Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court vacating a portion of an arbitration award that voided the guaranty agreement at issue in this case, holding that, contrary to the conclusion of the district court, the arbitrator acted within the scope of his powers.Massachusetts Technology Collaborative (MTC) contracted with KCST USA, Inc. to operate and market a fiber optic network in western Massachusetts. MTC also secured a guaranty of KCST's obligations under the contract from KCST's parent company, Axia NetMedia Corporation. Axia later sued MTC over the guaranty agreement. MTC sought an order compelling arbitration, which the district court granted. The arbitrator found that MTC had materially breached the agreement with KCST, and, therefore, that the guaranty agreement was void for failure of consideration. The district court concluded that the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of his powers and vacated the award. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his powers under section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Axia NetMedia Corp. v. Massachusetts Technology Park Corp." on Justia Law

Todd and Melissa Muller appealed a superior court decision granting summary judgment to their insurer, Progressive Northern Insurance Company. The Mullers challenged the court’s conclusions on how the setoff provision of their insurance policy should have been applied when there were multiple claimants. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that, construing the insurance policy as a whole, the setoff provision is unambiguous: It clearly provided that Progressive was entitled to reduce “all sums . . . paid” regardless of the number of claims made. View "Progressive Northern Insurance Company v. Muller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the district court committed harmless error in failing to suppress a blood test result, holding that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that Defendant could be guilty of an alternative charge.Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, the district court convicted Defendant of driving with a blood alcohol content of more than 0.08 as measured within three hours of driving. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that, even though the district court should have suppressed the blood test result, the stipulation included facts that supported a conviction on an alternative charge that was not a part of the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by not considering and applying the conditions that limited the binding nature of the parties' stipulation. View "State v. Braun" on Justia Law

Phytelligence, an agricultural biotechnology company that used tissue culture to grow trees, and Washington State University (WSU) contracted for the propagation of WSU's patented “WA 38” apple trees. Section 4 of the agreement was entitled “option to participate as a provider and/or seller in [WSU] licensing programs.” The parties acknowledged that WSU would need to “grant a separate license for the purpose of selling.” Phytelligence expressed concern about the “wispy forward commitment.” WSU responded that “Phytelligence and others would have a shot at securing commercial licenses.”WSU later requested proposals for commercializing WA 38. Phytelligence did not submit a proposal. WSU accepted PVM’s proposal, granting PVM an exclusive license that required PVM to subcontract exclusively with NNII, a fruit tree nursery association, to propagate and sell WA 38 trees. Phytelligence later notified WSU that it wanted to exercise its option. WSU responded that PVM was WSU’s “agent.” Phytelligence rejected PVM’s requirement to become an NNII member and two non-membership proposals for obtaining commercial rights to WA 38. WSU terminated the Propagation Agreement, alleging that Phytelligence breached the Agreement when it sold WA 38 to a third-party without a license and that such actions infringed its plant patent and its COSMIC CRISP trademark.Phytelligence sued, alleging breach of the Agreement. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of WSU. Section 4 is an unenforceable agreement to agree. WSU did not commit to any definite terms of a future license. View "Phytelligence Inc. v. Washington State University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing a corporation's (the Corporation) counterclaims after it was sued by two trusts (the Trusts), holding that the district court erred by dismissing the counterclaims.The Trusts sued the Corporation for payment of loans they made to the Corporation to finance its oil and gas service operations in Australia. The Corporation asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaims. The district court dismissed the counterclaims on the grounds that they unduly complicated the action. The jury ruled that the Trusts had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that the Corporation owed reduced damages to one of the trusts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred by dismissing the Corporation's counterclaims because Wyo. R. Civ. P. 13 does not authorize courts to dismiss permissible counterclaims simply because they would unduly complicate the action; and (2) on remand, the court must address a few problems with the jury instructions. View "Gas Sensing Technology Corp. v. New Horizon Ventures Pty Ltd" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of UIG's complaint alleging claims for fraud and detrimental reliance. UIG obtained a loan from Pedestal Bank and Wolters Kluwer provided written certification that the property subject to the loan was not in a flood hazard area. When the loan came up for renewal, the bank informed UIG that the property was in a special flood hazard area and required flood insurance. Because the company was unable to afford flood insurance, the bank foreclosed on the property.After determining that it had jurisdiction over the appeal, the court held that the district court did not err in ruling that UIG failed to state a claim for fraud. In this case, the only relevant fact that UIG has alleged beyond what little it alleges "on information and belief" is that Wolters Kluwer provided "written certification that the property subject to the loan was not in a flood hazard area that required insurance under FEMA regulations pursuant to the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973." The court held that this fact alone can ground nothing more than speculation as to the cause of the error. Likewise, UIG's claim of detrimental reliance failed. View "Umbrella Investment Group, LLC v. Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

