Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In this contract dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding Flathead Management Partners (FMP) $191,876 in expectancy damages, holding that the district court did not err when it denied Gary Jystad's motion for judgment on the pleadings and when it concluded that the contract at issue was enforceable.After a fire destroyed Jystad's home he entered into a contract with FMP to restore the property and to oversee the reconstruction of the main residence. After the parties worked together for a few months, Jystad informed FMP that the contract was void because it did not contain the statutorily required disclosures for a general contractor constructing a new residence. FMP filed this action claiming expectancy damages for the full contract price. The district court granted judgment for FMP, holding that FMP was not a general contractor and that the contract was not for the construction of a new residence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it determined that the contract was not for the construction of a new residence and that FMP was not a general contractor; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in the award of damages. View "Flathead Management Partners, LLC v. Jystad" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed as moot this petition addressing whether a law firm that deposited funds from a client into its trust account was a "transferee" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), Utah Code 25-6-1 to -14, holding that Petitioners had no remedy under the UFTA because they were no longer creditors.The district court granted partial summary judgment for Respondents, the law firm and a lawyer, concluding that they were immune from liability on the fraudulent transfer claims because they were not transferees under the UFTA. While the case was pending before the court of appeals, Petitioners allowed the judgment that formed the basis of their fraudulent-transfer claim to expire. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. On appeal, Respondents argued that even if Petitioners were to prevail on the transferee issue, it would not affect their rights because the fraudulent transfer claims became moot when the judgment expired. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the court of appeals' decision, holding that the case became moot before the court of appeals' opinion issued. View "Timothy v. Pia, Anderson, Dorius, Reynard & Moss, LLC" on Justia Law

In December 1995, Brian Trumble entered into a Career Agent’s Contract (“Agent Contract”) with Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho. Under the Agent Contract, Trumble was an independent contractor who procured insurance from interested buyers on Farm Bureau’s behalf. The Agent Contract included a non-competition clause. This case was about whether Trumble could collect service bonus commissions that were credited to him during his career, but which became forfeitable after his termination if he competed with Farm Bureau within one year of the termination. In addition, this case is about Farm Bureau’s counterclaims against the agent, alleging the agent misappropriated trade secrets and intentionally interfered with Farm Bureau’s prospective economic advantage after his termination. The district court held that Trumble forfeited his commissions by competing with Farm Bureau in violation of the one-year non-competition requirement. And the district court held that the agent was blameless for his actions after termination and dismissed Farm Bureau’s counterclaims. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed, affirming the district court’s judgment dismissing the agent’s claims and the insurance company's counterclaims. View "Trumble v. Farm Bureau" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Midland Funding, LLC, in these consolidated credit card debt collection appeals, holding that Defendant failed to set forth facts that established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the credit card accounts were in fact her accounts.The complaints in this case sought to recover the unpaid balance due on two credit card accounts. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff in both cases. On appeal, Defendant argued that there existed an issue of fact as to the ownership of the accounts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact. View "Midland Funding LLC v. Raposo" on Justia Law

Geico Marine filed suit seeking a declaration that a navigational limit in the policy with defendant that required the vessel to be north of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, during hurricane season barred coverage. The district court ruled against Geico Marine and declared that the policy covered the loss.The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the navigational limit barred coverage. In this case, the policy was not ambiguous about whether it contained a navigational limit when the loss occurred, and the plain language of the policy contained a navigational limit. Because the navigational limit was dispositive where the vessel suffered damage while outside the covered navigational area, the court need not address the breach of a duty of uberrimae fidei. View "Geico Marine Insurance Co. v. Shackleford" on Justia Law

