Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Sioux Steel Company, a South Dakota corporation, designed and manufactured a new line of hopper bins for grain storage. After selling one of these bins to a distributor in Mexico, the bin failed catastrophically, causing fatalities and property damage. Sioux Steel had an insurance policy with the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (ISOP), which included a professional services exclusion. ISOP denied coverage based on this exclusion, leading Sioux Steel to settle with the affected party without ISOP's involvement.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted summary judgment in favor of ISOP, finding that the professional services exclusion in the insurance policy was unambiguous and applicable, thus precluding coverage. The court also dismissed Sioux Steel's claims for bad faith, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the professional services exclusion was clear and unambiguous. The exclusion applied because the damage arose from professional engineering services provided by Sioux Steel's employee and an external engineering firm. The court also found that ISOP did not breach its duty to defend, as no civil proceeding or alternative dispute resolution process had been initiated with ISOP's consent. Consequently, Sioux Steel's claims for breach of contract and insurance bad faith were dismissed, and the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "Sioux Steel Company v. Ins. Co. of the State of PA" on Justia Law

Alrig USA Acquisitions LLC, a commercial real estate developer, entered into a purchase and sale agreement with MBD Realty LLC for a property in Portland. MBD was aware that the City of Portland planned to redevelop the area, which would involve condemning part of the property, but did not disclose this to Alrig. The agreement included clauses allowing Alrig to terminate the agreement and receive a refund of its deposit under certain conditions, including eminent domain. Alrig extended the inspection period multiple times, paying additional deposits, and eventually waived its due diligence and title review contingencies, making the deposit nonrefundable except in the event of MBD’s default. Alrig later learned of the redevelopment plans and terminated the agreement, seeking a refund of the deposit, which MBD refused.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) granted MBD’s motion to dismiss Alrig’s complaint for breach of contract and fraud, concluding that MBD had no duty to disclose the redevelopment plans. Alrig appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The court held that the amendment to the agreement unambiguously made the deposit nonrefundable except in the event of MBD’s default, and thus Alrig’s contract claim failed. Additionally, the court found that MBD did not actively conceal the City’s planned condemnation, and there was no special relationship imposing a duty to disclose. Therefore, Alrig’s fraud claim also failed as a matter of law. The court concluded that Alrig was not entitled to relief under any set of facts that might be proven in support of its claims. View "Alrig USA Acquisitions LLC. v. MBD Realty LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff law firm sought to recover damages from the defendant, a former client, for breach of contract in federal court. The defendant had engaged the plaintiff to represent it in a litigation matter but failed to pay the agreed-upon legal fees. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's breach was wilful and malicious, and sought common-law punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut partially granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, awarding compensatory damages. However, the court found genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages and the defendant's counterclaims, including legal malpractice. The jury later found in favor of the plaintiff on all claims and counterclaims, determining that the defendant's breach was wilful and malicious. The District Court then certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding the recoverability of common-law punitive damages for wilful and malicious breach of contract.The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that a law firm may not recover common-law punitive damages for a client's breach of contract unless it pleads and proves the existence of an independent tort for which punitive damages are recoverable. The court noted that Connecticut appellate courts generally do not allow punitive damages for breach of contract claims, except in certain contexts like insurance and surety. The court emphasized the different purposes of compensatory damages in contract law and punitive damages in tort law, and declined to adopt a broader rule permitting punitive damages for wilful, malicious, or reckless breaches of contract. The court's decision aligns with the majority rule in other jurisdictions and the Restatements of Contracts and Torts. View "McCarter & English, LLP v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc." on Justia Law