After Buyers purchased two care facilities from Sellers, Buyers filed suit alleging that Sellers made fraudulent or, at best, negligent misrepresentations in the parties' sale agreements. Buyers also brought claims against Sellers' representatives in their individual capacities.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Buyers' claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court held that the district court properly dismissed Buyers' non-fraud claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contractual representations and warranties because these claims were subject to arbitration. In regard to the remaining claims, the court held that Buyers have not adequately pleaded a misrepresentation with respect to both facilities and thus they failed to meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Therefore, because there was no misrepresentation, there was no fraud. View "Colonial Oaks Assisted Living Lafayette, LLC v. Hannie Development, Inc." on Justia Law

The Dais obtained a loan from Apex secured by a mortgage on their laundromat. The laundromat ceased operations; the Dais defaulted. Apex agreed to accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure if the property was marketable. A December 2008 inspection revealed that it was in disrepair, exposed to the elements, and open to vagrants. Apex took measures to preserve the property and returned the deed to the Dais in April 2009. In December 2010, two Chicago firefighters lost their lives battling a blaze at the abandoned laundromat. Their estates sued Apex. Apex and the estates settled. Apex's insurer, Federal, denied coverage, citing a policy exclusion for any liability or loss "arising out of property you acquire by foreclosure, repossession, deed in lieu of foreclosure or as mortgagee in possession.” The district court granted Federal summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated, applying Pennsylvania law. Summary judgment was inappropriate given the open question of material fact: who possessed the property at the time of the fire. Apex instructed its realtor to post a notice informing the Dais how to obtain keys for the new locks. Apex urged the Dais to inspect and secure the property. In July 2009, Dai ordered a handyman to board up the property after being cited for building code violations. In October 2009, Dai entered into a settlement to cure the code infractions by November 2010. He failed to do so and served 180 days in jail. Apex had no contact with the property after April 2009. View "Apex Mortgage Corp. v. Great Northern Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Carrier manufactures residential Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems. ECIMOS produced the quality-control system that tested completed HVAC units at the end of Carrier’s assembly line. ECIMOS alleged that Carrier infringed on its copyright on its database-script source code—a part of ECIMOS’s software that stores test results. ECIMOS alleges that Carrier improperly used the database and copied certain aspects of the code to aid a third-party’s development of new testing software that Carrier now employs in its Collierville, Tennessee manufacturing facility.ECIMOS won a $7.5 million jury award. The court reduced Carrier’s total damages liability to $6,782,800; enjoined Carrier from using its new database, but stayed the injunction until Carrier could develop a new, non-infringing database subject to the supervision of a special master; and enjoined Carrier from disclosing ECIMOS’s trade secrets while holding that certain elements of ECIMOS’s system were not protectable as trade secrets (such as ECIMOS’s assembled hardware). The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. There are sufficient reasons to conclude that Carrier did infringe on ECIMOS’s copyright, but Carrier’s liability to ECIMOS based on its copyright infringement and its breach of contract can total no more than $5,566,050. The district court did not err when it crafted its post-trial injunctions. View "ECIMOS, LLC v. Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery held that management of a Delaware corporation does not have the authority unilaterally to preclude a director of the corporation from obtaining the corporation's privileged information.This dispute concerned obtaining access to privileged communications among management of a company, its in-house counsel, and its outside counsel. The company, acting by and under the direction of a special committee of the company's board of directors, filed an action against a corporation and an L.P. alleging that the defendants breached contractual obligations they owed to the company. The special committee sought access to the privileged communications in order to oppose the company's motion for leave to voluntarily dismiss the complaint. The Court of Chancery held that the members of the special committee were entitled to discovery of the privileged communications. View "In re WeWork Litigation" on Justia Law