Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. operated a health plan primarily using its own facilities, but its members sometimes sought emergency medical care at non-Kaiser hospitals, including Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center. From 2004 until late 2017, Kaiser reimbursed Pomona Valley Hospital for emergency services at contractual rates under a written agreement. After Kaiser terminated this contract in 2017, it began paying Pomona Valley Hospital at a lower, unilaterally determined rate. Dissatisfied with these payments for services rendered from October 2017 through March 2020, Pomona Valley Hospital sued Kaiser in quantum meruit, seeking the asserted reasonable value of its emergency services, which it claimed was approximately $66 million more than what Kaiser had paid.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a jury trial in which Pomona Valley Hospital prevailed, and the jury awarded the full amount sought. Kaiser moved for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred by admitting the parties’ prior contract into evidence. The trial court agreed that admitting the contract was legal error but found the error only affected damages, not liability, and conditionally granted a new trial unless Pomona Valley Hospital accepted a remittitur, reducing the award by about $8 million. Pomona Valley Hospital accepted the remittitur, and judgment was entered. Kaiser appealed, and Pomona Valley Hospital cross-appealed, claiming the new trial should not have been granted.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, held that the trial court erred in granting Kaiser’s new trial motion. The appellate court concluded the contract was properly admitted because its exclusionary clause only applied to regulatory valuations, not to common law quantum meruit actions like this one. The court also rejected Kaiser’s other arguments except for the prejudgment interest rate, holding that interest should be awarded at 7 percent, not 10 percent. The appellate court reversed the new trial order, vacated the amended judgment, and remanded for entry of judgment on the jury’s original verdict, subject to the corrected interest rate. View "Pomona Valley Hospital v. Kaiser Foundation Health etc." on Justia Law

An employee of a major defense contractor, serving in a senior internal audit role, claimed to have discovered fraudulent activity involving government contracts for military aircraft. The contractor, which assembles aircraft using parts supplied by numerous subcontractors, is subject to detailed regulatory requirements intended to ensure fair pricing, including the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The plaintiff alleged that the contractor systematically ignored and concealed fraudulent inflation of cost and pricing data by its subcontractors, resulting in overbilling the government.The plaintiff brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), which allows private individuals to sue on behalf of the government. Previously, another relator had filed a separate FCA action against the same contractor, alleging a different fraudulent scheme: obtaining parts in bulk at a discount but charging the government full price. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the FCA’s “first-to-file” bar applied because the earlier action covered the same essential elements of fraud.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that the two complaints alleged distinct fraudulent schemes: one involving bulk pricing manipulation, and the other involving the submission of inflated subcontractor cost data. The Fifth Circuit held that the first-to-file bar under the FCA did not apply because the plaintiff’s complaint was based on a different mechanism of fraud, not merely additional details or locations of the same scheme. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ferguson v. Lockheed Martin" on Justia Law

