Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding Central Environmental Services, LLC (CES) damages, holding that a court may not award damages based on both unjust enrichment and breach of contract where such theories of recovery arise from the same set of facts.Gulfport Energy corporation entered into a contract with CES whereby CES agreed to provide services at Gulfport's wells. Some of CES's invoices remained unpaid when the business relationship ended. CES sued Gulfport alleging that Gulfport breached the contract and was unjustly enriched by CES's performance. The circuit court awarded CES $144,038. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the circuit court awarded judgment based, at least in part, on unjust enrichment where the litigants were parties to an express contract, the circuit court's order must be reversed. View "Gulfport Energy Corp. v. Harbert Private Equity Partners, LP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying the motion filed by Plaintiff, an oil and gas drilling company, for summary judgment and denying Plaintiff a favorable declaratory judgment, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to imply into an existing oil and gas lease a covenant to pool and unitize the lease with nearby mineral estates.Plaintiff brought this action seeking a declaration that the oil and gas lease at issue contained an implied covenant to pool or unitize the lease with other mineral interests. The circuit court rejected Plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment, holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that there can be no implied covenant to pool or unitize in the absence of language in the lease showing the parties contemplated that a lessor has a right to pool and unitize the lease with other estates. View "Ascent Resources - Marcellus, LLC v. Huffman" on Justia Law

Gulf LNG Energy, LLC owned and operated a liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) terminal in Mississippi (the “Pascagoula Facility”). Gulf LNG Pipeline, LLC (collectively with Gulf LNG Energy, LLC, “Gulf”), owned and operated a five-mile long pipeline that distributed LNG from the Pascagoula Facility to downstream inland pipelines. Eni USA Gas Marketing LLC (“Eni”), marketed natural gas products and offered related services to customers in the U.S. In 2007, Gulf and Eni entered into a Terminal Use Agreement (the “TUA”), whereby Gulf would construct the Pascagoula Facility, and Eni would use the Facility to receive, store, regasify, and deliver imported LNG to downstream businesses. Under the TUA, Eni agreed to pay Gulf fees for using the Facility, including monthly Reservation Fees and Operating Fees. In 2016, Eni filed for arbitration, alleging the U.S. natural gas market had undergone a “radical change” due to “unforeseen, vast new production and supply of shale gas in the United States [that] made import of LNG into the United States economically irrational and unsustainable.” Eni alleged the essential purpose of the TUA had been frustrated and thus terminated because of “fundamental and unforeseeable change in the United States natural gas/LNG market,” and sought a declaration that Eni could terminate the TUA at any time because Gulf breached warranties and covenants. After the first arbitration, the panel order Eni to pay Gulf "just compensation ...for the value their partial performance of the TUA conferred upon Eni." Gulf subsequently sued Eni to collect the arbitration award; judgment was entered in Gulf's favor. Eni initiated a second arbitration, again asserting breaches of the TUA. Gulf moved to dismiss the second arbitration. The Court of Chancery ruled the issues raised in the second arbitration were already decided in the first (and subsequent court case). The Delaware Supreme Court, after its review of these proceedings, determined: (1) the Court of Chancery had jurisidction to enjoin a collateral attack on the first arbitration award; and (2) the Court of Chancery should have enjoined all claims in the second arbitration between the parties, because the admitted goal of the second arbitration was to "raise irregularities and revisit the financial award in the first arbitration." The Court, therefore, affirmed part of the Court of Chancery's judgment affirming dismissal of the second arbitration, and reversed any part of the lower court's judgment allowing certain issues in the second arbitration to be considered. View "Gulf LNG Energy v. ENI USA Gas Marketing" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Ruth Ann Pinson and dismissing Denise Johnson's claim that Ruth's husband, Mark Pinson, violated West Virginia's Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act's (UFTA), W. Va. Code 40-1A-1 to -15, prohibition against fraudulent transfers, holding that Plaintiff did not present evidence demonstrating the existence of a material fact regarding Mark's status as her debtor within the meaning of the UFTA.Johnson asserted that Mark conveyed real property to Ruth with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Johnson's attempt to collect on a judgment assigned to her by a third party. The circuit court found that Ruth was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not misinterpret the UFTA or err in denying Johnson's motion to amend the complaint to add Mark as a defendant. View "Johnson v. Pinson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that Defendant had committed fraud in connection with a contract for dredging work to be performed in Massachusetts and in awarding Plaintiff $148,626 in damages, holding that the district court did not err.The jury's finding of fraud in this case was based on Massachusetts law. On appeal, Defendant argued that the court erred in determining at summary judgment that Massachusetts law applied to the fraud claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court was plainly correct that Massachusetts law applied; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (2) the arbitration clause in the contract between the parties' businesses did not bar this lawsuit. View "Hisert v. Haschen" on Justia Law

