Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Keles was admitted into Rutgers’s Civil and Environmental Engineering (CEE) Department’s graduate program and received his M.S. degree in 2014. While pursuing this degree, Keles expressed his interest in continuing his studies as a Ph.D. student. To continue their studies as Ph.D. students, M.S. students in the CEE Department must submit a “Change-in-Status” form, identifying advisors and describing their research plans. At the end of the M.S. program, Keles submitted an incomplete Change-in-Status form. Keles disputed that he needed to submit a completed Change-in-Status form due to his claimed enrollment as an M.S.-Ph.D. student. Members of the CEE Department and the University’s administration informed him that he needed to satisfy the admission prerequisites. Keles neither found an advisor nor submitted a completed form but sought to register for classes in 2015. Rutgers’s Administration informed Keles that his lack of academic standing prevented him from registering.Keles sued, alleging contract, tort, statutory, and due process claims. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit, finding that Rutgers adhered to its own policies and did not act in bad faith. All M.S. students were subject to the same departmental requirements. Rutgers afforded Keles sufficient process and did not venture “beyond the pale of reasoned academic decisionmaking.” View "Keles v. Bender" on Justia Law

After Phillips invoked the force majeure clause to terminate its agreement to sell a Rudolf Stingel painting on behalf of JN based on COVID-19 nonessential business restrictions, JN filed suit for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable estoppel.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Phillips's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, agreeing with the district court that the pandemic constituted "a circumstance beyond the parties' reasonable control" as contemplated by their agreement, rejecting JN's arguments to the contrary. The court also rejected JN's contention that the district court erred in dismissing its claim for breach of another agreement, the Basquiat Agreement. Rather, the court concluded that the Basquiat Agreement was not integrated with the Stingel Agreement and was fully performed where JN signed the Stingel Agreement, and Phillips auctioned off the Basquiat Painting and paid the seller a guaranteed sum. Furthermore, assuming the Basquiat Agreement required Phillips to fully perform the Stingel Agreement, Phillips's proper invocation of the force majeure clause excused its performance. Finally, JN's remaining contentions regarding its implied covenant claim, bad faith claims, and breach of fiduciary duty claim are unavailing. View "JN Contemporary Art LLC v. Phillips Auctioneers LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court ruling that an umbrella insurance policy between Motorists Mutual Insurance Company (Motorists)and Owens-Brockway Glass container, Inc. (Owens) did not apply to claims made against Ironics, Inc. by Owens, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Owens asserted claims against Ironics for, among other claims, breach of contract. Ironics asked its insurer, Motorists, to defend and indemnify it against Owens's claims under a commercial general-liability policy and a commercial umbrella policy with Motorists. The trial court concluded that neither policy covered Owens's claims and granted summary judgment for Motorists. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that Ironics was entitled to coverage under the umbrella policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Owens's claims arose out of an accident that resulted in "property damage" under Ironic's umbrella policy with Motorists and that none of the policy's exclusions applied. View "Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ironics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint against eighteen defendants relating to the installation of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) units at a property owned by Yellowstone Lodging, LLC, holding that Appellant did not meet the constitutional or prudential requirements of standing.Yellowstone, which owned and operated a hotel in West Yellowstone, hired and entered into contracts with several HVAC contractors to upgrade the HVAC system at the motel. Appellant, the sole member of Yellowstone, brought this complaint alleging thirty-nine claims related to the HVAC system, as well as claims of legal malpractice against the law firm and attorney Appellant originally engaged to pursue these claims on behalf of Yellowstone. The district court concluded that Appellant lacked standing to sue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant may not, through an assignment, bring Yellowstone's claims on his own behalf and without counsel. View "Sagorin v. Sunrise Heating & Cooling, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion to compel arbitration, holding that the circuit court did not err.Respondents Louise McGraw and Charlotte Rodgers, by and through their daughters, Nancy Reuschel and Loretta Holcomb, filed a complaint against Petitioner, Chancellor Senior Management, Ltd., arguing that Petitioner defrauded their mothers by making misrepresentations and misleading statements and concealing material facts, in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA). See W. Va. Code 46A-1-101 to -8-102. Petitioner filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision set forth in the residency agreement Reuschel and Holcomb signed on behalf of their motions. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the agreement could not be enforced as written. