Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Lamar maintained and operated a billboard on land that it leased from R.E.D. After R.E.D. and Landmark executed an agreement under which Landmark agreed to pay R.E.D. in exchange for, among other things, the right to receive rent from Lamar, Landmark sued R.E.D. for breach of contract and sued R.E.D. and Defendant Van Stavern for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the district court did not err by excluding the testimony of defendants' expert witness where the expert's opinions were not relevant because they were not supported by facts in the record. Furthermore, the district court did not err by denying defendants' request for reconsideration, because the discovery deadlines had passed and defendants failed to offer a substantial justification for their delay. Finally, the court held that the damages award were not duplicative and affirmed the attorneys' fee award. View "Landmark Infrastructure Holding Co. v. R.E.D. Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

MEBA filed suit against Liberty, alleging that its contract with Liberty required the parties to submit the underlying dispute to arbitration. The district court ruled in favor of MEBA and granted judgment on the pleadings, compelling arbitration.The DC Circuit affirmed and held that the district court had jurisdiction over MEBA's claim under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), which provides federal jurisdiction over suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. In this case, MEBA's claims regarding the arbitrability of the dispute clearly fell within the district court's statutory jurisdiction. The court rejected Liberty's argument under the Garmon preemption doctrine, and held that federal courts retain jurisdiction over hybrid claims raising both contractual and representational issues. Finally, although jurisdiction was proper here, the court reversed and remanded because material facts remained in dispute regarding the existence of an applicable arbitration clause. View "District No. 1 v. Liberty Maritime Corp." on Justia Law

A class of condo owners and Q Club, the entity that operates the condominium-hotel, dispute the meaning of the "Declaration" that governs the parties' relationship. The owners alleged that Q Club's new methodology used to calculate the shared costs breached the Declaration as applied both retroactively and prospectively.The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly concluded that the Declaration does not permit back-charging; the district court did not reversibly err in submitting the shared costs issue to the jury or in the way that it instructed the jury; and plaintiff has not met his burden for requesting a new trial because the new evidence would not likely produce a different result. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Dear v. Q Club Hotel, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-borrowers Thaddeus Potocki and Kelly Davenport sued Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and several other defendants (collectively, “Wells Fargo”) arising out of plaintiffs’ attempts to get a loan modification. The trial court sustained Wells Fargo’s demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend. On appeal, plaintiffs argued: (1) a forbearance agreement obligated Wells Fargo to modify their loan; (2) the trial court erred in finding Wells Fargo owed no duty of care; (3) Wells Fargo’s denial of a loan modification was not sufficiently detailed to satisfy Civil Code section 2923.61; and (4) a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was sufficiently pled. The Court of Appeal determined plaintiffs’ third contention had merit, and reversed judgment of dismissal, vacated the order sustaining the demurrer insofar as it dismissed the claim for a violation of section 2923.6, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Potocki v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established a system that includes the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and 12 regional Reserve Banks. The Board exercises broad regulatory supervision over the Reserve Banks, which serve as banks to the U.S. government and to commercial banks who are members of the Federal Reserve System. The Act set the statutory rate for dividend payments on Federal Reserve Bank stock at six percent per year, which remained in effect until 2016, when an amendment (12 U.S.C. 289(a)(1)) effectively reduced the dividend rate for certain stockholder banks to a lower variable rate. Plaintiffs argued that banks that subscribed to Reserve Bank stock before the amendment are entitled to dividends at the six percent rate and that, by paying dividends at the amended rate, the government breached a contractual duty or effected a Fifth Amendment taking. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. There is no “clear indication” of the government’s intent to contract in either the language of the Federal Reserve Act or the circumstances of its passage. Plaintiffs did not allege a legally cognizable property interest arising from its “statutory rights” and the requirement that member banks subscribe to reserve bank stock under the Act does not constitute a regulatory taking. View "American Bankers Association v. United States" on Justia Law