A group of bondholders sought to recover principal payments owed on defaulted Argentine sovereign bonds. These investors had previously participated in Argentina’s Tax Credit Program, depositing their bonds with an Argentine trustee, Caja de Valores S.A., in exchange for certificates representing principal and interest. After the Republic failed to pay the principal at maturity, the bondholders initially sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. That court dismissed the case primarily on the ground that, under Argentine law, only the trustee had authority to sue on the bonds, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The bondholders then obtained authorization from an Argentine court to sue and filed a new complaint in New York.The district court again dismissed their claims, mainly for two reasons. First, it found all claims were barred by New York’s six-year statute of limitations for contract actions, holding that the state’s “savings statute” (N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 205(a)) did not apply because the prior dismissal was for lack of personal jurisdiction. It also concluded that tolling provisions in New York’s COVID-era executive orders did not apply absent an equitable showing. Second, the court held that collateral estoppel barred the bondholders from relitigating issues related to standing and jurisdiction previously decided.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed that the savings statute did not apply but held that the COVID-era executive orders tolled the limitations period automatically, without any equitable showing. This made some claims timely (those on the AR16 Bonds) but not others (those on the GD65 Bonds). The Second Circuit further ruled that collateral estoppel did not preclude the bondholders from litigating whether they had authority to sue, and that—under Argentine law, with the new court authorization—they now had such authority. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bugliotti v. The Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Two attorneys verbally agreed to jointly propose providing legal services to a public entity for Hurricane Katrina-related insurance claims on a contingency fee basis. After a meeting with the entity’s officials, they submitted several joint proposals, all based on a contingency fee arrangement. The entity, however, offered only an hourly fee contract, which one attorney accepted and the other declined to participate in. Subsequently, the accepting attorney was retained alone and performed all legal work. Over a year later, the entity entered a contingency fee agreement with the accepting attorney and another law firm. The attorney who had declined the hourly arrangement was not included in this contract and performed no work for the entity.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans held a bench trial and found that a valid oral joint venture existed between the two attorneys when the contingency fee contract was executed. It concluded that the accepting attorney breached his fiduciary duty by failing to inform the other of the opportunity to participate, awarding damages equal to half the contingency fee. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the contract breach—not attorney fee rules—was controlling, and upheld the damages award.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and found clear legal errors in the lower courts’ analysis. The Court held that the initial joint venture terminated when the entity refused the proposed contingency fee arrangement, and no enforceable joint venture or other contractual relationship existed thereafter. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct govern such relationships and preclude fee-sharing without written client consent and meaningful legal services by all lawyers involved. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ judgments and entered judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to any portion of the contingency fee. View "SPEARS VS. HALL" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a series of complex financial transactions involving a Wyoming family and their businesses, a local bank, and a commercial lender. The plaintiffs, including a married couple and their closely held LLC, entered into various loans and mortgages related to their commercial property and business operations. When financial difficulties arose—exacerbated by a downturn in the oil and gas industry—the parties restructured their debt, resulting in a 2017 mortgage and, after the operating company filed for bankruptcy, a 2019 settlement agreement. The plaintiffs later alleged that the bank and lender’s actions and omissions caused them to lose equity in both their home and commercial property, and the defendants counterclaimed for breach of the settlement agreement and sought attorney fees.The District Court of Natrona County dismissed or granted summary judgment for the bank and lender on all claims and counterclaims, finding the mortgage unambiguously secured two loans and the bank had no duty to release it after only one was repaid. It also concluded the plaintiffs could not establish justifiable reliance on any alleged misrepresentations, interpreted the settlement agreement as permitting (but not requiring) the lender to record the quitclaim deed after a sale period, and found no breach by the lender. The district court further ruled the plaintiffs breached the agreement by filing suit, thus entitling the bank and lender to attorney fees.On review, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s decisions dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims, holding the mortgage secured both loans and the bank acted within its rights. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the grant of summary judgment to the bank and lender on their counterclaims, finding that filing the lawsuit was not a breach of the settlement agreement or its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Consequently, the award of attorney fees and costs to the bank and lender was also reversed. View "Adams v. ANB Bank" on Justia Law

A judgment creditor, Green Belt Bank & Trust, sought to collect on a $2.6 million judgment against Mashon Van Mill and others. After initial efforts to collect failed, Green Belt initiated garnishment proceedings against Unverferth Manufacturing Company, alleging that Unverferth owed substantial sums to Mashon for services. Unverferth initially indicated payments were for Mashon’s personal services but later clarified that Mashon worked as an independent contractor, invoicing through “Hill Top Industries,” a name also connected to Mashon. The parties disputed whether funds paid to Hill Top Industries were subject to garnishment and, if so, whether statutory limits applied.The Iowa District Court for Butler County found that Hill Top Industries was not distinct from Mashon, so the funds paid by Unverferth were subject to garnishment. However, the court limited the garnishment amount to 10% of the total payments, applying the cap in Iowa Code section 642.21(1), which restricts garnishment of an employee’s earnings. Green Belt challenged this ruling, arguing that the cap did not apply because Mashon was not an employee, and appealed after the district court denied reconsideration.The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s application of the statutory limit, following its own prior precedent. On further review, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the statutory garnishment limits in Iowa Code section 642.21(1) apply only to earnings of employees, not independent contractors. The Court reasoned that “employee” has a distinct legal meaning that excludes independent contractors and overruled contrary appellate precedent. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reversed in part the district court’s judgment, remanding for entry of a judgment without application of the statutory garnishment cap. View "Green Belt Bank & Trust v. Van Mill" on Justia Law

A business agreement was made in early 2020 for the rental of a yacht for an event. The agreement involved a payment of $18,280, which was to cover a deposit and a down payment toward the rental fee. The event was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the party that made the payment requested a refund. The yacht provider did not return the funds. The party seeking the refund sued under several theories, including unjust enrichment and breach of contract.After mandatory arbitration resulted in an award for the plaintiff, the defendant requested a trial de novo, and the matter proceeded under Nevada’s Short Trial Program. A short trial judge rendered a proposed judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant objected to this proposed judgment, but the short trial judge, after consulting with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Office, ruled on the objection and later denied the defendant’s NRCP 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial. The district court then entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, apparently approving the short trial judge’s proposed judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether a short trial judge has authority to adjudicate objections to a proposed judgment and post-judgment NRCP 59 motions. The court held that under the plain language of NSTR 3(d), only the district court—not a short trial judge—may review and adjudicate objections to proposed judgments and NRCP 59 motions. The court found that the short trial judge exceeded her authority by ruling on these matters. The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s judgment and the short trial judge’s post-judgment orders, remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "VEGAS AQUA, LLC VS. JUPITOR CORP." on Justia Law

