Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Hillarie and Keith Levy appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit filed against defendant, Only Cremations for Pets, Inc. Plaintiffs alleged it agreed to cremate individually two of their dogs, but then intentionally sent them random ashes instead. Plaintiffs sought recovery of emotional distress damages under contract and tort law. The Court of Appeal determined: the complaint failed to state a cause of action under any contract theory; and there were no factual allegations showing the existence of any contract between plaintiffs and defendant. Plaintiffs’ veterinarian, not plaintiffs, contracted with defendant. However, the complaint adequately pled two tort theories: trespass to chattel and negligence. The Court found allegations here "fit comfortably" in a cause of action for trespass to chattel claim, which permitted recovery of emotional distress damages. The allegations also supported a negligence cause of action because defendant advertised its services as providing emotional solace, and thus it was foreseeable that a failure to use reasonable care with the ashes would result in emotional distress. The Court reversed and remanded, giving plaintiffs an opportunity to plead more fully a third-party beneficiary cause of action. View "Levy v. Only Cremations for Pets, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal without prejudice based on forum non conveniens. The district court enforced a disputed forum selection clause requiring litigation in the 19th Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana.The court held that the forum selection clause contained in Section 107.01 of the 2006 Standard Specifications governs the dispute at issue, is mandatory, and is enforceable. The court also held that appellant has waived any argument that public-interest factors require retention of this suit in the federal court system. View "PCL Civil Constructors, Inc. v. Arch Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court entering judgment for Defendant, holding that Plaintiff's present challenge to the judgment was already conclusively resolved in his prior appeal.While the jury was deliberating, the parties agreed with limit their risks with a deal that put caps on what Plaintiff would receive and what Defendant would pay. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant. The district court dismissed the case consistent with the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order that entered judgment for Defendant. Thereafter, Defendant refused to pay the amount agreed upon, and so Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the agreement. The district court denied Plaintiff's motion to enforce the agreement. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff made no attack on the judgment that couldn't have been raised in the prior appeal. View "Freer v. DAC, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a contract dispute between Pizza Inn and defendant, a franchisee of Pizza Inn. Defendant held an option to renew but failed to timely notify Pizza Inn that he wished to do so; Pizza Inn did not honor the tardy notice of renewal and did not renew; and a jury subsequently awarded damages to defendant after finding that Pizza Inn breached the contract. The district court upheld the verdict and awarded defendant attorneys' fees.The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly applied the equitable-intervention doctrine. The court held that, because strict compliance with the agreement does not result in unconscionable hardship, equitable intervention is inapplicable. The court rejected defendant's asserted hardships: forfeiture of a portion of his initial investment, forfeiture of future profits, and shuttering a Pizza Inn franchise store. The court also held that the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees. The court rendered judgment in favor of Pizza Inn. View "Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Clairday" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of West Virginia Counties Group Self-Insurance Risk Pool, Inc.'s (WVCoRP) claims against Great Cacapon Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. (VFD), holding that the circuit court did not err.When a fire destroyed the building where VFD was housed, the owner of the building, the Morgan County Commission, was reimbursed for the loss by WVCoRP. Seeking to recover the funds it expended, WVCoRP sued the VFD and other parties for negligence. In the process, WVCoRP invoked a contractual right to subrogation. The circuit court determined that the claims against VFD were barred by W. Va. Code 29-12A-13(c), which prohibits claims against political subdivisions made under a right of subrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) WVCoRP's claims spring from its coverage contract with the Commission and fall within any plain meaning of subrogation; and (2) section 29-12A-13(c) is not an insurance law of the State from which WVCoRP is exempt. View "West Virginia Counties Group v. Great Cacapon Volunteer Fire Department, Inc." on Justia Law

