Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Two trees fell on Christopherson’s home, months apart, resulting in its total destruction. The village ordered demolition. Christopherson’s insurer, ASI, had advanced living expenses but did not provide the requested demolition payment by the village's deadline, so Christopherson razed the house himself. He did not provide invoices for the demolition or for his own labor. Christopherson sued, alleging bad-faith denial of policy benefits and informed ASI that, excluding personal property losses and additional living expenses yet to be determined, Christopherson’s losses were $143,384: the $135,000 dwelling coverage limit, $6,884 for demolition, and $1,500 for tree removal. ASI indicated that it would pay that amount, noting that it had not yet received any notice of claims for personal property.The court granted ASI a discovery protective order with respect to the bad faith claim, reasoning that Christopherson could not establish any underlying breach of the policies. ASI had already paid the full limits of his 2018–19 policy, Christopherson’s claims under his 2017–18 policy, and his additional living expenses under both policies. ASI obtained summary judgment. Christopherson had not presented evidence of costs actually incurred but not paid by ASI and could not show a breach; he had nearly exhausted the limits under both policies.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the case should be remanded to state court. Christopherson’s arguments ignore policy provisions that the insured must first incur the expenses and then provide the insurer with documentation before the insurer is obliged to pay. View "Christopherson v. American Strategic Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal vacated and remanded the trial court's order granting respondent's anti-SLAPP motion to strike Brighton's cross-claim for fraud. The parties' dispute stemmed from a contract between respondent and Brighton where Brighton would pay respondent $3,000 for a one-day photo shoot. Respondent filed suit against Brighton, alleging that the company failed to pay her immediately upon completion of the photoshoot. Brighton cross-complained, asserting claims for declaratory relief and fraud.The court concluded that, even if it were to assume that respondent met her burden of showing that Brighton's cross-claim for fraud arose from protected conduct, reversal is required because Brighton has shown a probability that it will prevail on its claim. In this case, the evidence submitted shows that Brighton's fraud cross-claim has the requisite minimal merit where Brighton submitted evidence that respondent made a misrepresentation when she told the company to pay LA Models for her services during the photoshoot upon receipt of an invoice rather than immediately upon her "termination" as an employee when the shoot concluded; it can be inferred that plaintiff knew that misrepresentation was false based on her actions, she intended for Brighton to rely on her misrepresentation, and Brighton justifiably did so; and reliance on respondent's misrepresentation damaged Brighton by exposing it to $90,000 in waiting-time penalties plus attorney fees and costs— in addition to the costs Brighton incurred in defending itself against her lawsuit. View "Brighton Collectibles, LLC v. Hockey" on Justia Law

Attorney Malcolm Murphy requested his client, Kenneth Borries, sign three promissory notes for legal services rendered. After Borries failed to pay the notes, Murphy filed suit. Borries appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Murphy. Because Borries did not deny voluntarily signing the promissory notes and because the notes contained clear and unambiguous terms, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Murphy. View "Borries v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court refusing to compel arbitration in this case alleging violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code 5-11-1 to -20, holding that the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) could not enforce the arbitration agreement.Plaintiff, a nurse who formerly worked for Sunbelt Staffing, LLC, signed an employment agreement containing an arbitration provision. Plaintiff was assigned to work at a hospital under DHHR's direction but later was informed she was not eligible to return to work for DHHR. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against DHHR and others, alleging violations of the Act. DHHR moved to dismiss the amended complaint and to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) DHHR had no right to invoke arbitration contained in the employment agreement; and (2) the theory of estoppel did not require arbitration. View "W. Va. Department of Health & Human Resources v. Denise" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against HealthEast and others, alleging multiple causes of action related to peer review determinations stemming from his practice of neurosurgery. After the district court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, three claims remained against appellees: defamation, tortious interference with prospective economic relationship, and tortious interference with contract. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims and the district court granted their motion.As to the defamation claims, the Eighth Circuit concluded that only three statements are before the court on appeal because plaintiff did not amend his complaint to incorporate the additional allegedly defamatory statements identified during discovery and, given the requirement that defamation claims be pleaded with specificity, only the statements included in the amended complaint can form the basis of plaintiff's claim. As to the first remaining statement, the court concluded that it was waived. In regard to the two remaining statements, the court concluded that Minnesota peer review immunity applies.As to the tortious interference claims, the court concluded that to the extent these alleged interferences occurred solely through the peer review process itself, appellees are entitled to peer review immunity. In the event peer review immunity does not fully shield appellees, these claims failed on the merits. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that appellees were entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims, and the court affirmed its judgment. View "Sherr v. HealthEast Care System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Defendants' appeal of a superior court order denying their "motion to vacate" a foreign judgment rendered in New York, which was brought in accordance with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, chapter 32 of title 9 of the Rhode Island General Laws, holding that the superior court did not err.In denying Defendants' motion to vacate, the hearing justice concluded that Defendants did not meet their "heavy burden" to overturn the New York default judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) New York law must be applied in addressing the forgery argument presented by Defendants; (2) applying New York law, Defendants failed to meet their burden of rebutting the presumption of due execution accompanying acknowledgements and notarial signatures, and therefore, the subject forum selection clause was valid; and (3) the New York court had personal jurisdiction over Defendants. View "Aspen American Insurance Co. v. East Coast Precast & Rigging LLC" on Justia Law

