Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

BACTES Imaging Solutions, LLC ("BACTES") contracted with health care providers to respond to pre-litigation requests from attorneys seeking access to their clients’ medical records. One option available to the attorney, among others, was to hire and pay BACTES to provide photocopies of the records. Spencer S. Busby, APLC ("Busby") was the class representative for a class of 9,691 attorneys who hired BACTES to provide photocopies of their clients’ medical records. Busby sued BACTES, claiming it charged photocopying rates exceeding the rates permitted by the California Evidence Code section 1158. After a bench trial, the trial court found BACTES acted as an agent of the health care providers when it responded to the attorneys’ requests for medical records; however, it found BACTES acted as an agent of the requesting attorneys when it photocopied the medical records and provided them to the attorneys. Because BACTES did not act as an agent of the health care providers when it provided the photocopied records to the attorneys, the court found BACTES did not violate section 1158. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Spencer S. Busby, APLC v. BACTES Imaging Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

BP retained the Responders (O’Brien’s and NRC) for nearly $2 billion to assist with the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Thousands of the Responders' workers filed personal injury lawsuits against BP, which were consolidated and organized into “pleading bundles.” The B3 bundle included “all claims for personal injury and/or medical monitoring for exposure or other injury occurring after the explosion and fire of April 20, 2010.” In 2012, BP entered the “Medical Settlement” on the B3 claims with a defined settlement class. The opt-out deadline closed in October 2012. The Medical Settlement created a new type of claim for latent injuries, BackEnd Litigation Option (BELO) claims. After the settlement, plaintiffs could bring opt-out B3 claims if they did not participate in the settlement, and BELO claims if they were class members who alleged latent injuries and followed the approved process. Responders were aware of the settlement before the district court approved it but neither Responder had control over the negotiations, nor did either approve the settlement.In 2017, BP sought indemnification for 2,000 BELO claims by employees of the Responders. The Fifth Circuit held that BP was an additional insured up to the minimum amount required by its contract with O’Brien’s; the insurance policies maintained by O’Brien’s cannot be combined to satisfy the minimum amount. O’Brien’s is not required to indemnify BP because BP materially breached its indemnification provision with respect to the BELO claims. View "O'Brien's Response Management, L.L.C. v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the doctrine of present execution does not permit an interlocutory appeal from a superior court judge's order denying a motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement.Plaintiff filed this action asserting claims for summary process eviction and breach of contract regarding Defendant's lease of office space. The parties' counsel engaged in settlement negotiations via e-mail. Thereafter, Defendant moved to enforce what it asserted was a binding settlement agreement. After the motion judge denied the motion Defendant filed a petition for interlocutory review asserting that its interlocutory appeal was proper under the doctrine of present execution. A single justice presented questions for appellate review. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Defendant was not entitled to an interlocutory appeal under the doctrine of present execution. View "CP 200 State, LLC v. CIEE, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court ordering Plaintiff to pay the attorney fees and costs of Defendant, the prevailing party in a construction defect suit initiated by Plaintiff, holding that the district court erred in part.Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants alleging negligence, breach of contract, and other claims. The district court held in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiffs' claims. The court then awarded attorney fees and costs to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred by determining that Defendant had a reciprocal right to an award of attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 70-19-428 and Mont. Code Ann. 28-3-704. View "Rafes v. McMillan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Plaintiff, Saint Elizabeth Home, and against Defendant, Rebecca Gorham, holding that there was no error.Defendant's mother was admitted to Saint Elizabeth's Home. Three days later, Defendant, acting as her mother's representative, entered into an admission agreement with Plaintiff, agreeing to be personally liable to Plaintiff for all amounts due from her mother. Plaintiff later brought this action alleging breach of the terms of the agreement. The hearing justice granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice properly granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. View "Saint Elizabeth Home v. Gorham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Pascoag Fire District and Pascoag Fire and Rescue Association (the district) and International Association of Firefighters, Local 4908 (the union) (collectively, Defendants) in this action alleging breach of duty of fair representation and breach of contract, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, a trained firefighter and emergency medical technician who worked for the district, brought this action after he was terminated based on his conduct and performance during a rescue run. Plaintiff began the grievance process between the district and the union, but the union informed Plaintiff that it had decided not to seek arbitration for his grievance. Plaintiff then brought this complaint. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the trial justice's grant of summary judgment. View "Eddy v. Pascoag Fire District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Board of Education of the Jefferson City Public School District to terminate Tammy Ferry's contract with the District, holding that the Board had the authority to terminate the contract.The Board decided to terminate Ferry's contract after she transferred confidential student information from the District's Google for Education account to her personal Google account. The circuit court vacated the Board's decision, finding that Ferry had not "disclosed" confidential student information, as that term is defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERA), 20 U.S.C. 1232g. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the Board's findings that Ferry violated the Board's policies and procedure and did so willfully were supported by competent and substantial evidence; and (2) the Teacher Tenure Act authorized the Board to terminate Ferry's indefinite contract with the District. View "Ferry v. Board of Education of Jefferson City Public School District" on Justia Law