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that the arbitration agreement could not be enforced as written because it did not "comply with its own stated standards." View "Chancellor Senior Management, Ltd. v. McGraw" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that the parties' contract in this case and its arbitration provision were unenforceable on the grounds that the parties never had a meeting of the minds on the contract, holding that the parties formed the agreement reflected in the contract they signed.Plaintiffs, members of the family of a woman killed in a high-speed crash while riding in a car driven by an intoxicated adult entertainer employed by Defendant, sued for wrongful death and survival damages, alleging that Defendant continued serving the driver alcohol after knowing she was clearly intoxicated. Defendant moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a contract containing an arbitration provision that the decedent and Defendant had signed almost two years earlier. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the terms in the contract were not perfectly clear, and therefore, there was no meeting of the minds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract terms were sufficient to constitute an enforceable contract. View "Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Roy Elizondo and dismissing this action brought by Cadence Bank, N.A. for breach of a deposit agreement, breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and common-law torts, holding that the lower courts erred.In response to a stranger's email for legal assistance, Elizondo, an attorney, deposited a cashier's check in his bank account then wired most of the funds to an overseas account. The check was dishonored, and the bank charged the transfer back to Elizondo, as allowed by the UCC and the parties' deposit agreement. When Elizondo refused to pay the overdrawn funds Cadence brought this action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Elizondo, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the wire-transfer form failed to create the contractual duty urged by Elizondo. View "Cadence Bank, N.A. v. Elizondo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court dismissing Honnen Equipment Company's (Honnen) breach of contract claim brought brought against Daz Management, LLC (LLC), holding that all elements of claim preclusion were met, and therefore, the breach of contract claim was barred.Honnen sued Tony Daz (Daz) claiming that Daz negligently operated and damaged a grader that had been rented by the LLC from Honnen and thus breached the rental agreement. The district court ruled for Daz on both Honnen's breach of contract and negligence claim. Thereafter, Honnen brought a second action against the LLC asserting the same claims. After Honnen voluntarily dismissed its negligence claim the district court dismissed the breach of contract claim under the claim preclusion branch of res judicata. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Honnen's breach of contract claim was barred. View "Honnen Equipment Co. v. DAZ Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court in this case, holding that the district court applied an overly narrow legal standard in denying a motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award but did not err in refusing to grant attorney fees.Sutey Oil Company brought a complaint against Monroe's High County Travel Plaza and Marvin Monroe (collectively, Monroe), and the parties stipulated to arbitration. After a hearing, the arbitrator entered judgment for Sutey and awarded $220,750. Monroe moved to either modify or vacate the arbitration award. The district court denied the motion and refused to grant Sutey's request for attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) remand was required for clarification of the amount of the award pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 25-5-217; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Sutey's motion for an award of attorney fees. View "Sutey Oil Co. v. Monroe's High Country Travel Plaza, LLC" on Justia Law

Star, a mine staffing company, bought workers’ compensation insurance from Granite. Early in each policy year, Star gave Granite an estimate of its total payroll, which Granite used to calculate an estimated premium. Star paid the preliminary installment. After each year, Granite audited Star’s records to produce an exact payroll number, then charged additional premiums or made reconciliation payments. A 2018 audit revealed that Star had significantly underestimated its 2017 payroll, as it had for 2016. To avoid a similar situation with the 2018 policy, Granite adjusted its estimated premium for Star halfway through the year. In accordance with industry guidelines, Granite increased Star’s 2018 estimated premium to reflect 2017’s actual payroll numbers, giving Star four weeks to pay the difference. Star never paid. Granite canceled the policy three months early. Star closed its business. To determine Star’s final premium—and whether it owed a reconciliation payment—Granite needed to complete its year-end audit. Star would not comply. Granite’s final bill, including the updated estimated premium, prorated for early cancellation, was $1,485,323, including an “audit noncompliance charge” (double 2018’s total estimated premium).Granite sued for breach of contract. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Granite, rejecting Star’s argument that the noncompliance charge is an unenforceable penalty. Kentucky’s insurance regulator approved the rates that Kentucky insurance companies charge, barring their review. View "Granite State Insurance Co. v. Star Mine Services, Inc." on Justia Law