A defendant is not required to file a new answer reasserting its affirmative defenses when the claim in the amended complaint related to those affirmative defenses remains the same. After ES entered into a contract with KST to provide services to NASA, KST filed suit against ES after ES's nonpayment of invoices. The district court granted summary judgment sua sponte to KST on its breach of contract claim.Applying de novo review, the Ninth Circuit held that, by not giving ES notice and the opportunity to assert its affirmative defenses, the district court erred in granting summary judgment sua sponte. The panel also held that ES was not required to respond and reassert its affirmative defenses to KST's Second Amended Complaint because ES had already asserted those affirmative defenses in response to the same breach of contract claim in the First Amended Complaint. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and entry of judgment for KST and remanded with instructions for the district court to allow ES to show why KST is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on KST's breach of contract claim. View "KST Data, Inc. v. DXC Technology Co." on Justia Law

Engineered Sales filed suit against Endress, alleging a violation of the Minnesota Termination of Sales Representatives Act. At issue is whether the Act, as amended in 2014, applies to their contractual relationship.The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's ruling as to whether Endress had "good cause" and otherwise violated the Act in its termination of the agreement. The court held that Engineered Sales continued to solicit orders with Endress's "consent or acquiescence" after August 1, 2014, and thus the parties' agreement was renewed after August 1, 2014, making the anti-waiver provision applicable to its terms. The court also held that the parties' Indiana choice-of-law provision would allow Endress to circumvent the requirements of the Act in this case, and thus the provision is void and unenforceable under Minn. Stat. 325E.37, subd. 7. View "Engineered Sales, Co. v. Endress + Hauser, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the University and others alleging that the parties' collective bargaining agreements' (CBA) "Conflict of Interest/Outside Activities" policy was unconstitutionally vague, that his termination breached the CBA, and that the University had used his insubordination as a pretext for First Amendment retaliation. Plaintiff's action stemmed from the University's termination of plaintiff after he attracted national news media attention for publicly questioning whether the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting had in fact occurred.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment rulings and its denial of plaintiff's post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's failure to exhaust the CBA's mandatory grievance-and-arbitration procedures barred his claim that the University breached the CBA by firing him. Although the court affirmed the district court on the constitutional claims, the court applied a different analysis. Without deciding the issue, the court assumed for the purposes of this appeal that plaintiff could constitutionally challenge the Policy on vagueness grounds. The court held that plaintiff's vagueness challenge failed on the merits, and his facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to the Policy's reporting requirement failed. Furthermore, plaintiff's challenge to the Policy's conflict-of-interest provision failed on the merits. Because plaintiff's constitutional challenges failed, his declaratory judgment claim based on the same grounds also failed. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the Faculty Senate meeting transcript. View "Tracy v. Florida Atlantic University Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that section 685.300(i)(1) defines the term "borrower defense claim" to include—rather than exclude—breach-of-contract and misrepresentation claims—and, accordingly, that section 685.300(f) prohibits Grand Canyon from enforcing its pre-dispute arbitration agreement with respect to plaintiff's claims here. In this case, Grand Canyon urges a reading of section 685.300 that would not only (1) exclude bread-and-butter breach-of-contract and misrepresentation claims—the claims that complaining borrowers are most likely to bring—but also (2) include non-contract and non-misrepresentation claims only if reduced to judgment, thereby rendering that aspect of the borrower-defense-claim protection meaningless. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision to the contrary. View "Young v. Grand Canyon University, Inc." on Justia Law

Donna’s former husband, Carl, retired from Ford in 1998 and participated in Ford’s retirement plan. “In the event of an error” in calculating a pension, the plan requires a beneficiary to return the overpayment “without limitation.” A committee runs the plan, with “discretionary authority" to reduce the repayment. Carl and Donna divorced in 2009. Donna received half of the marital portion of Carl’s pension. Donna agreed to postpone drawing the pension. In 2013, Ford offered a lump sum payment in place of future monthly benefits and a $351,690 retroactive payment for the postponed monthly benefits. After paying taxes, Donna invested some of the money and gave some to her children. Ford audited Donna’s benefits. It discovered that the retroactive pension payment mistakenly included benefits from 1998, when Carl retired, instead of 2009. The payment should have been $108,500. Ford requested repayment; the committee invited Donna to apply for a hardship reduction. The application required disclosure of her finances, including her other substantial retirement funds and an inheritance. Donna did not apply; she sued.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Ford. The committee’s actions were neither wrong nor arbitrary. Donna did not establish that Ford’s inclusion of an incorrect retroactive-payment amount constituted constructive fraud. She knew that the retroactive payment was too high when she got it, the plan put her on notice that Ford could demand repayment, and she has the capacity to return the money. View "Zirbel v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law