A&T Maritime Logistics, Inc. had an insurance contract with RLI Insurance Company and a bareboat charter agreement with Alexis Marine, L.L.C. While operating the M/V Uncle John, a vessel owned by Alexis Marine, A&T Maritime caused the ship to allide with an embankment. Believing the damage to be minimal, A&T Maritime did not take immediate action. After a lawsuit was filed, RLI was notified of the claim. A&T Maritime and Alexis Marine sought defense and indemnification from RLI, which denied coverage under the insurance contract. The district court upheld RLI's denial of coverage on summary judgment, finding that RLI was prejudiced by the delayed notice.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially denied A&T Maritime's and Alexis Marine's motions for partial summary judgment seeking reimbursement for defense costs, noting that the policy did not include a duty to defend. The Champagnes, who had purchased the damaged property, settled their claims for $200,000, funded solely by Alexis Marine. RLI then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Uncle John was not covered under the policy. The district court disagreed but granted partial summary judgment to RLI, holding that the prompt notice requirements were breached and RLI was prejudiced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that RLI was actually prejudiced by the delayed notice from both A&T Maritime and Alexis Marine, as the damage worsened over time and the opportunity to settle for a lower amount was lost. Consequently, the denial of coverage for both A&T Maritime and Alexis Marine was appropriate. The court also concluded that RLI had no duty to reimburse defense costs, as indemnification depended on coverage, which was voided due to the breach of the prompt notice requirement. View "A&T Maritime Logistics v. RLI Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case involves 27-35 Jackson Avenue LLC ("Jackson"), the owner of a New York City office building, which leased two floors to the United States government for the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Field Office. The lease, starting in May 2009, included a clause allowing termination if the premises were rendered untenantable by fire or other casualty, as determined by the government. In January 2015, a burst sprinkler head caused extensive water damage, leading the government to vacate the premises and eventually terminate the lease, citing untenantability.The United States Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government, finding that the government did not breach the lease agreement. The court held that the government’s determination of untenantability was within its discretion and was not made in bad faith. Jackson's claim that the government acted unreasonably and in bad faith was rejected, as the court found no evidence to support these allegations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the government’s determination of untenantability was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The court emphasized that the lease explicitly allowed the government to make this determination. Additionally, the court found that Jackson failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of bad faith or a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court concluded that the government acted within its contractual rights and upheld the summary judgment in favor of the government. View "27-35 JACKSON AVE LLC v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves two homebuyers, Wynton Sanders and Tosha Lindsey, who entered into contracts with SM Landover, LLC and SM Parkside, LLC, respectively, for the purchase of new homes. Both contracts included provisions for deferred water and sewer charges and a one-year statute of limitations for bringing any claims related to the contracts. The homebuyers later filed class action complaints alleging that the sellers failed to disclose required information about the deferred charges, as mandated by Maryland law.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County consolidated the cases for pretrial purposes and dismissed the complaints with prejudice. The court found that the sellers did not need to register as home builders because Stanley Martin Companies, LLC, a registered home builder, was also a party to the contracts. The court also concluded that the homebuyers’ claims accrued at the time of contracting, making them time-barred under the one-year contractual limitations period.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the one-year contractual limitations period was reasonable and that the homebuyers’ claims accrued at the time of settlement, not contracting. Therefore, the claims were timely. However, the court also held that the sellers did not need to register as home builders because a registered home builder was a party to the contracts.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the homebuyers’ claims accrued at the time of contracting. The court also held that the sellers were required to register as home builders under Maryland law, even though a registered home builder was a party to the contracts. Consequently, the sellers could not enforce the one-year contractual limitations period, making the homebuyers’ claims timely. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland. View "SM Landover LLC v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Aquarian Foundation, Inc., a non-profit religious organization, alleged that Bruce Lowndes infringed on its copyrights by uploading spiritual teachings of its late founder, Keith Milton Rhinehart, to various websites. Lowndes claimed he had a license from Rhinehart, granted in 1985, to use the materials. Rhinehart passed away in 1999, bequeathing his estate, including the copyrights, to Aquarian.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted partial summary judgment, confirming that Rhinehart's copyrights were properly transferred to Aquarian via his will. After a bench trial, the court ruled against Aquarian on its claims of copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and false designation of origin. The court found that Rhinehart created the works as his own, not as works for hire, and that he had validly licensed them to Lowndes. The court also determined that Lowndes did not breach the licensing agreement and that Aquarian could not terminate the license under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). The court denied attorneys’ fees to both parties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that Rhinehart’s works were not created as works for hire, that he validly licensed the works to Lowndes, and that Lowndes did not breach the licensing agreement. The court also affirmed the decision not to award Lowndes attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s determination regarding the termination of the license, holding that Aquarian’s termination letter in May 2021 was effective. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address any infringement that may have occurred after the license termination, as well as the denial of injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act. View "AQUARIAN FOUNDATION, INC. V. LOWNDES" on Justia Law

