Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from fourteen lawsuits brought by various plaintiffs against (1) Laura Willis, an insurance agent; (2) Jesse Dantice, the insurance broker who hired Willis and made her the agent in charge of the insurance office; (3) their insurance agency, Southern Risk Insurance Services, LLC (Southern Risk), and (4) six insurance companies for which their office sold policies (the Insurers). The plaintiffs in the lawsuits were Willis's customers (the Insureds) and other insurance agents (the Agents) in competition with Willis and Southern Risk. The Insureds filed twelve of the lawsuits, asserting claims against Willis, Dantice, and Southern Risk for, inter alia, violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), common law unfair trade practices, fraud, and conversion. They also named the Insurers as defendants on a respondeat superior theory of liability for failing to adequately supervise or audit Willis and Southern Risk. The question before the South Carolina Supreme Court was whether arbitration should have been enforced against nonsignatories to a contract containing an arbitration clause. The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding equitable estoppel was applicable to enforce arbitration against the nonsignatories. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the circuit court properly denied the motion to compel arbitration. View "Wilson v. Willis" on Justia Law

In this case concerning a boundary realignment agreement entered into between the parties in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting specific performance of a contract to Plaintiff, holding that the district court correctly determined that the cause of action was timely prosecuted by Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of a contract.The district court ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance and dismissed Defendants' trespass claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by concluding that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim was not barred by the relevant statute of limitation; (2) did not err by determining that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the contract; and (3) properly dismissed Defendants' trespass claim. View "Miller v. Kleppen" on Justia Law

After a jury found that Westcoast was liable for breaching a contract it entered with RCS, Westcoast raised claims of error regarding the finding of a bad-faith breach, the language of the verdict form, and the award of attorney fees. In this case, the jury had awarded RCS $304,189 on the bad faith breach of contract claim, $66,450 under the state Prompt Payment Act, $130,517.60 in attorney fees, and $400 in costs.The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the penalty amount determined under the Louisiana Prompt Payment Act, holding that the jury awarded damages exceeding those permitted under the clear language of the Act. The court also vacated and remanded the award of attorney fees for reconsideration of the amount after the statutory penalty was reconsidered. View "Alonso v. Westcoast Corp." on Justia Law

David Calvert was disbarred for various ethical violations, including entering into an oral agreement with a client without complying with the requisite safeguards of Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a). After being disbarred, Calvert sued his former client, Diane Mayberry, for breach of that same oral agreement, claiming that there was a contract between them. The trial court granted Mayberry’s motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, Calvert challenged: (1) whether an attorney who was found to have violated Rule 1.8(a) in a disciplinary proceeding was estopped from relitigating the same factual issues in a civil proceeding; (2) whether a contract between an attorney and a client entered into in violation of Rule 1.8(a) was enforceable; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees against Calvert after finding his lawsuit groundless and frivolous. The Colorado Supreme Court declined the issue preclusion issue raised because Calvert conceded he could not relitigate whether he entered into an agreement with a client without meeting Rule 1.8(a)’s requirements. The Court held that when an attorney enters into a contract without complying with Rule 1.8(a), the contract was presumptively void as against public policy; however, a lawyer may rebut that presumption by showing that, under the circumstances, the contract does not contravene the public policy underlying Rule 1.8(a). Further, the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees at the trial level because the record supported the finding that the case was groundless, frivolous, and brought in bad faith. But as to attorney’s fees at the appellate level, because the questions of whether issue preclusion applied in this proceeding and whether a contract made in violation of Rule 1.8(a) is void as against public policy were legitimately appealable issues, thereby making a grant of appellate attorney’s fees inappropriate. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals as to the merits on other grounds, affirmed the award of attorney’s fees at the trial level, and reversed the court of appeals’ order remanding for a determination of appellate attorney’s fees. View "Calvert v. Mayberry" on Justia Law

