Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the probate court's dismissal of a golf course partnership's claim based upon an unfulfilled pledge agreement in a decedent's probate proceeding, holding that the partnership failed to state a claim based on contract but did state a claim based upon promissory estoppel.The decedent entered into a written pledge agreement with the golf course partnership under which the decedent would make a gift of $20 million so that the partnership could make improvements to the golf course it operated. The decedent died the next year, and the partnership filed a statement of claim against the estate for the $20 million pledge agreement. The estate denied the claim. The partnership then filed a petition for allowance of claim, claiming that the pledge agreement was an enforceable, binding obligation against the estate and, alternatively, that the petition should be granted under a promissory estoppel theory. The probate court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because the partnership was not a charitable, educational, or like institution, its attempt to enforce the pledge agreement as a contract failed; but (2) the partnership stated a claim under a promissory estoppel theory. View "In re Estate of Ryan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC's (Prospect) motions to confirm arbitration awards and for summary judgment in this interpleader action, holding that when Prospect moved to confirm the arbitration awards under section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 through 16, the district court was required by the FAA to do so.After selling an interest in her personal injury claim to Prospect, Edrie Wheat settled her claim. When a dispute arose over the amount due Prospect, Prospect initiated arbitration proceedings against Wheat and Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., LLC (Palagi), the law firm representing Wheat. Awards were eventually entered against Wheat and Palagi in favor of Prospect. Wheat and Palagi then brought this interpleader action but did not seek to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration awards. The district court granted Prospect's motion to confirm the arbitration awards and also granted Prospect's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) summary judgment was not premature; and (2) the district court did not err in failing to find the agreement was invalid and unenforceable. View "Ronald J. Palagi, P.C. v. Prospect Funding Holdings" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment holding that defendant was liable for amounts owed in a consent judgment stemming from loan defaults. Defendant had signed a general guaranty for a company that he thought he owned in part with his trusted friend and financial advisor. His friend purportedly failed to mention that the guaranty would make defendant liable for millions of dollars of debt from loans that his friend had obtained and was unable to pay.The court held that the FDIC's creation of CADC and its sale of Premier Bank's assets thereto fell within its broad power; there was no clear error in finding that defendant's agent delivered the guaranty with his implied actual authority because defendant signed the guaranty, understood its contents, and gave express authority to conduct business; and there was no error in finding that the bank did not fail in its duty to ensure that the agent acted with implied actual authority and in rejecting defendant's fraud in the factum defense. View "Radiance Capital Receivables Eighteen, LLC v. Concannon" on Justia Law

Ryze’s headquarters and principal place of business was in Noblesville, Indiana. In 2014, Ryze hired Nedd, a California resident, to work for Ryze in El Cerrito. In 2017, Ryze terminated Nedd’s employment. Nedd filed a wrongful termination suit in Contra Costa County, under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The Employment Agreement between Ryze and Nedd contained a forum selection clause, stating that “any claim of any type brought by Employee against [Ryze] … must be maintained only in a court sitting in" Indiana. The court declined to stay or dismiss the case, stating that forum selection clauses will not be enforced when contrary to California public policy and that enforcing the forum selection clause would be contrary to Labor Code section 925 and Government Code section 12965 (governing venue in FEHA cases). The court of appeal directed the trial court to vacate its order. Labor Code section 925 establishes a policy prohibiting employers from requiring California employees from agreeing to litigate in a different forum as a prerequisite to employment, but by its plain language states that it applies to agreements “entered into, modified, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.” The FEHA venue statute has no bearing on the forum selection clause. View "Ryze Claim Solutions LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss this suit brought by the insurer (Insurer) of a chicken products manufacturer seeking damages from the manufacturer's chicken supplier (Supplier) for claims under Maine law of breach of warranty and strict product liability, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the claims.Insurer sought to recoup the money it paid to the manufacturer for the losses the manufacturer incurred when its products were recalled following a salmonella outbreak. Insurer's complaint against Supplier alleged that the manufacturer received raw chicken from Supplier that was contaminated with salmonella and was therefore defective under Maine law. The district court dismissed all claims, concluding that the allegations in the complaint did not plausibly allege that the raw chicken sent by Supplier to the manufacturer was defective and that the strict liability claim was independently barred by the economic loss doctrine. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) as to the breach of warranty claims, Insurer failed to plausibly allege that the raw chicken at issue was contaminated with a type of salmonella that would persist despite proper cooking; and (2) Insurer's strict liability claim was properly dismissed because the complaint failed to allege facts that could suffice to show that the chicken was defective. View "Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Mountaire Farms Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This appeal arose from a multitude of lawsuits filed by Connecticut homeowners whose basements walls were likely constructed with defective concrete manufactured by the now‐defunct J.J. Mottes Company.The court held that the "collapse" provision in the Allstate homeowner's insurance policy in this case did not afford coverage for basement walls that exhibit signs of deterioration but that have not collapsed suddenly, accidentally, and entirely, as required by the policy. Therefore, the horizontal and vertical cracking in plaintiffs' basement walls did not constitute a covered "collapse" under the policy and Allstate did not breach its contract by denying coverage for plaintiffs' claim. View "Valls v. Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this employment case arising out of the sale of a cattle feedlot the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing summary judgment on Plaintiff's implied-in-fact employment contract claim and Plaintiff's claim for promissory estoppel, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed preventing summary judgment.Plaintiff moved his employment from the old owner of the feedlot to the new owner, Defendant. Because of operational changes, Defendant later terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff then sued Defendant alleging breach of an employment contract, or in the alternative, detrimental reliance and estoppel. The district court concluded that Plaintiff was Defendant's employee at will, and therefore, Defendant could terminate Plaintiff's employment at any time without cause. The court of appeals reversed, holding that whether Plaintiff's employment was at will - or protected by an implied-in-fact contract - was a disputed question of fact. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) whether a meeting of minds existed between the parties on an implied-in-fact employment contract presented a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment; and (2) therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted for Defendant on Plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. View "Peters v. Deseret Cattle Feeders, LLC" on Justia Law