Pogue, believing that he had a severe anxiety disorder that prevented him from practicing as a family doctor, submitted a disability claim to his long-term disability insurers: Northwestern Mutual and Principal Life. Pogue failed to disclose that the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners had suspended his license for mis-prescribing painkillers. His insurers found out and denied both of his claims. Pogue sued, alleging breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.In Pogue’s lawsuit against Northwestern, the district court granted Northwestern summary judgment on two alternative grounds: the suspension occurred before Pogue became disabled, and the suspension caused stress and anxiety and thus contributed to his disability. The Sixth Circuit court affirmed on the first ground and declined to consider the second ground. When Pogue’s lawsuit against Principal reached summary judgment, the district court applied issue preclusion and relied on the Northwestern district court’s holding that the suspension of Pogue’s license contributed to his disability. The court did not address whether the suspension occurred before Pogue became disabled and also granted summary judgment on Pogue’s bad-faith claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred by giving preclusive effect to an alternative holding on which the Sixth Circuit declined to rule. View "Pogue v. Principal Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a cognovit promissory note signed by debtors was defective, holding that the contract, viewed as a whole, put the debtors on notice of the rights they were relinquishing by signing the note.Progressive Polymers, LLC and Darin Bay obtained a loan from Sutton Bank secured by a cognovit promissory note. The note included a confession-of-judgment clause containing a warrant of attorney by which Progressive Polymers and Bay agreed that if they defaulted on the note an attorney could confess judgment against them. Sutton Bank later filed a complaint for a cognovit judgment against Progressive Polymers and Bay, alleging default. The trial court ruled in favor of Sutton Bank and issued the cognovit judgment. The court of appeals vacated the cognovit judgment, concluding that the note did not meet the strict requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2323.13(D) and was therefore not a valid cognovit note upon which judgment could be entered. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although cognovit clauses are construed strictly against those seeking to enforce them, courts must still give effect to the clear intent of the parties when interpreting them. View "Sutton Bank v. Progressive Polymers, LLC" on Justia Law

Scott Carter, Amelia Carter, and Scott Carter, Inc., dba Carter Dental (collectively “Carter”) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Gateway Parks, LLC (hereinafter “Gateway”). This case concerned Carter’s second attempt to litigate the propriety of the use of his investment funds in a proposed snowpark in Eagle, Idaho. Carter sued Gateway for common law fraud in the inducement and under the “general fraud” provisions of the Uniform Securities Act of 2004 (Idaho Code section 30-14-501, et seq), alleging Gateway had misrepresented and failed to disclose its use of Carter’s investment funds in Gateway with an intent to defraud him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Gateway, finding Carter’s claims were: (1) barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata; and (2) because Carter could not establish the essential elements of a fraud claim. The district court also awarded attorney fees and costs to Gateway. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Carter v. Gateway Parks LLC" on Justia Law

Brenda and James Gustin appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Vulcan Termite and Pest Control, Inc. ("Vulcan"), and its general manager, Fred Smith. In 1998, Vulcan was hired by a construction company to pretreat a house in Shelby County, Alabama for termites. The house was three stories tall, with three concrete decks overlooking a lake. The decks were supported by 18 wooden columns. Additionally, to the left of the front door was a porte cochere for vehicles to pass through on their way up the driveway. The exterior of the house was entirely covered in faux-stone cladding. The Gustins purchased the house in 2006. In 2009, the Gustins entered into a contract with Vulcan for termite-damage inspection, treatment, and repair. In 2015, they hired a decorating company to renovate on of the rooms in the house. The company removed several sections of beadboard from the porte cochere, revealing extensive termite damage. Removing some of the cladding from the facade, the Gustins discovered active termites and severe damage to all levels and all sides of the house, as well as damage to a deck. The Gustins hired an expert, who estimated it would cost roughtly $950,000 to repair the house. Several days after the damage was discovered, Smith went to the house to inspect, and observed the active termites. Vulcan did not repair the house. The Gustins sued. In granting summary judgment, the trial court found "no evidence Vulcan breached the contract by failing to discover hidden termites. The Gustins presented no evidence that the annual inspection were not performed in accordance with the regulations or industry standards." The Alabama Supreme Court's review of the record indicated the Gustins submitted "substantial evidence" that Vulcan committed acts and omissions underlying each of their seven breach-of-contract claims. That evidence created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Vulcan breached its duty to "perform all services in a workmanlike manner," as the contract required. While the Court agreed with the trial court and affirmed as to some causes of action, it reversed with respect to others, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gustin v. Vulcan Termite and Pest Control, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting judgment in favor of an accountant and his new firm on his claims against his former firm, holding that the judgment was not in error.After Plaintiff left one firm to join another, he sued Defendant, his former firm, with whom he was a shareholder and officer. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to perform a mandatory provision in the shareholder agreement to buy out a departing shareholder's corporate shares at a price that accounted for lost billings by virtue of clients following a departing shareholder. Defendant brought counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of confidential information and third-party claims against Plaintiff's new firm, including tortious interference with business expectations. All claims presented to the jury were determined in favor of Plaintiff and his new firm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that all claims were correctly decided in favor of Plaintiff and his new firm. View "Dick v. Koski Professional Group, P.C." on Justia Law