Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Erick Pena filed a declaratory action against Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin (“Viking”), alleging the automobile insurance policy he purchased was illegal because it provided illusory minimum limits of UIM coverage. Pena then filed a motion for summary judgment asking the court to declare that the UIM coverage was illusory. Viking filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the policy was not illusory because it provided tangible benefits to a group of insured persons and that the offset provision in the policy complied with Idaho public policy. The district court granted Viking’s motion for summary judgment. Pena timely appealed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, finding the policy at issue indeed provided illusory coverage. View "Pena v. Viking Insurance Company" on Justia Law

ATC purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy from Westchester, which provided coverage against liability incurred because of “advertising,” a defined term that included trade dress infringement. BizBox sued ATC for breach of contract and interference with its business expectancies, alleging that ATC manufactured and sold a knock-off trailer using BizBox’s design. ATC sought a declaratory judgment that Westchester owed it a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify. Westchester argued that BizBox’s underlying suit was not covered under the insurance policy because BizBox did not allege, in that litigation, an infringement of its trade dress in ATC’s advertising.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. BizBox’s complaint never alleged a trade dress infringement claim against ATC nor an advertising injury and could not be construed to plausibly allege a trade dress infringement claim against ATC. BizBox alleged no facts that can plausibly be construed to show that it asserted that an advertising injury occurred. Westchester, therefore, has no duty to defend or indemnify ATC under the “personal and advertising injury” provision of the Policy. View "Aluminum Trailer Co. v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on a jury verdict in favor of S&H in an action brought by S&H against Bad Boy, alleging that Bad Boy's termination of its farm equipment dealership agreement was an unlawful breach of contract and a violation of Missouri's outdoor power equipment statute, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 407.898.In regard to the breach of contract claim, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that there was mutual assent as to the size and measurement of the protected territory, and there was sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could have chosen S&H's theory about the cause of the lost profits. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support S&H's outdoor power equipment statute claim. The court rejected claims of evidentiary errors and jury instruction errors, affirming the award of attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs. View "S&H Farm Supply, Inc. v. Bad Boy, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court in this dispute between the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 103 (the Union) and Johnson Controls Security Solutions, LLC over Johnson Controls' compliance with the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA), holding that the district court erred by failing to order arbitration as called for by a clause in the CBA.Johnson Controls' Norwood, Massachusetts facility entered into a CBA with the Union, a labor organization that represented employees of the company, that contained an arbitration clause. The Union filed a grievance concerning Johnson Controls' reduction in its matching contribution to the company's 401(k) plan, which Johnson Controls denied. When the Union filed a demand for arbitration Johnson Controls brought this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the dispute was not arbitrable under the CBA. The district court concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable. The First Circuit reversed, holding that nothing in the record showed that the parties intended to exclude this type of dispute from the scope of the arbitration clause. View "Johnson Controls Security Solutions, LLC v. Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 103" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court ruling that Western Wyoming Beverages, Inc. (WWB) would likely succeed on the merits of its claim that Jorge Malave, its employee, had breached his noncompete agreement that the WWB would suffer irreparable harm of Malave were not enjoined from continuing to work for WWB's competitor, holding that the district court erred.The district court concluded that there was a valid and reasonable noncompete agreement between the parties and that WWB would likely succeed on the merits of its claim that Malave had violated the agreement and would suffer possible irreparable injury if no injunction were entered. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that WWB did not meet its burden of proving probable success on the merits of the reasonableness of its noncompete agreement with Malave. View "Malave v. Western Wyoming Beverages, Inc." on Justia Law

