Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

After DSCI filed suit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom removed the case to federal district court and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of forum non conveniens, pointing to the forum-selection clause in the parties' contract. In this case, the contract provided that the Board of Grievances, a Saudi Arabian administrative court, shall be the assigned settlement of any disputes arising out of the contract. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Kingdom's motion, holding that the contract's forum-selection clause is mandatory and the dispute thus belonged before the Board of Grievances. View "D&S Consulting, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that an insurer's payment of an appraisal award barred an insured's claims under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA), Tex. Ins. Code chapter 542, holding that payment of an appraisal award does not extinguish TPPCA liability as a matter of law.After Insured's property sustained damage from a storm, Insurer valued the property damage at $5,153. Believing the property damage was undervalued, Insured sued, alleging breach of contract and extra-contractual claims and invoking the policy's appraisal clause. Appraisers valued the damage at almost $15,000. Insurer paid the balance of the award and then filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, as a matter of law, Insured could not maintain his TPPCA claim because Insurer paid the appraisal award. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the court of appeals' opinion was inconsistent with this Court's recent decisions on the issue. View "Perry v. United Services Automobile Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that an insurer's payment of an appraisal award barred an insured's claims under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA), Tex. Ins. Code chapter 542, holding that payment of an appraisal award does not extinguish TPPCA liability as a matter of law.After Insured's property sustained hail and wind damage, Insurer valued the property damage at $387. Believing the damage was undervalued, Insured sued, alleging breach of contract and extra-contractual claims. Insurer successfully moved the trial court to compel appraisal, and the appraisal award exceeded Insurer's prior estimates. Insurer paid the award and then filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, as a matter of law, Insured could not maintain his TPPCA claim because Insurer paid the appraisal award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals' opinion was inconsistent with this Court's recent decisions on the issue. View "Marchbanks v. Liberty Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

In this real estate dispute, the Supreme Court held that where the plain language of a special warranty deed limited the grantor's liability for failures of title to claims asserted by individuals "by, through and under" the grantor, the grantor could not be liable for breach of the covenant of seisin because the plaintiff asserted no such claim.The grantor of property, who purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, and the grantee entered into a residential sales contract, and the grantor conveyed the property by special warranty deed to the grantee. The grantee obtained title insurance from an insurer. When the validity of the foreclosure sale was challenged, the insurer assumed the grantee's defense and settled the suit. As the grantee's subrogee, the insurer sued the grantor for breach of the sales contract and breach of the implied covenant of seisin. The trial court found in favor of the insurer. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held (1) the special warranty deed barred the insurer's recovery because, regardless of whether it implied the covenant of seisin, the deed limited the grantor's liability for failures of title to claims asserted by individuals "by, through and under" the grantor; (2) because the failure of title did not arise from such a claim, the grantor was not liable for it; and (3) the merger doctrine barred the insurer's breach of contract claim. View "Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Cochran Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Navigators Specialty Insurance Company (Navigators) appealed a trial court order denying its special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiff Trilogy Plumbing, Inc. (Trilogy) alleged that Navigators, as Trilogy’s insurer, gave instructions with which Trilogy did not agree to attorneys Navigators had retained to defend Trilogy and wrongfully negotiated settlements without Trilogy’s consent. Navigators contended the alleged conduct constituted protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 (e)(2) and, therefore, the trial court erred by denying the anti-SLAPP motion. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed: the allegations challenged by the anti-SLAPP motion described Navigators’ mishandling of the claims process with regard to 33 different lawsuits involving Trilogy. While the alleged acts were generally connected to litigation, they did not include any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body and therefore did not constitute protected activity under section 425.16. View "Trilogy Plumbing, Inc. v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Defendant in this breach of contract case, holding that the evidence was sufficient to refute Defendant's argument that the alleged agreement was unenforceable.In granting summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that the alleged agreement relating to the transfer of real property was unenforceable because it was for an unlawful purpose, violated the statute of frauds, and lacked consideration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the parties' writings sufficiently set forth the substance of the parties' agreement to satisfy the statute of frauds; (2) the circuit court erred when it summarily concluded that the only reason Plaintiff transferred the property was to defraud the IRS; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to refute Defendant's argument that the alleged agreement failed as a matter of law for lack of consideration. View "Hanna v. Landsman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment for Hospital on Nurse's claims for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and defamation, holding that summary judgment was proper.Hospital terminated Nurse after it discovered errors in Nurse's documentation of controlled substances and Nurse's inability to account for controlled substances revamped from the dispensing system. Nurse brought suit against Hospital alleging several claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Hospital on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Hospital. View "Henning v. Avera McKennan Hospital" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Appellant's claims in three putative class action lawsuits against Defendants - Nestle USA, Inc., Mars, Inc., and The Hersey Company - holding that Appellant did not plausibly state a claim for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A and that Appellant's unjust enrichment claim was foreclosed by the availability of a remedy at law.Appellant alleged that Defendant's failure to disclose on the packaging of their chocolate products that upstream labor abuses existing in their cocoa supply chains violated Chapter 93A and that Defendants had been unjustly enriched by this packaging omission. The district court dismissed the claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not plausibly state a Chapter 93A unfairness claim; and (2) Appellant's unjust enrichment claims must be dismissed because an adequate remedy at law was available to her through Chapter 93A. View "Tomasella v. Nestle USA, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, a covenant not to compete was executed by an employee after the first day of employment. The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether the employer could enforce that provision in the post-employment timeframe although no new consideration was supplied in connection with its execution. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly denied a motion for a preliminary injunction: there was no evidence suggesting that, as of the commencement of the employment relationship, there was a meeting of the minds as to the noncompete agreement (NCA), or that the employee otherwise manifested his assent to provisions of the NCA that he was given, or an intent to be bound by them. View "Rullex Co., LLC. v. Tel-Stream, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting a preliminary injunction, holding that the court did not err when it found Plaintiff had a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its claims and was likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of action by the court.Pachira Energy LLC entered into an agreement with Northeast Natural Energy LLC establishing the Blacksville Area of Mutual Interest (Blacksville AMI) and setting forth guidelines for exploiting oil and gas leases and other mineral interests. Pachira later filed a complaint against Northeast Natural Energy LLC alleging that Northeast was breaching various agreements and was abusing its power to benefit itself, to the detriment of Pachira. Among other requests for relief, Pachira sought a permanent injunction stop Northeast's use of a jointly-owned water system within the Blacksville AMI to support Northeast's drilling operations outside the Blacksville AMI and to sell water to third parties outside the Blacksville AMI. The circuit court granted Pachira's motion for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it was fair for the circuit court to preserve the status quo until the parties' resolve the merits of their dispute and that there was no error in the preliminary injunction order. View "Northeast Natural Energy LLC v. Pachira Energy LLC" on Justia Law