Donald Zucker appealed a summary-judgment decision awarding attorney’s fees to Gregory Wark, because Zucker refused to mediate a dispute arising out of a real estate purchase and sale agreement. On appeal, Zucker argued he was not required to mediate because the purchase and sale agreement was not an enforceable contract. To this, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, reversed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment, and vacated the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. View "Zucker v. Wark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying Aerotek, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration, holding that an alleged signatory's simple denial that he signed the record was insufficient to prevent attribution of an electronic signature to him.Plaintiffs, four individuals, were hired by Aerotek to work as contractors on a construction project. After all four were terminated, they sued Aerotek and others for racial discrimination and retaliation. Aerotek moved to compel arbitration based on an online-only hiring application that each employee had completed. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that they had completed the online hiring application but denying that they had ever seen or signed a mutual arbitration agreement (MAA) within the application. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Aerotek's argument that it had conclusively established the validity of the MAAs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Aerotek conclusively established that Plaintiffs signed, and therefore consented to, the MAAs; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in denying Aerotek's motion to compel arbitration. View "Aerotek, Inc. v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing in part the ruling of the district court that Plaintiff was the prevailing party entitled to fees, holding that when a plaintiff recovers less at trial than the amount of a rejected offer to confess judgment, Iowa Code 677.10.bars recovery of the plaintiff's attorney fees incurred after the offer.The parties litigated claims over the breach of a farm lease entitling the "prevailing party" to recover reasonable attorney fees. Plaintiff's presuit demand was $190,564, and Defendant made a pretrial offer to confess judgment for $75,000. Plaintiff rejected the offer. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury awarded Plaintiff just over $41,000. Both sides sought attorney fees, and the district court granted them to Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that a plaintiff recovering less than the amount of the offer to confess cannot recover postoffer attorney attorney fees that are taxed as costs under Iowa Code 625.25. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) prevailing party contractual fees are considered "costs" when determining the effect of an offer to confess judgment; and (2) Iowa Code sections 677.10 and 625.22 operated together to preclude recover of Plaintiff's attorney fees incurred after it rejected the offer to confess judgment. View "NCJC, Inc. v. WMG, L.C." on Justia Law

In 2009, Carhartt contracted with Innovative to create a flame-resistant fleece fabric for use in its line of flame-resistant garments. The fabric that Innovative developed for Carhartt, “Style 2015," contained a modacrylic fiber, “Protex-C.” Innovative agreed that it would conduct flame-resistance testing on the Style 2015 fabric before shipping it to Carhartt, using the industry-standard test, ASTM D6413. Carhartt sent Innovative emails in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 stating that Carhartt would do “regular, random testing on the product that is received.” Carhartt performed visual inspections but did not conduct flame-resistance testing until 2016. The Style 2015 fabric failed the D6413 test. Carhartt notified Innovative, which then conducted its own testing and concluded that Style 2015 fabrics dating back to 2014 did not pass flame-resistance testing. In 2013, Innovative stopped using Protex-C and began using a different modacrylic fiber without notice to Carhartt.The district court granted Innovative summary judgment on Carhartt’s negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, false advertising claims. breach of contract and warranty claims. The court reasoned that Carhartt did not notify Innovative of the suspected breach within a reasonable amount of time after Carhartt should have discovered the defect, as required by Michigan’s Uniform Commercial Code. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Carhartt should have discovered the breach sooner by performing regular, destructive fire-resistance testing on the fabric. View "Carhartt, Inc. v. Innovative Textiles, Inc." on Justia Law