Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Amey Nelson brought a negligence claim against Stefani Kaufman, the Idaho Falls Anytime Fitness, and AT Fitness, LLC. Nelson was using a weight machine at the Idaho Falls Anytime Fitness under the direction of Kaufman, a personal trainer, when Nelson injured a metacarpal bone in her hand. Nelson filed suit alleging that Kaufman had improperly instructed her on the machine’s use, which caused her injury. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Kaufman, holding that Kaufman was an express or apparent agent of Anytime Fitness and therefore released from liability under the terms of the Member Assumption of Risk and Release form Nelson signed when she joined the gym. Nelson unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court determined Nelson did not waive her appeal by failing to expressly challenge the district court's finding of an express agency relationship. The Court determined the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Kaufman on the basis that Kaufman was an express agent of Anytime Fitness. Further, the court erred in apply the apparent agency doctrine defensively to find Kaufman was covered by the specific terms of the Membership Agreement. With judgment reversed, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Nelson v. Kaufman" on Justia Law

Zachary Beck appealed the denial of his request for relief from a judgment awarding damages to Hustle Proof Corporation and Chinedu Ilogu (Hustle Proof). Hustle Proof sued Beck and his manager, Ryan Matthews, alleging a breach of the parties’ contract for a joint concert tour. Beck and Matthews were personally served with the summons and complaint. According to Beck, he was told by Matthews that Matthews would handle the lawsuit. Matthews apparently initiated email contact with Hustle Proof’s attorney regarding the lawsuit, but neither Beck nor Matthews answered the complaint. Hustle Proof moved for the entry of a default judgment. Notice of the default proceedings was sent by registered mail to Beck and Matthews at the address of Matthews’ limited liability company in Florida. Neither Matthews nor Beck appeared at the hearing on the motion for default judgment. Hustle Proof sought the entry of a judgment in the amount of $252,740 consisting primarily of the profit Hustle Proof claimed it would have made had Matthews and Beck not breached the parties’ contract. The district court refused to enter a default judgment for a sum greater than the $3,000 guaranteed payment included in the parties’ contract and offered Hustle Proof the option of the entry of a default judgment in the amount of $3,000 or proceeding to trial. Hustle Proof elected to proceed to trial. A jury trial was held on January 30, 2018. Neither Matthews nor Beck appeared at the jury trial. Hustle Proof presented its evidence to the jury and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Hustle Proof in the amount of $192,500 plus interest. A judgment, including costs and interest, was entered in the amount of $227,790. Beck argued to the North Dakota Supreme Court that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for relief from the judgment pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) because he was not properly served with notice of the default judgment proceedings and the facts and circumstances of this case compelled relief from the judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hustle Proof, et al. v. Matthews, et al." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motions for dismissal and for summary judgment, granting summary judgment to the law firm. The court applied a five-factor test to determine the sufficiency of defendant's contacts and held that, when all of the circumstances are viewed in the aggregate, defendant had fair warning that he could be subject to jurisdiction in Arkansas. In this case, defendant's contacts with Arkansas involved more than just his guaranty; the language of the contract provided for Cuker to perform its obligations in the Western District of Arkansas; and, as personal guarantor of Cuker's performance, it was reasonable and foreseeable for defendant to anticipate being haled into that same court if Cuker failed to perform.The court rejected defendant's claim that his personal guaranty is unenforceable as a matter of law because his obligations are not adequately specified. The court held that the express terms of the legal services agreement evidence an intent to hold defendant liable to the same extent as Cuker's liability. Finally, the court applied state, not federal elements of estoppel in diversity cases, and held that the district's reasoning and the record supported equitable estoppel. View "Henry Law Firm v. Atalla" on Justia Law