In 1997, Suffolk Construction Company entered into a contract with the University of Connecticut (“UConn”) for the construction of several buildings on UConn’s campus. UConn secured insurance policies from Reliance Insurance Company for the Project, naming Suffolk (and other contractors) as an insured. Suffolk completed the work in January 2001. The Reliance insurance policy was extended until January 2004. However, in late 2001, however, Reliance went into liquidation. In 2013 and 2014, UConn complained of defects in the construction that resulted in damage to its buildings. UConn initiated legal proceedings against Suffolk and other contractors. In 2016, Suffolk submitted a proof of claim to the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania, as the statutory liquidator of Reliance. At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case involved the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's interpretation of certain contract language using Connecticut law. The Commonwealth Court found that the language of the contract was clear and unambiguous, thus precluding consideration of extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. The Supreme Court determined, however, a Settlement Agreement between the parties could have been construed as nothing more than a mutual general release between UConn and Suffolk: "The ambiguity stems not from Suffolk’s 'subjective perception' of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, but from the terms of the agreement itself, as the language releasing claims for 'insurance coverage' and 'indemnification' does not have a single, clear meaning." As such, the Commonwealth Court erred by failing to consider extrinsic evidence, outside of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, to discern the parties’ intent. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the Commonwealth Court decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Suffolk Constr. v. Reliance Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Steve and Pamela Zannini, appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendant Phenix Mutual Fire Insurance Company, on plaintiffs’ breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims. In March 2016, the plaintiffs’ Ashland, New Hampshire residence sustained “significant flooding” as the result of burst pipes. The house was insured by defendant, and plaintiffs filed a claim for water damage. Defendant sent an adjuster to investigate, who instructed plaintiffs to remove the floor of the house so that he could investigate the area underneath. After they did so, the house began to collapse, and plaintiffs repaired its framing to prevent it from collapsing completely. As a result of removing the floor, plaintiffs “suffered a complete loss [of the house] and direct physical loss of [their] personal property and use of the [house] for a substantial amount of time.” On May 3, 2016, defendant sent the plaintiffs a letter denying coverage of the damage caused by the collapse. Plaintiffs argued on appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court that: (1) a provision in the insurance policy at issue requiring that suits be brought within one year of the date of loss was unenforceable because it violated public policy; and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendant’s communications tolled the one-year period, and defendant was estopped from asserting or waived it as a defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the one-year limitation period did not violate the public policy underlying statutes of limitations. Further, the communications between the parties did not create issues of material fact as to whether the one- year period was tolled or whether the defendant waived or was otherwise estopped from asserting the provision as a defense. View "Zannini v. Phenix Mutual Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court allowing Insurer's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiffs' action claiming that Insurer failed to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement, holding that consent-to-settle clauses in professional liability policies do not violate Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, 3(9)(f).Insurer issued a professional liability policy to Insured that contained a consent-to-settle clause. Plaintiffs sued Insured for engineering design errors in their house, and Insured refused to consent to settle. Plaintiffs then brought this action under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. The motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of Insured, concluding that the consent-to-settle clause in this case limited Insurer's ability to engage in further settlement practices with Plaintiffs once Insured refused to give Insurer consent to settle Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where Insurer made good faith efforts to investigate the claim and encourage Insured to settle and where Insurer's shortcomings did not proximately cause harm to Plaintiffs the superior court did not err in allowing Insurer's motion for summary judgment. View "Rawan v. Continental Casualty Co." on Justia Law

In this breach of contract action, the Supreme Court reversed in part the trial court's judgment rendered in favor of Plaintiff as to his derivative claims, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring them under the common law or the Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 34-100 et seq., but affirmed the judgment for Plaintiff as to his direct claims.This case arose from the deterioration of a business relationship between three individuals. Plaintiff sought damages for, inter alia, breach of contract. Defendants filed a counterclaim. The trial court awarded judgment in part for Plaintiff on the complaint and on the counterclaim. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the court's award of attorney fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110a et seq., holding (1) Plaintiff lacked standing to bring his derivative claims; and (2) the trial court properly entered judgment for Plaintiff on his direct counts and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order Defendants to reimburse Plaintiff for the fees incurred by a joint, court-appointed fiduciary hired to wind up the companies at issue. View "Saunders v. Briner" on Justia Law

In September 2018, Western State Bank sued Swanson and James Lund to enforce commercial guaranties executed by Leland Swanson and Lund. Swanson and Lund consented to entry of judgment, and a $1,334,374.25 judgment was entered against Swanson and Lund. The judgment stated Swanson and Lund were jointly and severally liable. Swanson paid the judgment in full, and contemporaneously, Western State Bank assigned the judgment to Swanson. The next day, Swanson assigned his interest in the judgment to Open Road Trucking. The assignment from Swanson stated it assigned his contribution interest against Lund for $670,952.24, one-half of the judgment amount. Open Road Trucking, LLC, appealed district court orders: (1) denying Open Road’s application for a charging order lien against Lund; and (2) directing satisfaction of a judgment against Lund and Swanson. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Open Road was entitled to take an assignment of the judgment for the purpose of enforcing contribution against Lund. The Court reversed the district court’s order denying Open Road’s application for a charging order, and remanded for entry of a charging order against Lund’s transferrable interests in the limited liability companies. The Court reversed a part of the court’s February 2019 order directing entry of satisfaction of the judgment. The Court affirmed that part of the order cancelling any execution of judgment for the full amount of the judgment. View "Open Road Trucking v. Swanson, et al." on Justia Law