Alfa Insurance Corporation, Alfa Mutual General Insurance Corporation, Alfa Life Insurance Corporation, and Alfa Specialty Insurance Corporation (collectively, "Alfa") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus requiring the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its May 23, 2018, orders: (1) denying Alfa's motion for a protective order as to materials Alfa contended were protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) compelling Alfa to produce such materials for in camera inspection and for discovery. The underlying suit arose out of a policy dispute in which one side invoked an arbitration clause in the policy at issue. The insured claimed Alfa breached the policy by refusing to provide a defense and/or indemnity coverage. After review, the Supreme Court was satisfied Alfa established the trial court exceeded its discretion when it disregarded the attorney-client privilege and entered the May 2018 orders denying Alfa's motion for a protective order and compelling Alfa to produce the materials sought for in camera inspection or for discovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted Alfa's petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the May 2018 orders denying Alfa's motion for a protective order and compelling Alfa to produce the materials at issue. View "Ex parte Alfa Insurance Corporation et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals that the parol evidence rule barred evidence and enforcement of an agreement through which Plaintiff claims to have satisfied his debt to Defendant, holding that the parol evidence rule did not preclude enforcement of the agreement, and therefore, Plaintiff met his burden to establish a prima facie case for the falsity of Defendant's liens.Plaintiff brought this action claiming that after he fully satisfied his debt to Defendant, Defendant filed fraudulent liens and knowingly and intentionally slandered Plaintiff's title to mineral interests that secured that debt. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the claims, arguing that Plaintiff could not establish prima facie support for his slander-of-title and fraudulent-lien claims because the parol evidence rule applied and precluded Plaintiff from establishing any enforceable agreement that satisfied his debt. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the parol evidence rule did not preclude enforcement of the agreement through which Plaintiff claimed to have satisfied his debt to Defendant, and that Plaintiff thus met his burden to establish a prima facie case for the falsity of Defendant's liens. View "West v. Quintanilla" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the probate court's dismissal of a golf course partnership's claim based upon an unfulfilled pledge agreement in a decedent's probate proceeding, holding that the partnership failed to state a claim based on contract but did state a claim based upon promissory estoppel.The decedent entered into a written pledge agreement with the golf course partnership under which the decedent would make a gift of $20 million so that the partnership could make improvements to the golf course it operated. The decedent died the next year, and the partnership filed a statement of claim against the estate for the $20 million pledge agreement. The estate denied the claim. The partnership then filed a petition for allowance of claim, claiming that the pledge agreement was an enforceable, binding obligation against the estate and, alternatively, that the petition should be granted under a promissory estoppel theory. The probate court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because the partnership was not a charitable, educational, or like institution, its attempt to enforce the pledge agreement as a contract failed; but (2) the partnership stated a claim under a promissory estoppel theory. View "In re Estate of Ryan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC's (Prospect) motions to confirm arbitration awards and for summary judgment in this interpleader action, holding that when Prospect moved to confirm the arbitration awards under section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 through 16, the district court was required by the FAA to do so.After selling an interest in her personal injury claim to Prospect, Edrie Wheat settled her claim. When a dispute arose over the amount due Prospect, Prospect initiated arbitration proceedings against Wheat and Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., LLC (Palagi), the law firm representing Wheat. Awards were eventually entered against Wheat and Palagi in favor of Prospect. Wheat and Palagi then brought this interpleader action but did not seek to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration awards. The district court granted Prospect's motion to confirm the arbitration awards and also granted Prospect's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) summary judgment was not premature; and (2) the district court did not err in failing to find the agreement was invalid and unenforceable. View "Ronald J. Palagi, P.C. v. Prospect Funding Holdings" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment holding that defendant was liable for amounts owed in a consent judgment stemming from loan defaults. Defendant had signed a general guaranty for a company that he thought he owned in part with his trusted friend and financial advisor. His friend purportedly failed to mention that the guaranty would make defendant liable for millions of dollars of debt from loans that his friend had obtained and was unable to pay.The court held that the FDIC's creation of CADC and its sale of Premier Bank's assets thereto fell within its broad power; there was no clear error in finding that defendant's agent delivered the guaranty with his implied actual authority because defendant signed the guaranty, understood its contents, and gave express authority to conduct business; and there was no error in finding that the bank did not fail in its duty to ensure that the agent acted with implied actual authority and in rejecting defendant's fraud in the factum defense. View "Radiance Capital Receivables Eighteen, LLC v. Concannon" on Justia Law

Ryze’s headquarters and principal place of business was in Noblesville, Indiana. In 2014, Ryze hired Nedd, a California resident, to work for Ryze in El Cerrito. In 2017, Ryze terminated Nedd’s employment. Nedd filed a wrongful termination suit in Contra Costa County, under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The Employment Agreement between Ryze and Nedd contained a forum selection clause, stating that “any claim of any type brought by Employee against [Ryze] … must be maintained only in a court sitting in" Indiana. The court declined to stay or dismiss the case, stating that forum selection clauses will not be enforced when contrary to California public policy and that enforcing the forum selection clause would be contrary to Labor Code section 925 and Government Code section 12965 (governing venue in FEHA cases). The court of appeal directed the trial court to vacate its order. Labor Code section 925 establishes a policy prohibiting employers from requiring California employees from agreeing to litigate in a different forum as a prerequisite to employment, but by its plain language states that it applies to agreements “entered into, modified, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.” The FEHA venue statute has no bearing on the forum selection clause. View "Ryze Claim Solutions LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law