficient evidence that Plaintiffs suffered injury as a result of Defendant’s violation of the statute. The ICA affirmed on remand. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Plaintiff and the class sustained contract-based damages and damages under the UDAP statute. View "Kawakami v. Kahala Hotel Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that trial courts must expressly rule on objections in writing for error to be preserved.Plaintiffs sued Allstate Texas Lloyds and one of its adjusters (collectively, Allstate) asserting contractual and extra-contractual claims. Allstate moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a summary-judgment response that referred to certain pieces of summary-judgment evidence, including an affidavit, but Plaintiffs failed to attach any evidence to their response. The only evidence Plaintiffs provided was filed late. Allstate objected in writing to Plaintiffs’ summary-judgment evidence on multiple grounds. The trial court granted summary judgment for Allstate but did not specify the grounds for its judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ only summary-judgment evidence was incompetent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) unless Allstate complained of a defect in the evidence’s substance, rather than its form, it was obligated not only to object but also to obtain a ruling on its objection; and (2) Allstate’s objections were waived in this case. View "Seim v. Allstate Texas Lloyds" on Justia Law

In this divorce case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the finding of the trial court that Wife’s attempt to rescind a premarital agreement triggered a clause in the agreement under which Wife lost a $5 million payment otherwise due to her.Prior to the parties’ marriage, they entered into an “Agreement in Contemplation of Marriage” under which Husband would make a lump-sum cash payment to Wife upon the entry of a divorce decree. The Agreement also contained a “no-contest” or “forfeiture” clause, under which Wife would lose her contractual right to the lump-sum payment. After Husband filed for divorce, Wife requested rescission of the Agreement. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Wife forfeited any cash payment under the Agreement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by unsuccessfully seeking rescission of the Agreement and pursuing that remedy throughout the litigation, Wife lost her contractual right to the lump-sum payment under the Agreement. View "In re Marriage of I.C." on Justia Law

This appeal involved questions about the insurance coverage available to defendant Honeywell International, Inc. (Honeywell) for thousands of bodily-injury claims premised on exposure to brake and clutch pads (friction products) containing asbestos. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to address two issues: (1) whether the law of New Jersey or Michigan (the headquarters location of Honeywell’s predecessor when the disputed excess insurance policies were issued) should control in the allocation of insurance liability among insurers for nationwide products-liability claims; and (2) whether it was error not to require the policyholder, Honeywell, to contribute in the allocation of insurance liability based on the time after which the relevant coverage became unavailable in the marketplace (that is, since 1987). The Supreme Court determined New Jersey law on the allocation of liability among insurers applied in this matter, and the Court set forth the pertinent choice-of-law principles to resolve this dispute over insurance coverage for numerous products-liability claims. Concerning the second question, on these facts, the Court also affirmed the determination to follow the unavailability exception to the continuous-trigger method of allocation set forth in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 437 (1994). View "Continental Insurance Company v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law

Phillip Moore, Gloria Moore, and Katelyn Moore sued Olshan Foundation Repair of Jackson, LLC (Olshan), and Wayne Brown. Olshan and Brown sought to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision within a contract between Phillip Moore and Olshan for the repair of the foundation of the Moores’ home. The circuit court ordered Phillip and Gloria Moore to arbitrate their claims. But because the circuit court declined to order Katelyn Moore to the arbitral forum, Olshan and Brown appealed. Finding that Katelyn Moore was neither a third-party beneficiary to the foundation-repair contract nor was she bound by direct-benefit estoppel, the Mississippi Supreme Court found Katelyn Moore’s claims, including negligence and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress, were wholly independent of the terms of the contract to which she was not a party. As such, Olshan was not allowed to enforce an arbitration clause respecting Katelyn Moore’s claims, which were unrelated to the contract. View "Olshan Foundation Repair Company of Jackson, LLC v. Moore" on Justia Law

Thomas Lunneborg claimed he was entitled to $60,000 severance because he was terminated without cause. Lunneborg was hired to be Chief Operating Officer (COO) of My Fun Life Corporation (MFL) on April 16, 2014. Lunneborg was terminated on July 29, 2014, ostensibly for cause. Lunneborg brought this action seeking his severance pay pursuant to the employment contract. After a bench trial, the district court found MFL did not have cause to terminate Lunneborg. Therefore, Lunneborg was awarded $60,000 in damages, which was trebled to $180,000 under the Idaho Wage Claims Act. Lunneborg was also awarded attorney fees. The court also pierced MFL’s corporate veil and found that Lunneborg’s judgment could be collected against MFL’s sole shareholder, Dan Edwards (Edwards), and against Edwards’ wife, Carrie Edwards (Carrie), personally. MFL, Edwards, and Carrie appealed, contending that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to uphold Edwards’ determination that Lunneborg was fired for cause; (2) piercing the corporate veil; and (3) abusing its discretion in the amount of attorney fees it awarded to Lunneborg. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lunneborg v. My Fun Life" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a contract executed by Becker Property Services LLC and Cintas Corporation No. 2 containing indemnification and choice-of-law provisions entitled Cintas to indemnification for damages caused by its own negligence.The parties agreed that Ohio’s law controlled the interpretation of their contract but disagreed over whether that provision should be enforced. The circuit court concluded that the contract did not require Becker to defend or indemnify Cintas for its own negligence under Wisconsin law, adding that, if Ohio law had applied instead, the indemnification provision would have been sufficient to require Becker to indemnify Cintas for its own negligence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, even under Wisconsin law, the contract required Becker to defend and indemnify Cintas for its own negligence. The Supreme Court held (1) no public policy required the Court to preempt the parties’ agreement that Ohio law would control the contract; and (2) the contract’s indemnification agreement unambiguously required Becker to defend and indemnify Cintas even for its own negligence. View "Cintas Corp. No. 2 v. Becker Property Services LLC" on Justia Law