Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Kinder filed suit against Manning, alleging that Manning breached a contract to build a pumping station. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Manning, holding that Kinder committed the first material breach of contract by threatening to assess delay-related damages without any justification, interfering with the relationship between Manning and EarthTec, and failing to provide adequate assurances that Manning would be paid for its work. The court also held that the district court correctly found that Kinder wrongfully terminated the contract and that evidence at trial supported the damage award. View "Randy Kinder Excavating, Inc. v. JA Manning Construction Co." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the parties' dispute over Lone Star's proposed adjustments to a Revenue Calculation that provided payment to Sunbelt. The arbitrator agreed with Lone Star's upward judgment to the revenue attributable to its former customers, but reformed the contract after concluding that the parties had made a mutual mistake when their agreement listed the revenue target for the former Lone Star clients.The court affirmed and remanded for reconsideration of the mutual mistake claim. The court held that, because the parties did not agree in either the asset purchase agreement or the engagement letter to have the arbitrator decide reformation, the court must decide the issue. View "Hebbronville Lone Star Rentals, LLC v. Sunbelt Rentals Industrial Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Auburn bought Chrysler parts for resale to Cypros, which then sold those parts to customers in the Middle East. The FBI raided Cypros’ warehouse and charged its president, Kilani, with trafficking in counterfeit goods. Unbeknownst to Auburn, Kilani had been obtaining counterfeit parts, mixing them with the legitimate Chrysler parts received from Auburn, and selling the commingled parts to customers. When Chrysler learned of the scheme, it terminated its relationship with Auburn. Auburn brought tortious interference claims and a breach of contract claim against Cypros that the district court dismissed, stating that Cypros did not specifically intend to interfere with Auburn’s relationship with Chrysler and that Cypros and Auburn did not have a written contract. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Michigan tortious interference law requires the specific intent to interfere with a business relationship and that the Michigan statute of frauds applied. View "Auburn Sales, Inc. v. Cypros Trading & Shipping, Inc." on Justia Law

Lacagnina worked for Comprehend as vice president of business development, 2012-2013, when he was “abruptly” terminated. Lacgnina claims that he was fraudulently induced to enter into an employment agreement with Comprehend by false representations made to him by its founders, Morrison and Gardner. A jury awarded Lacagnina a total of $556,446 in damages, including $226,446 in damages for fraud and $75,000 for emotional distress. The court granted the defendants judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the fraud claim on the ground that Lacagnina was not damaged by the alleged fraud, and entered an amended judgment of $255,000. The court of appeal reversed in part. An employer who induces an employee to enter into an employment contract by intentionally promising compensation terms the employer never intended to honor may not avoid tort liability for fraudulent inducement of contract based on the contract’s inclusion of an “at-will’ provision that allows the employer to fire the employee at any time for any reason. The court rejected Lacagnina’s contention that an employee who recovers a judgment against an employee for lost compensation has suffered a “theft” of “labor” for which he is entitled to recover treble damages and attorneys’ fees under Penal Code Section 496(c). View "Lacagnina v. Comprehend Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s complaint claiming fraud, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, and civil conspiracy, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.Plaintiff, Action Snowmobile & RV, Inc. (Action), filed this complaint against Defendants, Most Wanted Performance, LLC and one of its owners (collectively, Most Wanted) regarding the circumstances under which Most Wanted purchased Action. The district court concluded that Action had failed to provide any evidence that would support the claims in the complaint and, therefore, granted summary judgment for Most Wanted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Most Wanted because Most Wanted presented a prima facie showing that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding any of the claims in Action’s complaint and Action failed to produce competent and admissible evidence demonstrating that any material facts were in dispute. View "Action Snowmobile & RV, Inc. v. Most Wanted Performance, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the declaration of the district court that the fair market value of Fred Assam’s ownership interest in the law firm of Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP (FPM) was $590,000.After Assam voluntarily withdrew from the firm, FPM filed this suit seeking a declaration of the parties’ rights under a governing partnership agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order declaring Assam’s interest in FPM to be $590,000 and that FPM should pay Assam that amount according to the terms of the agreement, holding that the district court did not err by (1) finding there was no conflict between District of Columbia and Nebraska substantive law governing the determination of Assam’s equity interest; (2) finding FPM did not breach the partnership agreement; (3) adopting the opinion of FPM’s expert in determining Assam’s equity interest; and (4) failing to award Assam a money judgment and attorney fees. View "Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP v. Assam" on Justia Law

A general construction contractor, S&P, filed suit against its secondary insurance provider, US Fire, after US Fire refused to cover damages S&P incurred when a courthouse construction project went awry. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to US Fire, holding that US Fire's policy allowed it to count the arbitration agreements as "Other Insurance." The court explained that an indemnity agreement fell under the plain language of the "Other Insurance" provision of US Fire's policy because it was a mechanism by which an insured arranged for funding of legal liabilities for which US Fire's policy also provided coverage. Under the reasoning of RSR Corp. v. International Insurance Co., 612 F.3d 851 (5th Cir. 2010), settlement proceeds resulting from an indemnity agreement also counted as "Other Insurance." The court also held that S&P failed to meet its burden to show allocation of the settlement proceeds between covered and noncovered damages. View "Satterfield and Pontikes Construction v. US Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs to Defendant on its counterclaim after the court determined Defendant to be the “prevailing party” following bifurcated trials, in which the parties settled as to damages on Plaintiff’s claims in an amount that exceeded Defendant’s damages judgment on its counterclaim.Specifically, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to aggregate the settlement recovery and damages award in this case because (1) there is no Nevada statute or court rule that requires the trial court to offset a damages judgment on one party’s counterclaim by the amount recovered by another party in settling its claim to determine which side is the prevailing party; and (2) the most reasonable interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(a) and 18.020(3) precludes the use of settlement recovery for this purpose. View "Northern Nevada Homes, LLC v. GL Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

In this dispute over a noncompete agreement (NCA) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous holdings that an NCA must be limited to the geographical areas in which an employer has particular business interests and emphasized that this precedent remains applicable in instances where the NCA imposes a nationwide restriction on the former employee. The Court further clarified that an employer seeking a preliminary injunction enforcing an NCA bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of the NCA’s reasonableness.In this dispute over an NCA, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of the motion for a preliminary injunction filed by Respondent, an employer, seeking to enforce the terms of a noncompete agreement (NCA) against Appellant, a former employee, holding that Respondent failed to make a prima facie showing that the NCA was reasonable by showing its restrictions did not extend beyond date geographical areas in which Respondent conducted business. View "Shores v. Global Experience Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s summary judgment motion in this case alleging that Liberty breached Plaintiff’s contractual rights by wrongfully denying his request for coverage under an insurance policy, holding that the district court’s reasoning in granting Liberty’s motion for summary judgment was flawed.Plaintiff argued in his complaint that Liberty improperly denied his coverage request under the Directors and Officers insurance policy that Liberty had issued to a Puerto Rico hospital where Plaintiff served as the medical director. The district court concluded that, under the policy, the “Claim” that would give rise to the “Loss” for which Plaintiff sought coverage should be “deemed first made” before the policy took effect and, therefore, was not covered by the policy. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s order granting Liberty’s summary judgment motion, holding that the “Claim” for which Plaintiff sought coverage from Liberty was not “first made” prior to the beginning of the policy at issue, and the district court wrongly construed the policy in concluding otherwise. View "Jimenez-Castaner v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law