After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Cuker on its claims against Walmart for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and misappropriation of trade secrets, the district court reduced the amount of damages awarded by the jury and entered judgment in favor of Cuker. The district court subsequently further reduced the damages awarded to Cuker on the ground that Cuker presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate it undertook reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of three of the four alleged trade secrets. Finally, the district court found in favor of Cuker on all other issues.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the evidence in the record supported the jury's finding that Cuker took reasonable efforts to protect only one of the alleged trade secrets, the Adobe Source Files; because Cuker failed to take reasonable steps to protect the other three alleged trade, that information was not subject to protection under the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act (ATSA); evidence in the record established that Walmart used improper means to acquire Cuker's Adobe Source Files and that it did so wilfully and maliciously; there was no error in the district court's analysis or conclusions on the reduction in damages based on Cuker's failure to establish proximate cause; and Walmart's argument that the contract granted Walmart a perpetual and irrevocable license was without merit.The court also held that the district court properly instructed the jury on material breach of contract; the record supported the jury's finding that Walmart's acts, hindrances, or delays excused Cuker's performance; sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that Walmart engaged in intentional wrongdoing; it was permissible under the ATSA for the district court to enter a injunction; and there was no error in denying Walmart's motion for a new trial. View "Walmart, Inc. v. Cuker Interactive, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1999, while working at the San Juan VA Medical Center, Dr. Sanchez, a urologist, reported to his superiors what he believed to be improper practices. In 2000, Sánchez received a proficiency report prepared by his supervisor, indicating that his performance “ha[d] shown a significant [negative] change since his last evaluation.” Sánchez was reassigned to the Ambulatory Care Service Line, where he believed that he would not perform surgery, care for patients, or supervise other staff members. He concluded that these actions were retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Sánchez and the VA entered into a settlement agreement under which Sanchez was to be reassigned to the Ponce Outpatient Clinic with a compressed work schedule of 10 hours per day for four days per week, to include three hours of travel per day. The parties adhered to the Agreement for 16 years. In 2017, Sánchez received a letter, informing him that he was required to be at the Ponce clinic from “7:30 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. from Monday through Friday.” An AJ rejected his petition for enforcement with the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The background of the Agreement supports the conclusion that 16 years was a reasonable duration. As the party claiming a breach, Sánchez had the burden of proof but did not offer evidence that the claimed animosity persisted after that 16-year time period. View "Sanchez v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review centered on a claim of abusive litigation that Timothy Coen filed based on a previous contract lawsuit against his former employer that was resolved in his favor. In his abusive litigation case, Coen sought punitive damages. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling that punitive damages were not available for a statutory abusive litigation claim, relying on its prior decisions that in turn relied on dicta in footnote 3 of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Yost v. Torok, 344 SE2d 414 (1986), which was decided three years before the current abusive litigation statutes, OCGA sections 51-7-80 to 51-7-85, were enacted in 1989. The Supreme Court granted Coen’s petition for certiorari to decide whether that statute authorized the recovery of punitive damages. The Court concluded punitive damages generally may be recovered in an abusive litigation lawsuit (as long as the lawsuit is not solely to recover damages for injury to peace, happiness, or feelings), because the text of OCGA 51-7-83 (a) indicated that punitive damages were included, the statute did not change the common law generally allowing punitive damages in abusive litigation cases, and punitive damages in abusive litigation cases did not always constitute an impermissible double recovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Coen v. Aptean, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Warner Wiggins appeals a circuit court's order compelling him to arbitrate his claims against Warren Averett, LLC. Warren Averett was an accounting firm. Eastern Shore Children's Clinic, P.C. ("Eastern Shore"), a pediatric medical practice, was a client of Warren Averett. In September 2010, while Wiggins, who was a medical doctor, was a shareholder and employee of Eastern Shore, Warren Averett and Eastern Shore entered an agreement pursuant to which Warren Averett was to provide accounting services to Eastern Shore ("the contract"). The contract contained an arbitration clause. Thereafter, Wiggins and Warren Averett became involved in a billing dispute related to the preparation of Wiggins's personal income-tax returns. In 2017, Wiggins filed a single-count complaint alleging "accounting malpractice" against Warren Averett. Warren Averett filed an answer to Wiggins's complaint, asserting, among other things, that Wiggins's claims were based on the contract and were thus subject to the arbitration clause. A majority of the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the determination of whether Wiggins' claims were covered under the terms of the arbitration clause was delegated to an arbitrator to decide. Therefore, it affirmed the trial court's order. View "Warner W. Wiggins v. Warren Averett, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court enforcing a liquidated damages provision in a contract, holding that the breaching party in this case did not prove that an unbridgeable discrepancy existed between actual and liquidated damages or otherwise demonstrate that the provision operated as a penalty.After Defendant breached the contract Plaintiff brought this action. The trial court enforced the liquidated damages provision in the contract, concluding that it was not a penalty because it reasonably forecasted the harm that would result from a breach and actual damages were difficult to estimate when the contract was made. The court of appeals affirmed the award of liquidated damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) at the time the parties' agreement was made, the harm that would result from a breach was difficult to predict, and the liquidated damages provision reasonably forecast just compensation; and (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate an unbridgeable discrepancy between liquidated and actual damages, measured at the time of the breach, to invalidate the liquidated damages provision. View "Atrium Medical Center, LP v. Houston Red C LLC" on Justia Law

In this breach of contract action involving the repurchase of all of a limited liability company's (LLC) member's membership interests, the Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's determination that the LLC was entitled to specific performance under the parties' agreement and granting the LLC's request for attorney fees, holding that the award of attorney fees was in error.The LLC member and the LLC executed an agreement whereby the LLC would buy back all of the member's membership interests. Five days later, the member attempted to revoke his offer to sell his interests. The LLC filed a breach of contract claim seeking specific performance as well as attorney fees under the contract. The district court held that the member had breached the agreement, ordered specific performance under the agreement, and granted the LLC's request for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that the contract was a valid and binding agreement and that the LLC was entitled to specific performance as the remedy for the member's breach of the agreement; but (2) erred in awarding attorney fees. View "Homeland Energy Solutions, LLC v. Retterath" on Justia Law

Cheetah’s 836 patent is directed to optical communication networks. AT&T uses hardware and software components in its fiber-optic communication networks. Cheetah asserted that AT&T infringes the 836 patent by making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing its fiber equipment and services. Ciena was allowed to intervene in the suit because it manufactures and supplies components for AT&T’s fiber-optic systems; those components formed the basis of some of Cheetah’s infringement allegations. Ciena and AT&T then moved for summary judgment that Cheetah’s infringement claim was barred by agreements settling previous litigation. Cheetah had sued Ciena and Fujitsu and executed two license agreements—one with Ciena and one with Fujitsu. Ciena and AT&T argued that the licenses included implicit licenses to the 836 patent covering all of the accused products. The district court dismissed the suit. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Cheetah’s argument that the parties did not intend that the licenses extend to the 836 patent. The court noted the presumption that a license to a patent includes a license to its continuation. The naming of certain patents expressly does not evince a clear mutual intent to exclude other patents falling within the general definitions in an agreement. That is especially true here where the licenses list broad categories of patents without reciting their numbers individually. View "Cheetah Omni LLC v. AT&T Services, Inc." on Justia Law