In December 2007, Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) and TS & A Motors, LLC d/b/a Kia of Somersworth (Somersworth) entered into a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Dealer Agreement), which governed the franchise relationship between the parties. Under this agreement, Somersworth was required to employ certain parts and service personnel. In 2011 and Kia sent a series of letters notifying Somersworth of perceived staffing and training deficiencies. These letters referenced Somersworth’s failure to meet technician training requirements in 2009 and 2010, to adequately staff and train personnel in its parts and service department, and to meet the minimum number of technicians required to participate in Kia’s “Optima Hybrid Program.” During Somersworth’s tenure as a dealer, Kia employees overseeing Somersworth made note of its high employee turnover rates. The Board determined that over the course of its operations as a dealer, Somersworth violated the provision of the Dealer Agreement that required certain parts and service personnel “on an almost constant basis.” Kia management worked with Somersworth to remedy its staffing deficiencies. It sent numerous written notifications to Somersworth referencing the inadequacy of its parts and service staffing, met with Somersworth to discuss its concerns over staffing, and gave Somersworth the “benefit of the doubt” when the dealer promised to hire the appropriate number of staff members. Somerset appealed a superior court decision to affirm a New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board ruling that Kia properly terminated its franchise agreement with Somersworth. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision. View "TS & A Motors, LLC v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a contract dispute between two oil-drilling businesses, Eni and Transocean. The district court granted judgment in favor of Transocean and rejected Eni's claims surrounding Transocean's maintenance of its equipment, found that Eni had wrongfully repudiated the contract, and awarded damages to Transocean.The Fifth Circuit vacated the damages award and held that the district court erred by simply applying the Standby Rate because Eni never issued any instructions after repudiation. In this case, the district court should have attempted to determine, in the hypothetical nonbreach world, how many days the Deepwater Pathfinder would have spent at each applicable rate. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to recalculate the damages using the correct methodology. The court found Eni's remaining arguments lacking in merit and affirmed as to those claims. View "ENI US Operating Company, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc." on Justia Law

Yuri Vanetik and his father, Anatoly (Tony), were involved with a number of interrelated companies in the business of oil exploration in Russia. Yuri approached his friend, Elliot Broidy, about investing in one of those companies, Terra Resources (Terra). Broidy agreed to invest $750,000, with the written agreement his investment would go only to efforts to start production on the oil wells. Farmers & Merchants Trust Company (F&M Trust) was the trustee and administrator of the simplified employee pension plan (SEP) for Broidy’s individual retirement account (IRA). F&M Trust acquired stock in Terra. Broidy later learned that his investment had not been used in connection with the oil wells - it had been used to pay off Yuri’s and Tony’s preexisting debts. Broidy and Tony orally agreed that Tony would pay back the $750,000, but Tony failed to do so. F&M Trust then sued Yuri and Tony for breach of written and oral contracts, and for fraud. F&M Trust also sued Richard Weed (the attorney for Yuri, Tony, and the oil exploration companies) for fraud. The jury found in favor of F&M Trust on all causes of action, and awarded compensatory and punitive damages against Yuri, Tony, and the Weed defendants. Judgment was entered against Yuri and Tony; the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) in favor of the Weed defendants. On appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict against Yuri and Tony on the claims for breach of written contract, breach of oral contract, and fraud. The jury’s special verdict findings on the contract and fraud claims neither resulted in inconsistent verdicts, nor required F&M Trust to make an election of remedies. However, F&M Trust failed to offer substantial evidence supporting the punitive damages awards against Tony and Yuri, so the Court reversed those punitive damage awards. The trial court properly granted JNOV in favor of the Weed defendants on the fraud causes of action. View "Farmers & Merchants Trust Co. v. Vanetik" on Justia Law