Southern Power and Cleveland County, North Carolina executed an “Incentive Development Agreement” in July 2007, providing that if Southern built and operated a natural gas plant — a decision left to Southern’s sole discretion — the county would make substantial cash payments to Southern. The North Carolina legislature enacted a new law (Subsection H) 37 days later, imposing more stringent requirements on such agreements, including a mandate that they include a recapture provision allowing a municipality to recover cash incentives already paid if the private entity breaches the agreement. In November-December 2008, Southern secured contracts to supply utility companies with electricity produced at the plant. Southern then asked the county to reaffirm its commitment to the Agreement. Cleveland County adopted a resolution at its January 6, 2009, meeting stating that it was committed to the incentive grants. Southern broke ground on the plant in October 2009 and began commercial operations in December 2012. Cleveland County, however, refused to pay Southern any cash incentives, arguing that the Agreement failed to comply with Subsection H.The district court dismissed the case as barred by North Carolina governmental immunity. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Cleveland county never waived its governmental immunity from suit. View "Southern Power Co. v. Cleveland County" on Justia Law

A patient sued a hospital after learning that a hospital employee intentionally disclosed the patient’s health information in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The patient alleged the disclosure breached the hospital’s contractual obligations to him. The superior court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the hospital if the jury found that the employee was not acting in the course and scope of employment when she disclosed the patient’s information. The jury so found, leading to judgment in the hospital’s favor. The Alaska Supreme Court found the jury instruction erroneously applied the rule of vicarious liability to excuse liability for breach of contract. "A party that breaches its contractual obligations is liable for breach regardless of whether the breach is caused by an employee acting outside the scope of employment, unless the terms of the contract excuse liability for that reason." The Court therefore reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings, in particular to determine whether a contract existed between the patient and hospital and, if so, the contract’s terms governing patient health information. View "Guy v. Providence Health & Services Washington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reducing the consequential damages awarded by the jury in this breach of contract action, holding that neither the jury's award of $56.3 million nor the court of appeals' reduced allowance of $12.4 million could stand.After a trial, a jury found Defendant breached a contract with Plaintiff by failing to pay $2.4 million as promised. The jury awarded $2.4 million as direct damages and then added more than twenty times that amount in consequential damages. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that consequential damages were authorized in the amount of $12.4 million. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part and rendered judgment that Plaintiff take nothing on its claim for consequential damages and reducing Plaintiff's recovery of direct damages, holding (1) legally insufficient supported the award of consequential damages; (2) the direct damages award is reversed in part; and (3) the court of appeals properly rejected Defendant's indemnification claim and its rendition of judgment against co-plaintiff Jeffry Ogden. View "Signature Industrial Services, LLC v. International Paper Co." on Justia Law