After defendant Randal Tyson’s first failed attempt at removing the case to federal court, his codefendant, Dulany Hill, filed a second notice of removal. Hill’s notice of removal was identical to the one Tyson had filed, merely substituting Hill’s name in the place of Tyson's. During this second removal period, the court denied defendant’s untimely motion to strike, which was fully briefed before the second notice of removal was filed. Less than a month later, the federal court again remanded the case. Thereafter, defendant failed to respond to the complaint or to appear for a case management conference. The court entered defendant’s default. Defendant took no further action in the case until eight months after the remand, when he moved to set aside the default. The court denied the motion and entered a default judgment against defendant. Defendant appealed the default judgment, contending the court did not have jurisdiction to rule on his motion to strike while the case was removed to federal court. He claimed the court’s ruling on the motion to strike, while it purportedly lacked jurisdiction, commenced an inappropriate responsive pleading timeline and resulted in a default judgment that the Court of Appeal should set aside. The Court of Appeal concluded the second notice of removal was untimely, frivolous, and duplicative. Under these unique circumstances, the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule on the motion to strike. View "ClipperJet Inc. v. Tyson" on Justia Law

In November 2008, the Anderson County, South Carolina Council (2008 Council) approved a $1.1 million Severance Agreement for county administrator Joey Preston (Preston). In January 2009, a new county council (2009 Council) was sworn in, and filed suit seeking to invalidate the Severance Agreement. The circuit court ruled that, despite tainted votes, the Severance Agreement was valid and also held: (1) public policy rendered neither the Severance Agreement nor the vote adopting it void; (2) Preston did not breach a fiduciary duty because he owed no duty to disclose Council members' personal conflicts of interest; (3) the County failed to prove its claims for fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation; (4) the 2008 Council's approval of the Severance Agreement was neither unreasonable or capricious nor a product of fraud and abuse of power; (5) the County's constructive trust claim no longer remained viable; (6) rescission was unavailable as a remedy; (7) the County had unclean hands; (8) adequate remedies at law barred the County from invoking the court's equitable jurisdiction; (9) the County breached the covenant not to sue in the Severance Agreement by bringing this lawsuit; and (10) the issue concerning the award of attorney's fees should be held in abeyance pending the final disposition and filing of a petition. Pertinent here, a panel of the Court of Appeals found the trial court erred in refusing to invalidate the 2008 Council's approval of the Severance Agreement based upon the absence of a quorum, and reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined this judgment was made in error: the County lacked a quorum. The matter was remanded to the circuit court to determine the exact amount Preston had to refund the County. View "Anderson County v. Preston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Barbara Needham in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of Charles Kelly Kluver (Estate) and denying the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by Karson Kluver and Genie Land Company (collectively, Kluver), holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.The Estate filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and for dissolution of Genie against Kluver, alleging declaratory judgment, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and judicial dissolution of corporation. The Estate filed a petition for partial summary judgment. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Estate in Counts I and II and denied Kluver's cross-motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Estate. View "Needham v. Kluver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting the motion of the Sandra L. Farber Trust (Farber) to enforce the parties' punitive settlement agreement and denying Karen Jarussi's cross-motion for enforcement, holding that the district court erred by concluding that the parties formed a legally binding settlement agreement.This dispute arose from the parties' disagreement on how their punitive settlement agreement should be interpreted. The parties filed opposing motions for enforcement, and the district court determined that the parties must comply with the agreement as interpreted by Farber. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this matter for further proceedings, holding that the parties did not mutually assent to the scope of their proposed agreement. View "Jarussi v. Farber" on Justia Law

Antero Resources Company and South Jersey Gas Company entered into an eight-year contract for Antero to deliver natural gas from the Marcellus Shale formation to gas meters located on the Columbia Pipeline in West Virginia. The parties tied gas pricing to the Columbia Appalachia Index.During performance of the contract, the price of natural gas linked to the Index increased. South Jersey contested the higher prices, arguing that modifications to the Index materially changed the pricing methodology, and that the Index should be replaced with one that reflected the original agreement. Antero disagreed. South Jersey then sued Antero in New Jersey state court for failing to negotiate a replacement index, and began paying a lower price based on a different index. Antero then sued South Jersey in federal district court in Colorado, where its principal place of business was located, for breach of contract for its failure to pay the Index price. The lawsuits were consolidated in Colorado and the case proceeded to trial. The jury rejected South Jersey’s claims, finding South Jersey breached the contract and Antero was entitled to $60 million damages. South Jersey argued on appeal the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or, alternatively, that the court erred in instructing the jury. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding a reasonable jury could find South Jersey breached its contract with Antero because the Index was not discontinued nor did it materially change. Furthermore, the Court found no defects in the jury instructions. View "Antero Resources Corp. v. South Jersey Resources Group" on Justia Law