Richard Marschner and Roxane Marschner divorced in 2016 after reaching a settlement agreement dividing their marital property. Richard received a lump sum from Roxane’s retirement account, and Roxane was to receive a portion of Richard’s Army National Guard pension and Federal Employees’ Retirement System benefits upon his retirement. The divorce judgment included provisions that if Richard took action to prevent or reduce Roxane’s share of his military retirement pay—including by waiving retirement pay in favor of disability pay—he would be required to indemnify Roxane. Both parties waived spousal support in the original settlement.After Richard was separated from the National Guard for medical reasons, he began receiving military disability retired pay and waived all his retirement pay. When Roxane attempted to collect her share, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service denied her request, stating that disability pay was not divisible under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act. Roxane then sought an amended judgment or redistribution of the marital estate from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District. The district court awarded Roxane spousal support equivalent to her lost share of Richard’s retirement pay, relying on the indemnification provision and reasoning that federal law did not prevent enforcement of the parties’ agreement.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether federal law preempts enforcement of the indemnification provision. The court held that federal law, as interpreted in Howell v. Howell, prohibits state courts from dividing military disability retired pay or enforcing indemnification provisions, even if contractually agreed upon. The district court’s award of spousal support was deemed an impermissible division of disability pay. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the amended judgment. View "Marschner v. Marschner" on Justia Law

A black-owned construction company was not invited to bid as general contractor on a major Boston public housing redevelopment project after participating in pre-construction work. Years earlier, the developer had called the company’s president to discuss possible involvement, but the parties disputed what promises, if any, were made during that conversation. The construction company performed pre-construction work and was later selected as general contractor for the first phase (Camden), but after performance and communication issues arose during that project, the developer chose a different, white-owned company for the second phase (Lenox). The construction company did not protest at the time but later sued, alleging breach of contract, quasi-contract, violation of Massachusetts consumer protection law, and racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.The matter was first brought in Massachusetts state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts based on federal question jurisdiction. After discovery, the developer moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the developer, finding no enforceable contract or promise had been made regarding the Lenox phase, that the quasi-contract and Chapter 93A claims failed as derivative, and that there was insufficient evidence of racial discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The First Circuit held that the summary judgment record did not contain evidence from which a reasonable jury could find an enforceable implied-in-fact contract or a promise sufficient for promissory estoppel. It further held that the plaintiff failed to create a triable issue of fact regarding pretext or discriminatory intent under § 1981, given the legitimate business reasons cited for the company’s exclusion. Thus, summary judgment on all claims was proper. View "John B. Cruz Construction Co. v. Beacon Communities Corp." on Justia Law

An environmental remediation company and an oil corporation entered into a Master Services Contract in 2008, which included a Texas choice-of-law and venue provision and an indemnification clause requiring the remediation company to defend and indemnify the oil corporation for claims arising from violations of applicable laws. In 2012, it was discovered that the remediation company’s then-president, along with subcontractors, had engaged in fraudulent overbilling for work performed for the oil corporation. Upon discovery, ownership of the remediation company changed hands, and litigation ensued in Louisiana state court. The remediation company’s new owner alleged that the oil corporation’s employee was complicit in the fraud, making the corporation vicariously liable.The oil corporation then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking a declaratory judgment that the remediation company had a duty to defend and indemnify it in the Louisiana litigation, and also sought attorney’s fees as damages for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for the oil corporation, holding that Texas law applied, the remediation company owed both a duty to defend and to indemnify, and awarding attorney’s fees for both the Texas and Louisiana lawsuits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo regarding summary judgment and attorney’s fees. The appellate court held that Texas law governed under the contract’s choice-of-law clause since Louisiana did not have a more significant relationship or materially greater interest, and applying Texas law did not contravene Louisiana public policy. The indemnity provision was not void as against public policy or for illegality. The court affirmed the duty to defend and to indemnify, but vacated the judgment to the extent it would require indemnification for punitive and exemplary damages, and remanded for modification. It also vacated attorney’s fees awarded for the underlying Louisiana litigation, affirming only those fees related to the declaratory judgment action. View "Anadarko v. Alternative Environmental Solutions" on Justia Law