A California consumer entered into an agreement with an RV manufacturer that stipulated all legal disputes would be resolved in Indiana under Indiana law. The consumer later filed a lawsuit in California under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging the RV manufacturer failed to repair or replace a defective motorhome. The manufacturer moved to stay or dismiss the action based on forum non conveniens, arguing that the case should be heard in Indiana. To address concerns about the consumer's rights under the Song-Beverly Act, the manufacturer offered to stipulate that California law would apply to the warranty claims in Indiana.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the manufacturer's motion, stating that the forum selection clause was not unconscionable and that the consumer's rights could be preserved by staying the California action while the Indiana case was pending. The court concluded that if the Indiana court declined to apply the Song-Beverly Act, the consumer could move to lift the stay in California.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and found that the lower court erred in its application of the legal standard. The appellate court held that the stipulation to apply California law in Indiana did not cure the unconscionability of the forum selection clause. The court emphasized that the agreement, as written, was void and against public policy because it attempted to waive unwaivable rights under the Song-Beverly Act. The appellate court concluded that severing the unconscionable terms would condone an illegal practice and that the lower court's solution violated California public policy.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case, ordering the trial court to deny the motion to dismiss or stay. The appellate court's decision underscores the importance of protecting California consumers' unwaivable statutory rights and ensuring that forum selection clauses do not undermine those rights. View "Hardy v. Forest River, Inc." on Justia Law

Chesapeake Exploration, LLC (Chesapeake) and Morton Production Company, LLC (Morton) entered into a joint operating agreement for oil and gas development in Converse County, Wyoming. Morton sued Chesapeake for breach of contract, violation of the Wyoming Royalty Payment Act (WRPA), and conversion after Chesapeake adjusted Morton’s ownership interest and withheld production proceeds. Chesapeake counterclaimed for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Morton.Chesapeake appealed, challenging the district court’s summary judgment on Morton’s breach of contract claim, the supplemental decision on Chesapeake’s counterclaims and affirmative defenses, and the determination that Chesapeake violated the WRPA. The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that Chesapeake breached the contract by adjusting Morton’s ownership interest and billing for costs beyond the twenty-four-month limitation period specified in the 1985 COPAS Form, which was incorporated into the joint operating agreement. The court found the language in the COPAS Form unambiguous and declined to consider extrinsic evidence. The court also upheld the district court’s use of Rule 60(a) to correct a clerical error in its original order and found that Chesapeake’s counterclaims were properly dismissed as they were rendered moot by the summary judgment on Morton’s claims. Additionally, the court ruled that Chesapeake violated the WRPA by withholding production proceeds without placing the disputed funds in escrow, as required by the statute. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, v. Morton Production Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Jeffrey Cubberley and Philip Seaver, filed a lawsuit against The Commerce Insurance Company, seeking declaratory relief and compensation for alleged breach of contract. They claimed that Commerce was obligated to cover "inherent diminished value" (IDV) damages to their vehicles, which were damaged in collisions caused by Commerce's insured drivers. Commerce paid for the repairs but refused to compensate for IDV damages, leading the plaintiffs to argue that their vehicles were worth less in the resale market post-repair.The plaintiffs initially filed their lawsuit in the Superior Court, which was later transferred to the business litigation session. The case was stayed pending the outcome of McGilloway v. Safety Ins. Co., which held that IDV damages were recoverable under the 2008 standard Massachusetts automobile policy. After the stay was lifted, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Commerce moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the 2016 standard policy excluded IDV damages. The motion judge granted the dismissal, concluding that the policy did not cover IDV damages and that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts suggesting an entitlement to relief. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their breach of contract claims because they had not obtained final judgments against the insureds, as required by G. L. c. 175, § 113, and G. L. c. 214, § 3 (9). Additionally, the court found that part 4 of the 2016 standard policy explicitly excluded coverage for IDV damages to third-party vehicles. The court also determined that neither G. L. c. 90, § 34O, nor the decision in McGilloway provided a legal basis requiring insurers to cover IDV damages under the 2016 standard policy. Thus, the plaintiffs' complaint did not plausibly establish an entitlement to relief. View "Cubberley v. The Commerce Insurance Company" on Justia Law