An immigration bond allows the release of a detained individual based on a surety’s contractual undertaking to the United States to either deliver the individual as demanded or forfeit the sum specified in the bond. Nexus runs a bonds program: It screens immigrants and maintains contact with them throughout their release. Nexus lacks the Department of Treasury’s commercial-surety certification and needs another surety to take on the liability to the government. RLI performs that function for a fee. Nexus agreed to indemnify RLI for all losses. The parties’ Commercial Surety General Indemnity Agreement involves nearly 2,500 bonds and contains several clauses designed to keep RLI whole. One obligates Nexus to provide collateral sufficient to cover all of RLI’s exposure,Nexus argued that RLI’s exposure should be measured on each bond individually, that RLI is not actually “exposed” to any risk, and Nexus does not need to deposit collateral until there is reason to believe that RLI will have to pay on a particular bond because an immigrant fails to appear in court.The Fourth Circuit affirmed in favor of RLI. Although it is not known which immigrants will breach, some will. The Agreement must secure against aggregate risk—the likelihood Nexus will be able to (timely) indemnify RLI for all future breached bonds. Nexus’s financial condition, its historical willingness to indemnify RLI, and the historical rate of bonds breached bear on that likelihood and should inform the collateral calculus. View "RLI Insurance Co. v. Nexus Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court denying the motion to compel arbitration brought by Uber Technologies, Inc. and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber) in this action brought by Patricia Sarchi, a user of Uber's ride-sharing service, and the Maine Human Rights Commission, holding that the superior court did not err.Plaintiffs brought this action against Uber for violating the Maine Human Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 4592(8), 4633(2), after Sarchi, who was blind, was refused a ride because of her guide dog. Uber moved to compel Sarchi to arbitrate and to dismiss or stay the action pending arbitration. The motion court denied the motion to compel, concluding that Sarchi did not become bound by the terms and conditions of Uber's user agreement. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, Sarchi was not bound by the terms. View "Sarchi v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, defendant, and cross-complainant Earl Greif sold 10 acres of raw vacant land (Property) in Rancho Mirage to plaintiff-respondent Yardley Protective Limited Partnership, a family real estate investment partnership. A few days after Earl signed the purchase agreement (Purchase Agreement), he concluded he had sold the Property for less than its fair market value and attempted to back out of the sale. The Yardley partnership sued Earl, Earl’s wife, Shirley Greif, and Gabriel Nicholas Limited Liability Company (collectively GNLLC) to enforce the Purchase Agreement. Greif filed a cross-complaint against the Yardley partnership and one of its limited partners, Solail Ahmad (Yardley), later adding as cross-defendants Yardley’s real estate brokers, Desert Gate Real Estate, Inc. dba Four Season Realty (Desert Gate) and Desert Gate broker, Eddie Sanin (collectively Sanin). The trial court dismissed Greif’s third amended cross-complaint (Cross-complaint) on the eve of trial for failing to state any cause of action as a matter of law. After a lengthy court trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Yardley and against Greif and GNLLC. Greif filed three separate appeals. Rejecting Grief and GNLLC's contentions raised in the appeals, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Greif v. Sanin" on Justia Law

The dispute underlying this appeal began with the failure of Camille Village, LLC, the owner of an apartment complex, to deposit additional money in escrow for repairs after it was demanded by Lenders Federal National Mortgage Association and Barings Multifamily Capital, LLC. The Lenders held Camille Village to be in default, lengthy settlement negotiations failed, and the amount demanded for repairs increased dramatically after additional inspections. After a trial, the chancery court concluded that Camille Village was in default and had failed to prove the Lenders had acted in bad faith. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Camille Village, LLC v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, et al." on Justia Law

An explosion at the Omega Protein Plant in Moss Point, Mississippi killed one man and seriously injured several others. Multiple lawsuits were filed against Omega in federal district court. Colony Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action in state circuit court seeking a declaration that it did not cover bodily injuries arising out of the Moss Point facility explosion. Evanston Insurance Company intervened also seeking a declaration of no coverage for the same injuries: Evanston provided a $5 million excess liability policy, which provided coverage after Colony’s $1 million policy was exhausted. Because Colony settled one of the underlying personal injury cases for $1 million (the limits under its policy), Omega sought excess coverage from Evanston for the injuries that occurred at its plant. A special master was appointed, and the trial court granted Evanston’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the pollution exclusion in the insurance contract barred coverage. Omega appealed that grant of summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that a pollution exclusion in the insurance contract was ambiguous, and should have been construed in favor of the insured, allowing coverage. Further, the Court found the question of whether coverage was triggered was governed by the language of the contract, and that Evanston failed to prove there could be no coverage under the excess liability policy. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to all issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Omega Protein, Inc. v. Evanston Insurance Company" on Justia Law